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The Commission also proposed that the security functions remaining in FAA be elevated to a new Assistant Administrator for Security, responsible directly to the Administrator.

Serving under the Assistant Administrator would be holders of the recommended position of Federal Security Manager. FSMS, stationed at each high risk airport in the US and overseas where US planes fly, would have overall responsibility for security at that airport. (FSMS in foreign airports would have substantially less authority but, as Foreign Security Liaison Officers, would perform a similar function to the extent permitted by foreign governments.)

CARGO AND MAIL

Cargo and mail pose particularly thorny problems because there is little control over contents, and no adequate technology to screen either one. In addition, with mail, screening raises serious concerns (which may rise to the Constitutional level) for privacy and delay. The Commission recommended increased R&D for cargo screening technology, and that the airlines, rather than the US Postal Service, screen mail for possible bombs, and be responsible for cargo screening as well.

EXPLOSIVE DETECTION

The Commission recommended considerable acceleration of R&D in the field of aviation security, including creation of a Science Advisory Board.

The Commission strongly recommended against any further deployment of Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) machines, which the Commission found to be ineffective in detecting small amounts of plastic explosives without unacceptable levels of "false positives."

THREAT NOTIFICATION

Threat notification was a major item on the families' agenda. They claimed that their relatives should have been notified of the threat against PanAm, and further that a threat notice, posted at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, gave privileged treatment to the Embassy personnel (the latter charge was not borne out by the evidence).

While recommending that the access to information on civil aviation threats be reduced to a minimum number of people, the Commission found that the public should be notified of threats to civil aviation under certain circumstances; and that such notification should avoid any appearance of favored treatment of certain individuals or groups.

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INTELLIGENCE

The Commission found the system for coordinating and disseminating intelligence to be working reasonably well (it did not evaluate intelligence gathering). It recommended that the FAA and FBI work together to assess the overall domestic terrorist threat, and the vulnerability of individual airports.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE: H.R. 5200 TITLE II

The Commission made numerous recommendations relating to international aviation security, mandating the U.S. government to take the lead in enhancing aviation security worldwide multilaterally through the Foreign Airport Security Act (Sec. 1115 of the Federal Aviation Act), and in bilateral and multilateral fora. These recommendations include the creation of the position, in the State Department, of a Coordinator for International Aviation Security with the rank of Ambassador.

It also addressed deep concerns of the families of Pan Am 103's victims, centering on their treatment by the State Department in the aftermath of the tragedy. It recommended procedures to ensure that the families of victims receive prompt, humane and courteous treatment and service following overseas disasters. In order to facilitate prompt notification of next of kin, it recommended that airline manifests, including passport numbers and emergency contacts, be turned over to the State Department by the airline immediately following an overseas airline disaster, and that families be notified promptly.

The Commission found that American victims of terrorist actions, including but not limited to those stricken by aviation terrorism, aimed at the U.S. government should qualify for special financial compensation as victims of acts of aggression against their country, and recommended that they be compensated through monetary and tax relief.

NATIONAL WILL

While proposing the above measures to substantially strengthen aviation security, the Commission recognized that, ultimately, the nation must demonstrate the "national will" and moral courage to confront terrorism at its source, not after the terrorists have struck. It recommended a more vigorous U.S. policy that not only pursues and punishes terrorists, but also makes state sponsors of terrorism pay the price for their actions. These policies should include planning and training for preemptive or retaliatory military strikes against terrorist hideouts in nations that harbor them, as well as covert operations to prevent, disrupt or respond to terrorist acts. These recommendations are contained the Findings section.

HEARING AND MARKUP OF H.R. 5200, AVIATION SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1990

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1990

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION,

Washington, DC.

The committees met at 9:30 a.m., Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman) presiding.

Chairman FASCELL. We are meeting today, jointly with the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, to hear testimony from a plethora of witnesses from the administration and the private sector on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and on H.R. 5200, the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. I want to welcome my distinguished colleagues from the Public Works Committee and I look forward to working with them on this important legislation. I would like to recognize the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee for any remarks he may wish to make at this point.

The way we are going to proceed today is as follows: we will hear the administration and private witnesses as separate panels and we will proceed under the 5 minute rule so that all members will have a chance to question the witnesses.

Our first witness will be the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Lautenberg, who was a member of the President's Commission and is the chief sponsor of the Senate companion measure to H.R. 5200. Mr. Lautenberg, welcome to the committees. Please proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Chairman, you're very generous and I thank all of my colleagues at the bench because I know that customarily you hear from Members of the committee, and I therefore thank each one for the courtesy extended to me.

I have an amendment that's to go on the Senate floor at 10:00 and therefore will take advantage of the generosity of the Chairman to make my statement.

As I think everyone knows, I have worked with Chairman Jim Oberstar. We worked very hard together on the Aviation Security Commission and we're treading on kind of familiar ground. We're here today because of the families of the victims of Pan Am 103.

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It's been their perseverance and their diligence that's kept aviation security on the agenda. They know that they can never bring their loved ones back, their mission is therefore to keep other families from suffering the grief that they have endured. And, for that, all of us owe them a debt of thanks. We owe them something more, however. We owe them action.

In the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103, we were faced with a serious and compelling challenge. First, we had an obligation to find out what happened, and how it was allowed to take place. Through the work of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, we've taken that first step.

And, Mr. Chairman, I just want to note that Ann McLaughlin, who was Chairman of the Aviation Security Commission and from whom who you're going to hear later, did a splendid job in shepherding this group through and getting a very good job done on time. That's rather unusual around here, as you know, Mr. Chair

man.

Now we have to use the information that we've gathered to reduce the chances of it ever happening again. By acting on the legislation pending here and in the Senate, we can better protect Americans traveling here and abroad from the cowardly attacks of terrorists. Perhaps the most troubling finding of our Commission was that that bombing may very well have been prevented.

We can never provide an iron-clad guarantee against terrorism. But we can make it more difficult for terrorism to succeed. That's what our security system is supposed to do. However, that's not what happened with Pan Am 103. There were gaping holes throughout the system. And through one of those holes slipped the bomb that killed 270 innocent people.

The Commission found flaws in virtually all areas and made 64 recommendations to address those shortcomings. Those recommendations are embodied in your legislation. And in the bill that I introduced in the Senate.

I'd like to highlight four major areas in the legislation. First, we suggest structural changes in our aviation security establishment. Second, we call for higher standards and training for the people involved in the security system. Third, research and development efforts need to be enhanced. And, fourth, what the Commission referred to as developing a national will.

With the Government, aviation security has not been given the priority it deserves. The security function has been buried deep within the FAA, isolated from the Administrator, and even more so from the Secretary of Transportation. Elevating the security functions would help ensure not only that security would have a higher profile, but that it would not simply be lost among the many complicated missions of the FAA.

We also need to establish Federal security managers at high risk airports at home and abroad. They would be the on-site eyes and ears of the Government. They would, as needed, also be the Government's heavy hand, to make sure that security requirements are complied with.

Creating this new position and giving it power and direct access to the FAA Administrator may well be the single most important structural change we could make.

In the area of security employment standards, the Commission found a major weakness, that standards basically don't exist. The FAA should develop minimum standards for hiring, training and employing people to perform security functions. We need to make sure that the people on the front lines of our security effort can do the job.

That means minimum education levels. Minimum training and retraining requirements. Background checks. And in some cases, minimum foreign language skills.

The human element will always be critical to an effective security program. But technology must also play a part. The Commission found major flaws in the FAA's research and development efforts. There was too much focus on a single approach, on the thermal neutron analysis, known as TNA. TNA now, it is generally believed, is an interim technology. With modification, it may prove to be a viable part of our security system.

To find the best technology, we need an intensive accelerated R&D program with a short-term goal of providing travelers with more than just a sense of security.

Later this morning, the subcommittee I chair, Transportation Appropriations, will mark up its fiscal year 1991 funding bill. In that bill, I plan to more than double the FAA's security R&D budget, to a level much greater than any year previous. We need to get the R&D program on a fast track, and do it now.

There are other important areas that our legislation would deal with, including the role of the State Department. Its performance after the bombing was discouraging. It can be described as abominable. The legislation recommends changes to make sure that American citizens receive compassionate and effective treatment in times of tragedy.

Finally, there is something that goes beyond any legislative effort. Ultimately, the United States must have the national will to battle terrorists. We've got to make it clear that terrorists will be punished. We should not negotiate on equal terms with terrorists or nations that sponsor terrorists. Our government must work with others to isolate and cut off terrorists from their support.

As long as the civilized nations of the world look the other way, they are effectively condoning terrorism and they will continue to be victimized by it.

Mr. Chairman, once again, I think you for the opportunity to be with you, for acting on this legislation, and I can assure you, the families of the victims and all Americans who travel that I'll do all I can on our side of the Capitol to move the companion bill. I thank you very much.

Chairman FASCELL. Senator, thank you. We appreciate your work on the Commission and I'm particularly pleased to hear of your efforts with regard to research and development money on the Senate side in the Appropriation Bill. Let me also express my appreciation for your consideration and cooperation in supporting the authorizing process.

Things are getting so bad with regard to the authorizing and appropriating process, and leaving out policy makers, any time we can get that kind of cooperation, I just want you to know it's worthy of a deep sense of appreciation and expression.