Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. I appreciate your presentation and abbreviating it. Your full statement, will of course by unanimous consent appear in the record.

I would like first to address the matter of the Commission's recommendation for an Assistant Secretary for Security. I raised the question with Chairwoman McLaughlin. The Commission spent a great deal of time deliberating this issue and recommended that this office be established at the highest level within the Department for a variety of reasons, principally to have higher visibility for security within the Department of Transportation; secondly, to have the function of security at an administrative level that would be comparable with similar positions in the Department of State and the other intelligence agencies of the Federal Government, so that on a policy basis, matters of security can be addressed with dispatch without-how shall I say it-for want of a better term, without the bureaucratic tap dancing that goes on about who should speak to whom at what level, and to assure that there will be accountability.

Now, you've testified that the Secretary has and I commend him for moving quickly on a matter of this kind to establish an Office of Security and Intelligence and I would like to know what is the status of Administration thinking both at the White House, the Office of Management and Budget and within the Department on this issue. What are you thinking for and what are you thinking against this issue, what are the merits of it?

I realize a decision hasn't been taken, but I want to know what is the status of that thought process at this point.

Mr. SHANE. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I might answer that question on behalf of the Department of Transportation.

Certainly all of the objectives in the report, the ones that you cite: the need for higher visibility for the intelligence and security functions; the importance of having someone at an influential level and have that person be accountable, all of those objectives were very much in Secretary Skinner's mind in appointing Admiral Robbins the new Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security of the Department of Transportation and there should be no doubt but that appointment and the creation of that office are specific, direct responses to that recommendation of the Commission.

There is no disputing the need for an office providing those functions in the Office of the Secretary with somebody reporting immediately to the Secretary of Transportation.

So on the substantive content of the recommendation, I think there's absolutely no disagreement at all between the Commission, between the drafters of this legislation and the Administration. On the specific question of whether that person should be an Assistant Secretary of Transportation, it is fair to say that there is not yet a final Administration view.

The Administration has in fact resisted that notion, I think, from the beginning, primarily based largely on administrative considerations having to do with the way the Department of Transportation is organized. The Department of Transportation Act does not list specific functions for Assistant Secretaries with one exception, and that is the Assistant Secretary for Administration, which is a

career position. All others are Department-wide, generic Assistant Secretary functions, general counsel, budget, legislation.

I am the Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs cutting across all modal lines and cutting across all policy issues. So creating an Assistant Secretary for the specific functions of intelligence and security would in fact be an anomaly within the structure of the Department of Transportation.

We are a relatively small family at the senior levels of the Department of Transportation. There is no difference between the influence of an Assistant Secretary and the influence of a Director of an Office of Intelligence and Security in terms of the way in which the Department will perform the intelligence and security functions.

If I can speak personally, Mr. Chairman, I am an Assistant Secretary now, I have been a Deputy Assistant Secretary in two departments, I have been a Special Assistant to an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Transportation. I was always impressed with the amount of access I had to the Secretary and the amount I could accomplish as a Special Assistant to an Assistant Secretary. Now that I'm an Assistant Secretary, I guess I'm equally impressed with the number of things I can't seem to accomplish despite the fact that I'm an Assistant Secretary. So I have treated the issue personally as a bit of a red herring. The title ought not to be the issue. The issue is the access of the person, the influence of the person, the visibility and the accountability of the person, and I think that's what we have already accomplished with the appointment of Admiral Robbins to the job of Director of Intelligence and Security.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think the question, and you've touched on it there, is access and who reports to whom. In the Commission's deliberations, I know that several of the Commissioners questioned the air carrier executives about various activities and vice presidents who are sort of their Assistant Secretaries and it was interesting that the one who has the highest status and the one who had the most direct access to the President of the carrier was the one for marketing. And the role of security kind of went through other people before it got to the President.

Now, of course they all were insistent that if there were an important security matter, they would take direction, take notice of it and respond to it, but the Government operates in a little different fashion, although you can't make parallels, there are some comparisons to that same role.

My question really is who has access and is an Office of Security and Intelligence something of such permanence as an Assistant Secretary position so as to assure that this role will always have the status that it requires, that it can't be abolished by a subsequent Secretary of Transportation and is the person in that position going to have the stature to be able to march into the Secretary's office and say, "Here is something that needs to be done." No question if he called Admiral Busey or his successor and there would be immediate communication.

Would there be the same responsiveness from, say, the Ambassador at State Department who handles counterterrorism and whatever the other policy level positions in the Department. What

about the CIA counterparts who have aviation and security? Are they going to be willing to talk to this person?

Those are questions that perhaps we shouldn't air entirely in this forum. But which need to be addressed and which I would recommend that you and the Department think through carefully so that by the time we reconvene after Labor Day and move to markup on this legislation we can have those matters resolved and to move ahead, because we intend to mark up this bill.

Mr. SHANE. Mr. Chairman, if I may, those are precisely the right questions to ask and indeed those were very much the questions that we did ask.

We were very much aware of the Commission's view that the Department of Transportation was not exercising sufficient influence and receiving sufficient attention from the intelligence community, speaking about the Government-wide intelligence community with which we have to deal. And therefore, the question before the Secretary was would the creation of the Office of Intelligence and Security as we have done it provide that better access, that better influence and that better receipt of information that we were seeking?

It's our view that we will accomplish those objectives through the creation of this office. Time will tell. There isn't any question. But there isn't any question either that Admiral Robbins will be perceived within the Government as somebody that is sitting at the Secretary's right hand. He will be the Secretary's principal advisor on all matters concerning intelligence and security, covering all modes of transportation. He will operate, for all intents and purposes, in the way that the Commission envisioned an Assistant Secretary operating. There is no colorable difference.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have every confidence that as long as Mr. Skinner is the Secretary of Transportation, that situation is going to obtain. When he leaves, and surely he will in time, I don't relish that thought, he's a great Secretary. But someone else may have a different attitude and may have a different relationship.

Let me ask: has the Department developed MOU's with other intelligence agencies such as CIA or DIA or State Department and this Office of Intelligence and Security?

Mr. SHANE. As of this time, no. Those relationships are being worked out very quickly.

Mr. OBERSTAR. One other question-I have several, but I want to yield to Mr. Clinger. Admiral Busey, one of the four most important structural change recommendations of the Commission was to establish a position of Federal Security Manager for airports. Your response to the recommendation and what would you foresee for that position and that role?

Mr. BUSEY. Yes, sir. I can best characterize my response to that recommendation as enthusiastically positive. I think it's a good idea. I have an inhouse indepth management study underway right now. I have tasked the publicly-constituted Aviation Security Advisory Committee to counsel me by providing their recommendations in that regard. I might say that in 31 airports here in the United States, we have more than 200 security specialists. It would be a very simple matter for me to take the steps necessary to empower the senior security specialist at each of those 31 airports with the

additional responsibility and accountability to fulfill this requirement.

Overseas, I have today 11 security specialists at airports throughout Europe. I've been to Europe recently. We're already beginning to see the very positive results from the presence of those specialists living at airports such as Frankfurt, the London airports, Rome, Paris, and others. We're beginning to see the positive results from that constant presence, by having a security specialist living at those airports, working with U.S. carriers, interfacing with airport management and foreign governments.

Again, I view it as a relatively simple matter to provide the additional empowerment that the senior specialists at those foreign airports would require to meet the full spirit of the recommendation of the Commission.

So I am supporting that and I expect to be taking the necessary moves. I have all the authority that I need to take the step to empower those persons within the next several weeks.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Congratulations. I am very pleased and very appreciative of the dispatch with which you have moved on these matters. You have made a real difference. Mr. Clinger.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to echo those comments. I think the fact that you are addressing a lot of the recommendations very vigorously in an expeditious manner certainly deserves a lot of commendation.

Reverting for a moment to this question of how best to ensure an ongoing commitment, whether in the Assistant Secretarial mode or through the Office of Intelligence and Security which has already been established within the Department, I'm just wondering what that would be administratively? In other words, in terms of the differences here? For example, under the present Office of Intelligence Security, will that office have its own intelligence gathering capability or will it rely on the existing intelligence community for its information?

Mr. BUSEY. Well, in the work that we have done thus far, and as Mr. Shane mentioned, we don't have all the details ironed out yet; Admiral Robbins has been aboard a relatively short period of time. He is certainly demonstrating the strong hand that the Secretary knew that he was capable of when he made that wise selection to put him in that office.

We envision that he will have his own intelligence function. He will have the tasking to provide a strategic, long-range broad view. He will be in contact on a day-to-day basis with ongoing operational intelligence as it comes up, and will provide the Secretary and the other modes with the policy guidance necessary for them to do their job.

So I think we envision that he will have an independent capability and I understand that in accordance with the Commission's recommendation that the CIA has also agreed to provide the support recommended.

Mr. CLINGER. You indicate that he would have direct access to the Secretary to counsel him on these issues, not through you or any other layer.

Mr. Busey. Absolutely, sir. Absolutely. He will reside in the Secretary's office building, not in the FAA. He will in no way be subordinated or have to work through my operation.

Mr. CLINGER. On the other hand, there is real need for the two to work very cooperatively, it seems to me, because so much of the intelligence he is gathering and the things he is perceiving are going to be information you will need in conducting the affairs of the FAA, is that not right?

Mr. BUSEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLINGER. You see that as not a problem?

Mr. BUSEY. No, sir, I do not see that as a problem at all.

Mr. CLINGER. Let me turn to one other item here, that is I think maybe you were here when I alluded to the fact that there's been some complaints from our international carriers, of the inequity in terms of what they are expected and required to do by the FAA in getting passengers to get on their airlines that are traveling internationally as compared to what the foreign carriers are required to do.

There is a proposal in the legislation that there be statutory requirements for foreign air carriers to conduct the same security procedures as U.S. carriers. How does this affect our existing bilateral agreements with various nations? And, number two, does this run counter in any way or would there be problems in requiring that sort of commitment by virtue of ICAO or any of those issues? Mr. SHANE. Congressman Clinger, we would almost immediately receive complaints from our foreign partners about the extraterritorial applications of U.S. law. That's a given. They complain about it when it's justified; they complain about it when it's not justified. I can promise you that we would have those diplomatic nodes coming over the threshold the day after we began to impose those kinds of requirements.

The bilateral agreements that we have with foreign governments now, most of them at least do treat international aviation security but they don't specify specific requirements. Those are always perceived as being operational kinds of matters. They change from time to time as needs change.

What they do is require that both parties to a bilateral agreement comply with outstanding ACAO regulations and they go further now as a result of an initiative taken since the TWA 847 hijacking in 1985 to say that if one side or the other is not convinced that aviation security is all that it should be, then it is available to that party to terminate services under the agreement without being guilty of a violation.

The initiative that we undertook to establish those provisions was a major initiative, perhaps the single biggest initiative we've ever undertaken in these international aviation negotiations. It has been a dramatic success in the number of provisions that have now been incorporated in our bilateral agreements. They underscore the importance of adhering to international standards governing international aviation security. They also underscore the importance to individual countries of being able to assure their traveling public, their passengers, the highest possible levels of aviation security. That's what the provisions allow us to do. And therefore I don't believe it's fair to say that there would be any adverse impact