recommended that there ought to be training for this type of response and that there ought to be a response team set up and there ought to be a periodic refresher for personnel to undertake this kind of tragedy. Of course, the farther one gets away from the incident itself, the less intensity there is about the situation.

Secondly, the issue of the passenger manifest. We found, again, that while there was a willingness to participate at a working level, at a policy level within Pan Am, one order had been given to share the manifest with State and with the consular offices and then that order was countermanded and State couldn't get the information on the passengers, couldn't provide information to families who were inquiring. They felt frustrated, they were angry at their Government, they were angry at Pan Am and there was justification for all that. Despite all the efforts, this was a terrible muddle. A painful muddle.

Now, have there been negotiations between ATA and State over this manifest issue? I'd like to know what is the status of the negotiation? Why don't we have an agreement now? Why isn't this matter settled? What is happening with the establishment of a program or a guidepost for handling tragedies of this nature?

Mr. SELIN. Let me take these in the order that you brought them up, Mr. Chairman. As for as dealing with the families, we have some very decent people in the Foreign Service, but if we don't give them the right tools, they're not going to react very well in a crisis. It's unreasonable to ask them to know what to do if they haven't been trained. It's unreasonable to ask them to react in that compassionate fashion when they're under extraordinary pressure, not properly supported, not properly trained and way overworked-not getting the kind of understanding from Washington that they should get.

Everything that you found I agree with.

We've done quite a bit since then. We've had a lot of help from the families. It's too bad that they had to go through such a terrible, traumatic experience and then have a second one inflicted on them afterward, but they have been extremely helpful with us.

We couldn't just circulate a specific handbook done by a particular consular officer because it's too specialized for one particular experience. We have taken that handbook, and used the experience that we've learned from that officer and from a number of other people, and we have prepared an entire set of handbooks-they're really not handbooks, they are manuals that say what you do in a specific situation. They were distributed by airgram in January to the field and they are updated regularly.

It's not only a guestion of what goes out to the consular officer in the field, Mr. Chairman, it's also what happens on the seventh floor in the State Department, in the crisis management room at all levels because many people are required to contribute.

In short, I think we've done a pretty good job of learning from this very graphic experience and we have put out the procedures to go with that. We've done a lot more. We put the resources out that are called for. We put out the telephone lines, the 800 numbers, et cetera, so the families can reach the Department, whether it's overseas or in the States. We've taken the concept of a SWAT team that's in the report. We've identified people. We're training the

people. We have a general crisis management capability and instead of treating terrorist incidents as isolated events, we put them into the broader context of how we handle crises, because there are many people who get involved and some, don't know what it is to begin with. They know something has happened out of the ordinary. What do we do? So this handbook has been part of our broader crisis management planning handbook. It has been exercised in what the military would call command post exercises. I think we have got some pretty good procedures and training and exercises from the seventh floor of the State Department out to the field.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Selin, I'm going to interrupt you at that point. I know you have not responded to the second part of my question

Mr. SELIN. I haven't even finished the first part, I'm sorry to tell you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTar. You can submit that for the record. We do have a long list of witnesses today. We have a recorded vote on the House Floor of Congress right now.

Mr. SELIN. Could you give me 30 seconds on the manifest and then I'll let you off?

There are two problems with the manifest. One is getting access to it, and the second is making sure it has the information that we need. We are sure that we have access to the manifest. Our negotiations are really more designed to figure out how to get the right information into the manifest. That's technical; that's hard. We're making good progress. We may need a regulation, we may not. Thank you, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I know that there are problems on both sides. I don't think it should have taken a year and a half to get this matter resolved.

Mr. SELIN. We will be available to answer your further questions. Mr. OBERSTAR. That needs to be settled and I would like that responded to. I just want to remind Admiral Busey that I sent you a letter about the Denver Airport security situation. I think that is a travesty. At this airport, security is being ignored in the construction of the arrivals structure.

We have already a superb example in both the British Airways terminal at Heathrow and at Philadelphia. Philadelphia is in it's final stages of construction, being built to the standards of security that are recognized. Denver is not. That project should not go forward until that security problem is resolved.

Mr. BUSEY. We're involved in that, Mr. Chairman. It's not a closed issue yet. I have your letter, I am aware of your concerns. I'm equally concerned. This is an opportunity we have to put some design and development for security into an international terminal, so it's not a closed issue. We met as recently as yesterday with the city authorities and it's an ongoing process, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Before the ready-mix is poured.

Mr. BUSEY. Yes.

Mr. OBERSTAR. We will reconvene at 1:15 and continue with our hearing.

[Whereupon, the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1:15 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. OBERSTAR [presiding]. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation will come to order and resume the hearing, with apologies to our witnesses for the delays necessitated by activity on the House Floor this afternoon.

I would like to resume the hearing and move it along so we can take all the testimony or as much as possible before the next anticipated recorded vote on the House floor.

Our next panel consists of representatives of the families whose family members were victims of the tragedy that occurred over Lockerbie, Scotland. I want to thank the groups represented by Mr. Hudson and Mr. Ammerman for their persistence, for their devotion to the memory of their loved ones, for their insistence that what was wrong be set right, that the gaps in security be closed. For they recognize that all that we may accomplish in the legislative field and all that may be done on the administrative side in the Executive Branch cannot bring back the lines of those who have been lost. But it is to their everlasting credit, to these two gentlemen, to those whom they represent, that they care that others shall not have to experience the pain, the loss, the personal anguish that they and their colleagues have experienced.

In that unselfish quest, we on the Commission wanted to walk the last mile and we on the committees with jurisdiction in the House want to take every necessary precautionary step to set into law the guidance and the direction that is necessary to ensure adequate security in the future.

We will begin with Mr. Ammerman.

STATEMENT OF BERT AMMERMAN, PRESIDENT, VICTIMS OF PAN AM FLIGHT 103

Mr. AMMERMAN. Thank you, Chairman Oberstar. We appreciate the opportunity to testify in front of your committee today on the bill in front of the House. We also want to thank Representative Broomfield's comments this morning, which really targeted our frustration over the last year and a half of getting the Government to act. And we support those comments and appreciate them.

The chill morning of December 21, 1988 was filled with the promise of upcoming holidays and a joyful reunion with our loved ones who were flying home on Pan Am flight 103 that evening. All too soon, the anticipation turned to horror as each of us heard the news that flight 103 had gone down over Lockerbie, Scotland as a result of a terrorist bomb.

In the 19 months since that day, you and many of your colleagues have come to know many of us personally and the majority of us under the name the Victims of Pan Am Flight 103. As President of the Victims of Pan Am Flight 103, the single largest and most representative group of victims' families, we are proud to sit before you in that capacity today and acknowledge the efforts of our members. We have learned to work the system such as exists in Washington.

Slowly but surely, we have chipped away the tough exterior of the Government in order to get to the heart of a problem that goes

much deeper than the destruction of one 747, the taking of 270 innocent lives, and the fracturing of hundreds of families from 21 countries.

The problem is terrorism. And its rage is growing. Terrorism is a cowardly form of war.

Countries such as Iran, Syria and Libya are using terrorism as a scapegoat in order to carry out their heinous crimes against society. These nations do not suffer the consequences that would be brought upon them had they declared war in the traditional sense. The work of our organization has only just begun. With the report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, of which you were one of the members, and this resultant bill entitled the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, our goal to effect positive changes in airport and airline security is coming to realization.

The President's commission and this legislative bill have acknowledged and validated our efforts as an organization to move the public will towards a tougher stance against terrorism. But moreover and more importantly there must be a Congressional and Executive will working in concert to keep the terrorist threat in the forefront of this nation's agenda.

We the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 expect to be the nation's watchdog now and we will monitor into the future the guarantee that this takes place.

This new legislation is instrumental in initiating change. Time after time, our membership has sat aghast as we heard FAA officials testify that the Helsinki warning was the only warning until it was uncovered there were at least nine other security bulletins or warnings relevant to the Pan Am 103 tragedy.

We listened in horror as Pan Am's director of security, Mr. Cunningham, testified that he did not know or want to talk about or answer questions dealing with security in certain areas, most notably Pan Am's Frankfurt station.

We were infuriated when we heard State Department officials posture themselves in the beginning of this 19-month odyssey in a role of efficient confidence when we clearly knew that their performance was deplorable. This is why we are here today. Government, through legislation, must take responsibility for the well being of its citizens.

We are aware that officials of the Government will come before you and ask that legislation not be enacted, that they are doing the job and that they are taking care of the problem. They told us that 19 months ago and they have proven that is not the proper way to go. We need legislation to monitor and give accountability in this cesspool of unaccountability and administration.

However, with the terrorist threat constantly changing, does mere compliance with even these new regulations proposed in this bill absolve the Government from the responsibility of providing safe air travel?

American aircraft are owned by private industry but they carry the American flag. Pan Am certainly bears the burden of being a carrier of the flag. American routes are awarded by international treaty and are regulated by intergovernmental agreements.

American airlines are naturally targets because they are defenseless. Yet, an airline expert, Fred Ford, at a recent Congressional hearing in front of Cardiss Collins, asked why our aircraft require any less protection that Kuwaiti oil tankers crossing the Straits of Hormuz? "Is oil more precious than American human life?" he asked.

American families and their loved ones are entitled to at least the same concern and level of safety as oil from Kuwait. The cost of protection of our airlines is probably no greater than the cost of one month of patrols in the waters between Iran and Iraq.

American Government must have a conscience. It's first duty is to its citizens. It must adhere to the precept that nothing is politically right which is morally wrong.

The report by the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism is the most comprehensive, insightful information available today on the incidents surrounding the hows and whys of the bombing. The legislation intended to implement the recommendations of this Commission has begun the long overdue process of improving air travel for Americans.

The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 extends its endorsement to the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 with the following qualifications:

First, we have reservations about the Congressional findings with respect to the Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 as amendments the Warsaw Treaty. The Protocols are designed to protect the airlines by eliminating the willful misconduct exception and all other means of avoiding or defeating the limit. With the elimination of the negligence system, there would be no motivation for the airlines to prevent accidents and liability payments. Under the Protocol system, the entire burden of paying for the protection would fall on the passenger.

Additionally, to prevent airline passengers or their survivors from using the legal system to find fault or learn the facts is contrary to the American judicial process. Without the Warsaw Treaty, American airlines would be kept in check simply by the ever-present threat of financial losses from lawsuits like those against Pan Am today.

We would like to see airline security improved, not no-fault in

surance.

Second, it is our contention that 60 months or five years is too long to wait for new equipment and procedures needed to meet the technological challenges presented by terrorism. We would recommend that 36 months be considered as sufficient time.

It has been clearly demonstrated in testimony before the Commission, of which you were a member, Chairman Oberstar, that even nine months after Lockerbie the security of Pan Am Frankfurt was still woefully negligent.

The specter of another terrorist bombing looms large on the horizon. New equipment and procedures must be devised and implemented with the utmost expediency and urgency.

We defer to your Commission regarding the TNA machines. We were in the forefront of pushing for them a year ago. The President appointed your Commission; you did an outstanding job and after your extensive investigation, you would say and we have been told