that I have any hesitation. I cannot today and sit before you and suggest that I am at all apprehensive of the President's commitment to the findings in the report and implementation. Just the re

verse.

What remains to be seen now is how they want to manage those changes and work with the various committees on the Hill. But I think the intention and the support, as the members from the Administration I'm sure will now testify to, has been rather intense. Mr. CLINGER. Well, that's been my view, that they want to work with us in drafting an effective response to what is a very serious problem.

Ms. MCLAUGHLIN. Very much so.

Mr. CLINGER. I have just one area that I wanted to ask_you_to comment on. I had a briefing some months ago at Charles DeGaulle by people involved in the security of that particular airport and there were two issues raised and I wonder if you could comment on them. They are concerned that they're not getting the kind of cooperation in many instances from foreign airport authorities that they should perhaps have. And they cited the notorious example of something called LeShack at DeGaulle.

Ms. MCLAUGHLIN. We saw it.

Mr. CLINGER. And you're familiar with the problems of that, it's not a very secure installation. But secondly, that many of the airlines, for example, do not require the same sort of screening process required of U.S. airlines, suggesting that perhaps there is a competitive advantage therefore and you can run through a lot faster if you're going on British Air or Air France than if you're going on Pan Am or TWA and that they are just not doing the kind of thorough screening that perhaps we should insist upon as a matter of international practice.

Can you comment on whether that in fact is true? That we do have some disparities?

Ms. MCLAUGHLIN. Call them "disparities" or "diversity." There are rights of sovereignty and different countries have different laws, and different laws affect new laws or new regulations for these kinds of things such as airport security or aviation security.

We looked specifically at the competitive advantage question and we were unable to get from anyone any numbers to back up that assertion. There are a lot of reasons people take different air carriers, whether it's walking up to the counter and getting on right away, nobody has been able to say because you have less security, I'm going to fly you.

We think that in this day and age that a reputation for good procedures, good security, good way of managing the airline is a plus because the American public-indeed, all traveling people-are interested in that.

I think, though, that what it illustrates is that while diversity may even be of itself a security measure, each airport is different and wasn't structured according to the security needs today. It was built before we needed some of this. That's why they came up with a scheme like LeShack. They realize that's now ridiculous and it's my understanding that's been solved.

But it does illustrate the need, I think, again, for that State Department Level person of ambassadorial rank to help negotiate

some of these things that look somewhat incompatible; continuing work with ICAO, of course, which is by its own nature the lowest common denominator, the Federal Security Manager who can work with our airlines and be able to understand the overall individual airport security operation, not just the airlines. A lot of those things can be smoothed out, I think.

But in direct answer to your question about the competitive advantage and whether they're letting down, I don't think any country wants to see risk for their people flying or for our people flying on their airline. It's just a different attitude on how to run the operation.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an opening statement I would ask to have submitted for the record. Chairman FASCELL. Without objection, we'll include the statement in the record at the appropriate point. Mrs. McLaughlin, thank you very much.

We've got a vote on. We'll take a short recess here and then we'll proceed with our next witness.

[Brief recess.]

Chairman FASCELL. We'll interrupt here to consider other legislation and then we'll come back to the consideration of the pending legislation.

[Whereupon, the committee proceeded to other business.]

Chairman FASCELL. Now, we'll revert back to the regular order of business on the further consideration of H.R. 5200. Our witnesses at this point: James B. Busey, III, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, accompanied by Mr. Jeffrey N. Shane, Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Department of Transportation; Mr. Ivan Selin, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department of State.

Gentlemen, welcome. We appreciate your courtesy in waiting for us. I think we got some time to allow you to testify between now and the next vote. I sincerely hope so, because we're very anxious to hear all of you.

Do you have prepared statements?

Mr. BUSEY. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FASCELL. Well, without objection, we can put the statements in the record. But if you want to proceed directly off your statement, you may do that also.

So, without objection, we'll put the statement in the record and you may proceed extemporaneously or highlight it or however.

Mr. BUSEY. Thank you, sir. I'll proceed and highlight through my prepared statement and I'm sure Mr. Selin would like to do the

same.

Chairman FASCELL. Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES B. BUSEY, FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATOR

Mr. BUSEY. I welcome the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to appear before the committee today to discuss the status of our efforts in the Administration to respond to the recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.

At the outset, I would like to reaffirm our appreciation of the work done by the Presidential Commission. The Commission took a hard look at virtually all facets of aviation security and developed a thoughtful and well-reasoned report for the President containing its findings and recommendations.

The Commission's report represents a serious effort on its part to improve aviation security and, for our part, we are treating the report with the seriousness it deserves and we're doing our very best to rapidly evaluate fully all of the recommendations.

We have spent the last two months analyzing the report, meeting with other agencies involved in security and intelligence matters and considering the feasibility of implementing each and every one of the Commission's recommendations. We are currently working with White House and other departmental officials to offer our views on the recommendations contained in the report to the President.

I am also pleased to report that at this early stage of our analysis, we have already agreed to take actions consistent with approximately two-thirds of the Commission's 64 recommendations contained in their report. In fact, we have already taken a variety of measures within the Department and within the FAA to improve security consistent with the Commission's recommendations.

To my knowledge, this swift and supportive response by the Executive Branch to a report by a Presidential commission is unprecedented.

In response to the Commission's recommendation that a position of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Security be established, Secretary Skinner has recently established a new Department of Transportation Office of Intelligence and Security to oversee policy and strategic planning for security and intelligence initiatives within the department.

U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Clyde Robbins has been selected to head this office, and he reports directly to the Secretary. Admiral Robbins also serves as the Department's chief liaison with the intelligence community.

The Secretary believes that the establishment of this new office fulfills the need identified in the Commission's report, although the establishment of this office does not preclude the future establishment of a different organizational structure should circumstances warrant.

Within the FAA, I have elevated the organizational status of the civil aviation security function so that it is now headed by an Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security who reports directly to me.

In order to bring about a more concentrated focus on security research and development initiatives and clearer accountability, we have established the position of Director for Security Research and Development within the FAA.

In May, we issued a proposed change to the Air Carrier Standard Security Program to improve the standards for metal detectors, and we're currently evaluating comments on that proposal.

Last month, we issued a notice of proposed rulemaking which calls for an enhancement in the performance standards required of X-ray equipment used in the pre-board screening process. And we

also amended the standard security plans to tighten up the report of threat information to the FAA by all carriers and to ensure that threats are being appropriately dealt with by all carriers.

This month, we convened the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, and I requested their views from all attendees on specific Commission recommendations including cargo and mail, bomb threat response procedures, airport design standards and the most effective assignment of security functions amongst air carriers, airport operators and Federal security managers. We expect formal recommendations from the committee this September. I think we're moving as fast as we possibly can in that regard.

With regard to improving FAA technical assistance to foreign authorities, we will soon have an automated tracking system for foreign airport assessment results in place. This tracking system will enable us to better focus our technical assistance efforts that we had in place for some years and provide for better coordination of efforts among other agencies of the Executive Branch with technical assistance responsibilities.

We've also met with the FBI. I personally met with the Director of the FBI to agree on a series of joint actions to enhance civil aviation security readiness:

The FBI and the FAA will host this October a seminar for all chief executive officers of major international air carriers to discuss challenges to civil aviation security.

The FAA and the FBI will soon hold joint meetings of our professional field personnel assigned to major U.S. airports to discuss threat and vulnerability issues and how best to complement each other's responsibilities.

The FAA and the FBI are developing plans to send teams to major U.S. airports to conduct airport-specific evaluations. These teams' findings will be available for making changes in contingency plans and in improving crisis management guidelines.

Secretary Skinner and I have spent considerable time, along with our senior staff, putting in place needed short-term changes and in ensuring that the Commission's report has been objectively and fully reviewed. Our objective is to ensure that the President has the benefit of our best thinking on the report's recommendations so that the changes we make in response to the Commission's findings will, in fact, result in long-term benefits to the traveling public.

In the meantime, we would urge that the committee hold any further legislative efforts in abeyance. The President's Commission recognized in its report that many of its recommendations were far-reaching and represented a dramatic shift in the Government's traditional approach to civil aviation security. To that end, they realistically understood that six months to a year would probably be necessary to address all of the recommendations.

Many of the Commission's recommendations, of course, do not require legislative action to implement. We would ask that in cases in which the Department of Transportation and the FAA have existing statutory authority to make the changes on our own, legislation not be pursued in order to provide us the flexibility needed to meet changing security threats.

The oversight process will certainly provide an adequate opportunity to assess both our performance and our implementation of these recommendations.

For those recommendations which would require legislation to implement, we would ask that legislation be stayed pending the completion of our ongoing efforts, our interagency discussions and discussions with the White House so that fuller policy development and coordination can be given a chance to occur in order to develop a final Administration position to proceed.

So, as I have said earlier, we view the Commission's report as a serious effort which demands a serious effort on our part. And that is exactly what we have been doing in the past two months since the report was presented to the President.

We're anxious to make those structural and procedural changes that will tangibly improve security and all of us in the Executive Branch share that objective. We appreciate your continued interest in and support for a strong security system, and we will be most pleased to keep you apprised as to our further efforts to implement the key improvements required in security.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator. And let us now take Mr. Shane's statement.

Mr. SHANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Busey is speaking for the Department this morning. I do not have an additional statement.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Selin.

STATEMENT OF HON. IVAN SELIN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR

MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SELIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. In light of how late it is this morning, how many statements have been read and the fact that I do have a prepared statement to submit, I would like to drastically abridge the remarks. I just have four or five things to say. Of course, we're delighted to have the opportunity to contribute and participate in the hearings this morning.

In our opinion, and everybody's opinion in the Administration, the Commission did an absolutely terrific job in dealing with a very complicated subject. As far as the recommendations are concerned, 38 of them deal directly or indirectly with the Department of State. We agree with all but 2 of those. We've implemented or are well on our way to implementing two-thirds of the recommendations. Some of the remaining ones need to be fleshed out a little bit to see exactly how they should be implemented, rather than whether they should be implemented.

You've heard testimony from the FAA Administrator on behalf of the Department of Transportation and the Administration. Their clear preference is that action on the proposed legislation be deferred: Since the FAA is primarily affected, the State Department defers to them in this recommendation.

I will not enumerate all of the steps we've taken already to implement the recommendations: These are all covered in my statement. But we take very much to heart the remarks about the State Department's performance in dealing with the families after the