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Our work in metal and matrix composite materials continues and we have a few demonstration projects being initiated that should come to fruition in the next year or two.
We participated extensively with the White House, with Jay Keyworth, on a study to establish a U.S. policy on aeronautical research and technology for the 1980's and 1990's and that study was completed in November 1982 and we continue to support it.
With these highlights, Mr. Chairman, why don't I turn it back to you and let you and the other members ask Bob and me some questions that are more germane to what you think would be best served for us to answer.
(The statement follows:)
STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. DELAUER, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DOD
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased again this year, as on previous occasions, to review the Department of Defense's programmatic relationships with NASA in space and aeronautics activities. I will address those programs in which we work jointly with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and highlight our activities that are otherwise complementary. In keeping with prior interests of this committee, I will begin by briefly describing recent Soviet activities in space to provide perspective for our own programs.
SOVIET SPACE ACTIVITIES
The expansion of Soviet space programs and capabilities continued unabated in 1982 with [deleted] attempted space launches that placed [deleted] payloads into orbit. This high rate, which we expect to continue in the 1980's, reflects not only the large number of programs, but expansion in scope and capability of these systems for the direct and indirect support to Soviet land, sea, and air forces. On any given day 70-110 Soviet satellites are in active use to support military forces. Development continued in 1982 on new capabilities: Two new space boosters, one a heavy lift vehicle in the Saturn V class and the second a medium lift vehicle, [deleted] reusable transport systems, one a U.S. shuttle type orbiter and the other a smaller space plane; and large permanently manned space station complexes. The heavy lift vehicle we project would be launched in the 1985-1987 time frame and be capable of lifting 220,000 to 330,000 pounds into low earth orbit. By comparison the U.S. space shuttle can lift approximately 65,000 pounds into low Earth orbit. This large booster could be used for placing large space stations in orbit, for supporting manned lunar/ planetary exploration, and for orbiting very large weapons. A variant of this vehicle would be used to launch a large shuttle craft in the late 1980's, and provide the Soviets with capabilities similar to our own space shuttle. A smaller space plane could be launched in the [deleted] time frame. It will probably be used to ferry cosmonauts to manned space station to conduct independent reconnaissance and satellite inspection [deleted]. The Soviets have continued to expand at an increasing rate their research, development testing and evaluation facilities, production and manufacturing plants, launch facilities, and space mission control network to support this large space effort.
Soviet military space capabilities include an anti-satellite interceptor, operational since 1971 and effective against low altitude satellites; platforms which provide space-aided weapons delivery against U.S. naval carrier forces; a full array of photo and Elint reconnaissance satellites for covering strategic and tactical targets; a missile launch detection capability against U.S. ICBM fields and test facilities; an expanding communication satellite systems for support to Soviet leadership, military and intelligence entities; and several military satellite networks for navigation, meteorological, and weapons system R&D support. Perhaps the most unique feature of the Soviet program, and one which has military potential, is their manned program. The program consists of a space station, space station modules, and ferry spacecraft for cosmonauts and equipment to sustain long-term manned missions. The trends and momentum of the Soviet space program for the past 25 years reflects a commitment to develop and deploy space capabilities that enhance and project military
power. I will now discuss some selected highlights and noteworthy developments during 1982.
During 1982 the Soviet Union conducted an operational test of the radar equipped co-orbital interceptor as part of a large armed forces exercise. [Deleted].
Key elements in Soviet surveillance [deleted] are the ocean reconnaissance platforms, the Elint Ocean reconnaissance satellite (EORSAT) and the radar ocean reconnaissance satellite (RORSAT). These satellites provide detection and targeting data to Soviet surface vessels and submarines equipped with anti-ship weapons. The Soviets launched [deleted] EORSATs, which detect electronic emissions, in 1982. RORSAT activity was, however, the [deleted]. The Soviets continue to power the RORSAT with a nuclear reactor, but problems occurred with Cosmos 1402 reminiscent of the 1978 Cosmos 954 incident when it failed to boost its reactor into high storage orbit at the end of its mission. We expect the Soviet will continue, however, to maintain ocean surveillance satellites at high similar levels of operational activity in 1983.
The large and extensive photo and Elint reconnaissance program accounted for the greater part of the Soviet launches in 1982. [Deleted].
During 1982, the Soviets completed the Salyut 6 space station mission and launched and subsequently manned its replacement, Salyut 7. The combined Salyut6/Cosmos 1267 space station complex was purposefully deorbited and destroyed as it entered the atmosphere on 29 July 1982. The 42,000 pound Salyut space station had completed well over four and one-half years in space. Salyut 7 was launched on 19 April from Tyuratam and was manned by a primary crew, cosmonauts Berezovoy and Lebedev, from 14 May through 10 December. This flight was 211 days in length and created yet another new record for mission duration. Salyut 7 was visited by two crews consisting of three cosmonauts each. The first crew contained a Frenchman, and the second crew, the second female cosmonaut. [Deleted].
The Soviets launched three Molniya 1 communications satellites in 1982 to maintain the eight satellite network that became operational in 1976. Two Molniya 3 satellites were launched to maintain the four satellite network now used to support civil and military communication relay. The Soviets also successfully launched one Raduga satellite into geostationary orbit to relay both civil and military communications. Two Gorizont geostationary platforms were also launched and support domestic and international communications. Two Ekran television broadcast satellites were also launched to provide service to the Far East.
[Deleted.] The Soviets also launched the first three developmental satellites in their navigation satellite (Glonass) program. Glonass will be the Soviet counterpart to the U.S. global positioning system (GPS) and has the potential to replace the NAVSAT-2 and NAVSAT-3 networks. The Glonass network will consist of 9-12 satellites. Meteorological networks were maintained with two launches. There were no scientific satellites launched in 1982.
On 3 June 1982, the Soviets launched a lifting-body type reusable spacecraft, designated Cosmos 1374. The primary mission of this subscale test model was probably to evaluate the aerodynamic performance of a reusable manned space plane.
DOD SPACE ACTIVITIES
To maintain the security of the United States, the Department of Defense acquires and operates space systems and pursues advances in related research and technology development. During 1982, new focus was provided for Department of Defense space systems. On June 22, 1982, the Secretary of Defense approved a statement of policy to guide the space-related activities of the Department. The DOD space policy is in furtherance of the national space policy announced by the President on July 4, 1982, and is fully consistent with and supports the principles underlying the United States space program. The DOD space policy directs the continued maintenance of a strong technology base with leadership in those areas necessary for effective national security. The policy recognizes that since a number of military missions in both peace and conflict can be very effectively supported by space systems, future military use of space, including such functions as command and control, communications, navigation, environmental monitoring, warning, surveillance, and space defense, should have an operational orientation.
As noted, Soviet development of an operational anti-satellite (ASAT) capability presents the potential for space to become a hostile environment. Therefore, the DOD space policy directs that military space systems, including essential ground elements as well as orbiting spacecraft, be designed, developed, and operated to enhance the survivability and endurance of critical mission functions. Within limits
imposed by international law, the policy directs development of a U.S. operational ASAT capability to deter threats to our and allied space systems and threats from space systems supporting hostile military forces. The policy contains no new directions in space weaponry, but provides for continued research and planning.
Space launch is critical to any space capability and the policy requires the availability of an adequate launch capability to provide flexible and responsive access to space to meet national security needs. The shuttle is recognized as the primary space launch system, and the need for continued cooperation with NASA to develop a fully operational space transportation system is acknowledged.
In a separate, but related action, the Air Force consolidated its management of space activities through formation of a new major command, space command, on September 1, 1982. Headquartered in Colorado Springs, space command will be built around the existing aerospace defense center staff.
The Air Force also created within Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) a space technology center at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, in October 1982. Under this realignment, three AFSC laboratories, the Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory, the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory, and the Air Force Weapons Laboratory will constitute the elements of the space technology center under the Air Force Space Division. This realignment will better meet the unique technology needs of space systems. The center will focus on the major scientific disciplines for launch vehicle and spacecraft technology.
To continue the momentum of achieving technically superior systems with enhanced operational characteristics (with particular emphasis on survivability) we are requesting $9.3 billion for Department of Defense space programs in fiscal year 1984. This represents an increase of 9.4 percent (real year dollars) over the corresponding $8.5 billion appropriated in fiscal year 1983.
As requested in your letter of February 18, to Secretary Weinberger, I would now like to focus on development, operation, and future plans for the space transportation system and related space activities of joint NASA/DOD interest.
Since I last addressed this committee, we have witnessed the completion of the highly successful space shuttle orbital flight test program, and we have experienced a nearly flawless flight on the shuttle's first operational mission, STS-5. Based on this demonstrated performance, we can now look forward confidently to a new national capability that will significantly affect our future space activities. That is not to say that we have answered all the questions or have overcome all the troublesome areas typical of any such complex program, but we are generally pleased and encouraged with progress to date.
We in the Department of Defense make extensive use of space systems to support national security operations, and that use is increasing. Fundamental to our capability in space is a responsive and affordable means of delivering payloads into orbit. Both our policy and our plans recognize the shuttle as the primary space launch system for national security payloads, and our concern for the viability of the shuttle program is obvious.
As I have noted, we have been very pleased with the shuttle's flight test program and its highly successful first operational mission. We are justifiably proud of the design, development and progress to date, but recognize that additional significant achievements are required to make the system fully operational and responsive to DOD requirements.
Thus far, the fastest turn-around for a shuttle launch was for STS-4 which took 78 workdays for system preparation with additional experience and maturing of the system hardware, this turn-around time should decrease appreciably. Indeed, this turn-around must decrease in order to increase the shuttle launch rate which is key to achievement of a responsive and economical operational system.
We remain concerned about the shuttle's capability to launch payload weights that were specified in the early days of shuttle development and which provided the basis for payload design decisions. We have some national security payloads being developed which are close to the latest maximum shuttle payload capability projections provided by NASA. Reductions in orbiter payload weight capability could cause significant problems and result in major delays and cost increases for some of the Nation's most critical space systems.
We are closely monitoring the schedule slip of the upcoming flight of STS-6 (the first shuttle launch of the inertial upper stage and the first tracking and data relay satellite) because of the operational demonstration it will provide as well the possible effect on the near term shuttle launch schedule. While we do not believe the currently projected slip on STS-6 to late March will delay our first DOD operational launch on STS-10 scheduled for November 1983, it does cause some uneasyness regarding the shuttle's operational capabilities during its early operational period.
The current problems with the main engines are troublesome and disruptive, but I believe they are part of the learning process associated with bringing any new, complex system into operation. These same problems also emphasize the DOD's longstanding concern for the adequacy of logistics support for the shuttle. Time and experience will improve our ability to predict the number and types of spare parts required, but it is clear from our current experience that our spares posture is tenuous to inadequate. Fortunately, the current slip in schedule happens as we are building to our planned launch rate. Such a protracted delay later, when our planned flight rate is much higher, would be far more serious.
On the recurring question of the ultimate number of orbiters, with just five STS flights to date, I do not believe there is adequate data to make a reasonable and confident decision on orbiter fleet size. As additional flights are made, we will be able to assess more fully such critical factors as turn-around time, system availability, maintenance, attrition, and demand. Prudent management dictates that STS production capabilities be maintained until we have made sound assessments of all these critical factors. To constrain ourselves prematurely to a four orbiter fleet could erode confidence in the STS as a dependable space transportation system. Both United States and foreign commercial customers must be able to view the STS as a dependable means to satisfy firm launch schedules. Significant launch delays translate rapidly into economic penalties that are particularly important to commercial users. It is important that the STS be operated as it was conceived making it highly dependable with competitive costs as rapidly as possible. Thus I strongly support the President's policy on this issue. This means that we should maintain the orbiter production base to include such items as wings, mid-bodies, and crew modules. If a four orbiter fleet continues to meet the aggregate demand, these components can be used as modular spares. However, if demand or circumstances dictate additional or replacement orbiters, the production base will be in place to support this procurement under efficient conditions.
In a related area, I note that the Air Force has renegotiated shuttle user charges with NASA. The new price of $29.8 million after 1985 (in 1975 dollars) has been incorporated in our fiscal year 1984 FYDP. This upward adjustment from the previously agreed to price of $12.2 million per flight was made to accommodate cost increases experienced by NASA. The key element of this agreement was the determination of a fair charge for DOD launches. Under this new agreement, the DOD will pay the same price per launch as commercial and foreign users for equivalent service, excluding manpower charges which will be traded between the Air Force and NASA. This agreement recognizes the interest of this committee in keeping the shuttle adequately supported without undermining other elements of the NASA budget.
Part of DOD's participation in the national shuttle program is the development of shuttle processing, launch, and landing facilities at Vandenberg AFB, California. This development is proceeding toward a first launch in October 1985. This west coast space shuttle facility will permit civil and government shuttle users access to polar and near-polar Earth orbits. Polar orbits cannot be reached from the Kennedy Space Center launch site without significant performance loss necessary to avoid overflying densely populated areas.
Vandenberg shuttle launch and landing construction was started in fiscal year 1979 with substantial modifications and additions to a launch pad that was built for the canceled manned orbiting laboratory program. A number of major construction projects are underway. These consists of facilities needed to store and process the orbiter, the external tank, the solid rocket boosters, and the payloads during prelaunch assembly and checkout activities. Also included are off-line engineering, data processing, and logistics support facilities. Construction is about 80 percent complete. The shuttle assembly building construction project awarded this past January is the last time-critical, major facility construction effort. This construction is on the critical path for an October 1985 IOČ.
With many of the major buildings and facilities having been constructed, the major efforts have now transitioned to equipment and systems installations. This is the critical phase of the development program and will require the best efforts on the part of the Vandenberg team to meet the schedule. We have devoted significant attention to the Vandenberg program and have an able and competent team managing it. We believe that the Vandenberg construction will be completed on the schedule required.
This critical need for Vandenberg combined with mutual NASA/DOD interest in assuring the most economical operations possible, prompted the NASA and the Air Force to join together in requesting industry to propose a single shuttle processing contract le contract approach will not only provide for
healthy competition but will also give the winning contractor team maximum flexibility to earn incentives being offered for increased efficiency and reduced costs. This is only one of several positive signs of the maturing of the STS program. All in all, we are pleased about the progress being made at Vandenberg.
As I stated, the Vandenberg launch site is used for spacecraft requiring polar or near-polar orbits. Most of these spacecraft will be placed in low-earth orbits wherein most of the shuttle payload capacity is translated into spacecraft payload on orbit. The Kennedy launch site is used to launch spacecraft requiring lower inclination orbits including all of our geosynchronous and other high altitude spacecraft. Since these spacecraft require altitudes greater than those achievable by the shuttle. A boost propulsion stage must be used to place the spacecraft in the desired orbit. Use of this boost stage, which must be considered as part of the shuttle payload, results in a significant reduction in the spacecraft weight that can be placed in higher altitude orbits.
These shuttle compatible upper stages are critically important to the amount of payload that can be placed in higher orbits. In examining national security upper stage requirements last year, it became apparent that the inertial upper state (IUS) was close to the margin required to meet the near-term projected weight needs and that a higher performance upper stage would be necessary by the late eighties. When NASA was directed by Congress, during the fiscal year 1983 review process, to develop an STS compatible centaur upper stage to launch its Galileo and international solar polar missions, we decided that a joint development program between the DOD and NASA would be in the Nation's best interest. Thus, NASA and the DOD will cost share the basic development program, called Centaur G. NASA will fund required modifications for the shuttle and launch pad as well as fund a stretched version of the stage called Centaur G prime. Under this agreement, two Centaur G vehicles will be provided to DOD to meet our 1987 and 1988 mission needs. A third spacecraft program, already integrated to the IUS will transition to the Centaur as part of a planned spacecraft block change in the late 1980's. Our remaining spacecraft programs will remain on the IUS at least for the near-term since these spacecraft are not scheduled for block changes until the early 1990's and earlier transition to Centaur would be too costly. I believe this upper stage strategy or continuing the IUS program while transitioning certain programs to the Centaur gives us the flexibility and capability needed to meet our future mission requirements.
Moving toward the ERA when the Department of Defense will plan and control national security shuttle missions, we are proceeding with our program for the consolidated space operations center to be located at Falcon Air Force Station, Colorado-A site in the vicinity of Colorado Springs. The CSOC is comprised of two elements, the satellite operations complex (SOC) and the shuttle operations and planning complex (SOPC).
The need for the satellite control capability is based on the vulnerability of the Satellite Test Center in Sunnyvale, California, a single node in the satellite control network which provides tracking, telemetry, and command capabilities to satellites supporting various national security missions. The STC is vulnerable to both environmental and man-made threats and has limited growth potential.
The need for the shuttle control capability stems from the planned reliance on the shuttle as the primary launch system for national security space missions. The DOD shuttle control capability at Johnson Space Center does not meet all DOD requirements for planning and conducting DOD missions. The annual capacity at JSC to conduct classified missions is limited, security is limited to secret, and military and civilian space operations are intermingled. JSC is also a single node, subject to hostile actions and environmental hazzards. CSOC overcomes these limitations by providing a secure environment from which to conduct DOD space missions, siting to minimize environmental and man-made threats, adequate capacity to support the national shuttle traffic model in concert with JSC, and the capability to conduct military space operations from dedicated DOD facilities allowing close coordination of shuttle and satellite operations.
The CSOC will become an integral part of the Air Force satellite control network. There have been a number of inquiries by the Congress concerning the adequacy of CSOC planning and selection of the computer hardware and software. Although the distinction is not usually made, these inquires are directed at the SOPC portion of the CSOC, since the hardware and software for the satellite operations complex on the CSOC will use the same elements as those being incorporated in the competitively procured data systems modernization project of the satellite control facility. This equipment is on current configuration and the software is being produced using ADA design standards.