it would be turning more good money after bad. Let's get the proper technology. We agree with that. We say, though, let's shorten the period of time. The technology is out there.

For example, I will leave for you to look at a late date-a couple of weeks ago, it was in the paper that Dr. James Swire, when he came to visit our organization, he brought along a fake bomb on British Airways that went undetected. Dr. Swire met with us in Boston, Massachusetts. We have that bomb. We planned on bringing it today, but we didn't want to sensationalize this hearing, we wanted to get to the facts.

But what we do have is X-rays that were taken by the backscanner machine up in Massachusetts that clearly shows when you look at this that this machine would have picked up the Semtex and would have picked up this if it had gone through this X-ray machine.

We then believe, and we are not experts and we don't pretend to be, that there is technology available. The question is, is the Administration willing to move on this?

And I will leave this for you to look at and see. Also, the clippings went along with this. If you in the future would like to see what was used exactly, we have it. We can make that available to you also.

Third, the FAA has stated that it receives between 20 and 30 credible threats a year, high alert warnings. We ask them that these credible threats be made public in order to allow the passenger the choice as to whether or not to fly.

We emphasize we do not ask that the media be told but rather those passengers scheduled to board the flights in question. In looking at the proposed legislation, it gives criteria. One concern that we have after 19 months, it says under one of the criteria "specific flight". And our concern could be that an administrator might determine that if it doesn't meet all three criteria, we're not going to make it public. We feel if there was something added in there-and we can help in that area, if you so desire-that the high alert warnings that the FAA determines, that would be the credible threats that should be made known to the passengers.

As an aside, we realize that Administrations change. Secretary of Transportation Skinner is a viable force for the Administration. He's very intelligent. He does an excellent job in defending the Administration and their viewpoint. Who knows; six months from now, a year from now, he could be the Attorney General and all of a sudden we're dealing with another Secretary of Transportation. That's why we need legislation so as the faces change the law is there and we have accountability to work from law and not work from personality.

The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 are heartened and gratified that Government has indeed learned from this preventable tragedy. Yet terrorism and how it relates to airline safety is an everchanging process that requires the constant vigilance of our nation's leaders and legislators.

This bill, as important as it is, should not be perceived as the final solution, but rather as a beginning to an affirmation of cur nation's will to fight terrorism and preserve the inalienable rights of citizens above all else.

As for our part, those of us who have lost our loved ones, we have taken as our own: "Life's unfairness is not irrevocable: We can help balance the scales for others, if not always for ourselves." We appreciate what the Presidential Commission has done. We realize that the legislators from that Commission have put together this legislation. We realize that this is a step forward, it is not an end. We endorse your efforts. We are here to support and we'll help in any way we can.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Ammerman. We appreciate very much your very well thought out presentation and your recommendations.

Mr. Hudson, welcome. We look forward to your statement.

STATEMENT OF PAUL S. HUDSON, CHAIR, FAMILIES OF PAN AM 103/LOCKERBIE; ACCOMPANIED BY ROSEMARY WOLFE AND MICHAEL LEMOV, ESQ.

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am accompanied here today by Rosemary Wolfe, step-mother of Miriam, and Mr. Michael Lemov, our Washington counsel who is a former counsel to several Congressional committees and a Presidential commission.

I would like to begin by commending Chairman Oberstar and Chairman Fascell for swiftly holding this hearing on this most important legislation to finally begin the work of tightening aviation security so we can prevent another bombing like Pan Am 103.

My name is Paul Hudson. I am Chairman of the Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie and the father of Melina, age 16, who was lost on December 21, 1988, along with 242 others, 16 Pan Am crew members and 11 citizens of Lockerbie, Scotland.

The Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie is an organization of 170 families of persons killed on Flight 103 and four families of those lost on a French UTA airliner in September 1989. Our organization's purpose is to ensure that the pain and loss that has befallen all of us will not again blight the lives of our fellow Americans.

This is the standard by which we have evaluated H.R. 5200, the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. Our conclusion, unfortunately, is that this legislation will not achieve the purpose of avoiding to the maximum extent possible future terrorist bombings; that it is inadequate; in that it fails to carry out the conclusions of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Ter

rorism.

And I add as an aside, Mr. Chairman, we were shocked this morning to hear the testimony of the Administration that they will not support even this weak legislation and have called for an indefinite-I believe the word is "stay" on any Congressional action. This after 19 months since the bombing of Pan Am 103.

In evaluating H.R. 5200, we have asked ourselves these questions:

Has international aviation and the American public been secured to the maximum extent possible against terrorist attacks?

Are we doing the best we can as a nation to ensure that there will be no future Pan Am 103s?

Are passengers being informed of credible security threats that risk their lives?

Have bomb detectors been installed as promised by Secretary Skinner 15 months ago in at least 40 high risk airports?

Have the perpetrators of the bombing of Pan Am 103 been brought to justice?

Has the United States taken any action against suspected terrorist organizations or nations that harbor them?

And finally, has legislation that would close the glaring security gaps revealed through the destruction of Pan Am 103 been passed, or introduced, in the United States Congress?

Our answer, in all candor, to each of these questions is no, no, and again no.

H.R. 5200 is, we believe, weak, flawed and inadequate. We call on this committee to strengthen it or else to defeat it. This bill would cancel the deployment of the U.S. Government's main initiative to detect aviation bombing, the bomb detectors known as TNAs. And even more damning, would not require deployment of any alternative devices nor require any heightened security procedures in their place. This provision alone, we believe, is an inexplicable backwards step for aviation security, and is enough to require defeat of the bill in it's current form.

The bill would also continue, and set in statutory concrete, a blanket exception for foreign airlines flying to the U.S. from complying with U.S. security requirements. Over 50 percent of the 23 million Americans taking transatlantic flights each year use foreign airlines. Last month, we saw yet another example of how an other Lockerbie tragedy could occur tomorrow.

Jim Swire, father of a Pan Am 103/Lockerbie victim and an explosives expert, carried a replica of the Lockerbie bomb aboard a British Air flight, from London to New York, without detection.

Last December, I travelled on KLM and Alitalia Airlines to and from Europe with a locked suitcase containing numerous electronic devices, the same type known to be used by terrorists in aviation bombs. And over 300 candles that could well have been sticks of dynamite. We were never questioned and our locked suitcases were never opened.

When we were leaving Lockerbie in December 1989, after attending the anniversary memorial services, a resident of Lockerbie from an area called Sherwood Crescent gave my wife a package, a present. He said to open it when we got home. We then flew on Alitalia Airlines from London to Rome, and later from Rome to Chicago.

I'd like to show the committee what was in that package. This is metal from the fuselage, nearly one-half inch thick, wiring harnesses, some other fragments. This was wrapped up in a package with some other things. We were never stopped, we were never questioned, our bags were never searched. I am told this makes a very high profile on even the standard type of X-ray machines.

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