APPENDIX 3

alpa

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

1625 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW. WASHINGTON, DC 20036

August 22, 1990

(703) 689-2270

On behalf of the Air Line Pilots Association, I am enclosing five copies of our statement in support of H.R. 5200, The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. We very much appreciate that this statement be made part of the record for the joint hearing held on July 26, by the Subcommittee on Aviation and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

STATEMENT OF

HENRY A. DUFFY, PRESIDENT

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

JOINT HEARING

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION

AND COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON H.R. 5200, THE AVIATION SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1990

JULY 26, 1990

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), representing 42,000 airline pilots who fly for 50 commercial airlines, is pleased to submit comments on H.R. 5200, the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. ALPA commends the sponsors of H.R. 5200 and the two committees for their interest and desire to improve the security of aviation for the U.S. air traveller.

As the committees are aware, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was established by the Department of Transportation, in October, 1989, and since its institution has been meeting regularly and deliberating on needed improvements to aviation security procedures, equipment and technologies. ALPA has been an active participant on the ASAC and we strongly endorse the objectives of that group. As such, we believe that Congress should consider delaying the implementation of its proposed security improvements until such time as the ASAC has had adequate opportunity to review and comment on all of the recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.

AIRLINE EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION

ALPA supports the overall effect of this bill which essentially gives aviation security much greater emphasis and increased visibility both within the government and industry. However, we have noted a significant omission that we would like for Congress to seriously consider. On April 23, 1987, FAA issued a memo instructing airports to revise and improve their airport identification systems by providing for enhanced accountability,

controllability, accuracy, currency, scope of authority, renewal criteria, and other attributes. Under the stipulations of this memo, airports must also perform basic background checks prior to issuing this identification. Airports were required to revise and reissue their identification, not later than December 31, 1988, through a change to their individual airport security programs. Subsequently, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 107.14 was enacted which further improved airport access control. This regulation requires airports to institute computerized access controls, or their equivalent, designed to prevent unauthorized entry to airport secure areas.

Unfortunately, neither of these requirements have been made of the airlines. Although some airlines have, on their own, made strides to accomplish the kind of identification quality prescribed for airports in 1987, others have not been so industrious. As an example, several member pilots have complained that they have not been issued new picture identification for as many as 20 years. Others hold two, three or more pieces of airline identification, all recognized by the carrier as valid, because the company has not required old identification to be turned in as the new is issued. As a result of these types of problems, ALPA members are not able to place confidence in the validity of airline identification and are fearful that air operations access could easily be compromised due to a stolen, lost or outdated identification used by someone of illicit intent. Airports have echoed these same concerns to

ALPA.

It should be noted that in the performance of their groundrelated duties, cockpit crews are required to walk around the restricted airport ramp utilizing company identification and a uniform as proof of authorization. With such lackadaisical identification criteria and procedures in force, we believe that a dangerous access control breach is a distinct possibility.

To address this problem, ALPA urges Congress to instruct FAA to require that: (1) airlines institute the same type of identification controls and improvements required of airports per the above-noted 1987 memo; and, (2) combine this identification with access control capability, as specified in FAR 107.14, so as to obtain the same level of security for airline employees as is prescribed for airport employees.

EQUIVALENT SECURITY ON ALL SCHEDULED PASSENGER AIR CARRIERS

We would also strongly encourage Congress to address a longstanding inadequacy of the FARS as concerns prescribed security measures based upon size of aircraft. AS FAR 108, Airplane

ALPA

Operator Security, currently reads, scheduled passenger operators of aircraft with more than 60 seats are required to implement a full security program. Smaller scheduled passenger carriers using aircraft with 60 seats or fewer are only required to provide such security measures as the FAA may deem appropriate (as specified in the carrier's operations specifications). has long held that such a dichotomy should not exist; passenger carrying commuter aircraft are hijacked, receive bomb threats, carry unruly and dangerous passengers, and experience all the other security problems of the major carriers without benefit of an FAA security program. We urge that this bill be amended so as to instruct FAA to require all scheduled passenger operators to have a security program. It should be emphasized that, in many cases, it would not be necessary to have the same depth of procedures, equipment and training for smaller carriers as for large. However, a scaled-down and economically feasible program to incorporate security training and standardized procedures for flight crews would be of great benefit to the industry and the travelling public.

NEW GOVERNMENTAL SECURITY POSITIONS

Our comments on some of the bill's provisions are provided as follows. We endorse the objective of establishing an office of the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security and Intelligence. We also support elevating the FAA's Security Directorship to an Assistant Administrator post. However, we have questions, which are currently under discussion by the ASAC, about the feasibility or even need for Federal Security Managers at high risk airports within the U.S. We are uncertain as to how this function would operate within the current FAA hierarchy. Would it assume all of the responsibilities and liabilities of the FAA's security field office for a particular high-risk airport? Would the creation of such a post aggravate FAA's current problem with non-standardization of regulatory interpretation and implementation? Many other concerns also need to be resolved on this issue prior to instituting such a position.

CHECKED BAGGAGE

The bill refers to the prescription of strengthened controls over checked baggage including "measures to ensure baggage reconciliation." ICAO has established as a Standard under Annex 17 that a passenger/baggage reconciliation is to be conducted on all international flights. U.S. airlines have not yet complied with this Standard; FAA has only proposed a rulemaking to establish a requirement for compliance with the Standard. We