possible control of my army, and their abandonment not justified as a military measure. I call the attention of the committee to the fact that one of these passes was 42 miles south of Chattanooga, and the next nearest 26 miles south of Chattanooga, and the nearest at the extremity of Lookout mountain in front of our lines. This latter may have been the one which gave rise to his report; and if so, it ought to have been so stated. I was satisfied that I could not hold even this pass and Chattanooga at the same time if the enemy did his duty, and therefore withdrew my troops from it, but established batteries on the other side of the river, which rendered it practically of little if any use to them. Subsequent events amply justified the wisdom of this decision, for the enemy, with a division and a half, were unable to hold it against General Hooker, and it was their attempt to cover this point which was one of the causes of their being beaten so easily at Missionary ridge. In General Grant's official report of the battle of Missionary ridge, I think—for I have not the document-there is an implication that when he assumed command there was great danger of my abandoning Chattanooga. Nothing could be more mistaken or unjust to me than such an impression. All my actions and sentiments were utterly at variance with the idea of giving up that point, which I had won, and the possession of which formed an epoch in the war. I mention facts on this subject, viz: as early as the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle, I called the attention of General Thomas and General Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose, I would take possession of Lookout valley, opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain, and fortify it, thus completely covering the road from there to Bridgeport, on the south side as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well as of Lookout valley; because, by means of a fortified tête-de-pont, after our fortifications at Chattanooga were completed, we could easily concentrate our whole force to fight the enemy if he entered Lookout valley, and that within less than two hours' march, while he could not approach us in force with artillery without making a circuit over Lookout mountain, by way of Frick's and Stevens's gaps, 26 miles southeast, which would take two or three days.

An interior line of fortifications was laid out and put in course of construction, designed to cover our depots with a garrison of one or two divisions against all the forces the enemy could bring. I had, moreover, ordered the construction of small steamboats and barges at Bridgeport to run thence to Chattanooga, two of which were well advanced when the army crossed on its advance into Georgia; and, from the 23d of September, my correspondence and my staff officers will testify that I was urging the quartermaster, Captain Edwards, who had the work in hand, to hasten its completion, which it was hoped would be the case by the time we were ready to take and hold Lookout valley. To effect this General Hooker was directed to concentrate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and advised that as soon as his train should arrive, or enough of it to subsist his army ten or twelve miles from his depot, he would be directed to move into Lookout valley to take possession of that; and every effort was made to complete the pontoons, &c., to connect that with our troops at Chattanooga. On the 19th of October I examined the river, and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at Ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chattanooga. I moreover directed General W. F. Smith to reconnoitre the shore above Chattanooga, with a view to that very movement on the enemy's right flank which was afterwards made by General Sherman. On the 19th of October, on my returning from selecting the position of the pontoon bridge, I received orders to turn over the command of the army of the Cumberland to Major General Thomas, repair to Cincinnati, and report from there by letter to the Adjutant General for orders. Convinced that this would

excite profound sorrow and discontent in the army of the Cumberland, which my continued presence, after it became known, would increase, and that this would be detrimental to the public service in the presence, as we were, of the enemy, I determined to forego the gratification of receiving the parting adieus of those with whom I had shared so many toils and successes. I left the next morning shortly after daylight, before the order was known. The committee will probably desire to know what communication took place between me and General Burnside during my movement on Chattanooga. I have before stated that a co-operation between him and myself, arranged with a view to the Tullahoma campaign, was prevented by re-enforcements ordered from Burnside's command to Vicksburg. When his troops were returned, he arranged to move on East Tennessee, communicated to me his plan for a movement into East Tennessee, but it was independent of mine, and though intended to be contemporary, was likely and actually proved to be unavailing to assist my movement for want of unity of object and command. It was from the first obvious that the moment we seriously threatened Chattanooga all the forces in East Tennessee would probably abandon it and join General Bragg to oppose us. General Burnside's as an independent command, as was to have been expected, was little or no use, for the moment we threatened to cross the Tennessee above Chattanooga Buckner began to retire from the north towards Loudon, and when we threatened Bragg's communications south of Chattanooga, he precipitately abandoned the whole of East Tennessee and joined General Bragg.

General Halleck, in his official report for that year, quotes at length orders given on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of September to Burnside, at Knoxville, General Hurlbut, at Memphis, and General Sherman, at Vicksburg, to re-enforce the army of the Cumberland, but fails to state that on the 14th of September I telegraphed the general asking if he had reason to believe Bragg had been reenforced from Virginia, and that on the 15th he telegraphed in reply that no re-enforcements had gone south to Bragg, only a few regiments to Charleston. More, the accompanying correspondence shows that an apprehension existed in Washington even as late as the 11th of September that Bragg was re-enforcing Lee. The committee will no doubt inquire how orders to troops at such distant points at that date could have brought any support to the army of the Cumberland, which began its life and death struggle on the 18th, only six days from the earliest of his orders. I will also state to the committee that Longstreet's movement to support Bragg was known to General Peck as early as the 6th, and that Colonel Jacques, 73d Illinois, endeavored to communicate the fact that Longstreet's corps was going to Bragg, to the authorities at Washington, so long before the battle that he was able to wait ten days in vain in Baltimore for a hearing, and then to reach us and take part in the battle of Chickamauga. As I have narrated the principal events not prominently developed in my official report, (a copy of which, and some official letters, I have made a part of my testimony before the committee, in relation to the campaign of Chickamauga,) I forbear to notice and reply to the various erroneous and diverse rumors and statements which have found more or less publicity; but I think it due to justice and the discipline of the army, as well as to the country, whose servants are thereby implicated, to state that General Woods, whose official report of his part in the battle, comprising near seventy pages foolscap, was duly forwarded to Washington by me, was, after I was relieved from command of the army of the Cumberland, permitted access to my official report and allowed to send a letter to Washington direct, without furnishing me a copy of it; and that his letter was received without notice to me, and quoted by the general-in-chief, as to some extent, a rival authority, and subsequently furnished from the War Department to the press as an accompaniment to my official report of the battle; and that, when I complained of it, no redress or apology was offered therefor, nor was my letter of correction published until the lapse of some two months thereafter.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1863. Burnside has been frequently urged to move forward, and cover your left in entering East Tennessee. I do not know what he is doing. He seems tied fast to Cincinnati. H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.

For Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1863.

The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory. H. W. HALLECK.

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1863.

It has been reported for some days that some portion of Bragg's army has been sent ot Richmond to re-enforce Lee. It is important that the truth of this report be ascertained as early as possible. H. W. HALLECK, Major General.

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1863.

Burnside, when last heard from, was at Mount Vernon, moving towards Knoxville. He is directed to move forward as rapidly as possible, and to keep you posted in regard to his operations. Grant's movements at present have no connexion with you.

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1863.

Burnside is at Montgomery, moving on Kingston; the enemy expected to be concentrated at Loudon.

HALLECK.

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1863.

I have heard nothing from Burnside since his despatch of August 31, the substance of which was sent to you. His instructions were to advise you of his movements, and connect as soon as possible with your left. There is no reason now to suppose that any of Lee's troops have been detached, except, perhaps, a small force at Charleston. H. W. HALLECK, Major General.

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1863.

You give no information of the position of Bragg and Buckner; if they have united, it is important that you and Burnside unite as quickly as possible, so that the enemy may not attack you separately. H. W. HALLECK, Major General.

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1863.

Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland gap that he holds all East Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gap of the North Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving towards Athens to connect with you. After holding the mountain passes on the west and

Dalton, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move further south into Georgia and Alabama It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg's army is re-enforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible.

H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.

By order of Secretary of War to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1863.

Following telegram is sent for your information, by order of Secretary of War, from Memphis, 5 p. m., September 9. A gentleman just in from Mobile reports that all of Johnston's force has gone to join Bragg at and near Chattanooga. I think the report true, from the source I received it, and from the fact that the country south of Corinth is full of regular cavalry making some movement.

66

S. A. HURLBURT, Major General.

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

"WASHINGTON, September 13, 1863.

"There is no intention of sending Burnside into North Carolina. He is ordered to move down and connect with you.

"Should the enemy attempt to turn your right flank through Alabama, Chattanooga should be turned over to Burnside and given away, or such part of it as may not be required there should move to prevent Bragg from re-entering Middle Tennessee. Hurlbut will aid you all he can, but most of Grant's available force is west of the Mississippi. "HALLECK."

Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1863-3 p. m.

Nothing heard from Burnside since the 19th; he was then sending to your aid all his available force. It is hoped that you will hold out till he can re-enforce you. He was directed to connect with you ten days ago, and the order has been reported several days since. I can get no reply from Hurlbut or Sherman.

H. W. HALLECK, Major General.

President Lincoln to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1863.

Below is Bragg's despatch, as found in the Richmond papers. You see he does not claim so many prisoners or captured guns as you were inclined to concede. He also confesses to heavy loss.

An exchanged general of ours, leaving Richmond yesterday, says two of Longstreet's divisions and his entire artillery, and two of Pickett's brigades and Wise's legion have gone to Tennessee. He mentions no other.

A. LINCOLN.

"CHICKAMAUGA RIVER, September 20, via Ringold, 21st.

'Major General COOPER, A. Gen. : "After two days' hard fighting we have driven the enemy, after a desperate resistance from several positions, and now hold the field, but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides, especially on our officers. We have taken over 20 pieces of artillery and some 2,500 prisoners.

Major General ROSECRANS,

Comd'g Dept. of Cumberland:

"BRAXTON BRAGG."

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 24, 1863—3 a. m.

In addition to the expected assistance to you from Burnside, Hurlbut and Sherman, with fourteen or fifteen thousand men from here, will be in Nashville in about seven days. The government deems it very important that Chattanooga be held till re-enforcements arrive.

H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.

Major General ROSECRANS,

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 30, 1863-10 a. m.

Comd'g Army of Cumberland:

The advance of Grant's re-enforcements were on their way from Vicksburg to Memphis on the 22d. Hurlbut was directed to report their movement from day to day, but he is probably unable to do so, having no telegraphic communication. Moreover, it is probable that all mail boats were sent to Vicksburg for troops. I have no communication with Burnside since he left Knoxville. Communicate to him directly what you wish him to do. H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.

Major General ROSECRANS,

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 24, 1863-10 a. m.

Comd'g Dept. of Cumberland. :

The corps of 14 to 15,000 men to be sent you from here has the usual amount of artillery, but no cavalry; if the artillery is not deemed necessary, the railroad transportation will be greatly diminished. Please answer.

H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 12, 1863-10 a. m.

Major General ROSECRANS,

Comd'g Dept. of Cumberland:

Captain Comstock is sick. Sherman is moving east of Corinth; where he now is I do not know; no telegraphic communication with him. Have heard nothing of Burnside since the 7th. If he is not moving down you must look to the passes of the Tennessee river above Chattanooga. Lee's army is again moving northward.

Major General ROSECRANS :

H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 28, 1863-10.5 a. m.

Grant's forces were ordered to move to Memphis, Corinth, Tuscumbia, to Decatur, and thence, as might be necessary, to co-operate with you. Supplies were to be collected at Corinth before they arrived; as the rolling stock is only sufficient to carry baggage and supplies, the troops must march the whole distance. The order was issued on the 18th, and steamboats went to Vicksburg to bring up the troops; they calculated to be able to communicate with you in fourteen days from that time. Since then nothing has been heard of them, there being no telegraph lines. The troops from here will probably reach you first.

Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.

MURFREESBORO, January 14, 1863.

I must have cavalry or mounted infantry. I could mount infantry had I horses and saddles. The saddles I had ordered have been delivered so very slowly, that now, after four months, I have only a few hundred more than have been required for the use of the cavalry. With mounted infantry I can drive the rebel cavalry to the wall, and keep the roads open in my rear. Not so now. I must also have some bullet-proof light-draught transports for the Cumberland. Will you authorize the purchase of saddles and horses for mounting, when requisite, 5,000 more infantry?

Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.

MURFREESBORO, February 1, 1863.

I have direct information that Joe Johnston arrived at Tullahoma on the 27th ultimo. Van Dorn, who was sent in command of the rebel cavalry in Mississippi, has been ordered over here to subsist on the country and interrupt our communication. To meet this emergency we must bring down all the cavalry available, and add to it the mounting of a brigade of infantry for backing and expeditionary purposes If you will back me up, I am determined to command the country, instead of giving it up to the enemy. I shall ask you things as they are needed. General Wright thinks the 2d Ohio cavalry at Columbus,