lated circumstances where some disagreement exists regarding the priorities of the activities being pursued, the major thrust of these efforts is to achieve the improvements in air vehicle characteristics as stated in the Office of Science and Technology Policy report issued last November. This year as in past years, we will make significant progress toward achieving those benefits. Yes, I am satisfied that the federal responsibilities in aeronautics research and technology are being fulfilled.

Question. NASA and DoD are involved in two joint aeronautic projects: (1) NASA/ Air Force project on the advanced technology integration of the F-16 aircraft, and (2) a NASA/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project to develop the technology base for the X-wing/rotor concept. How are the responsibilities, costs, and results shared in these two projects?

Answer. (1) In the NASA/Air Force Advanced Figher Technology Integration project on the F-16 (AFTI/F016), the Air Force is responsible for all contractor modifications and flight tests; operational type flight testing; and, provision of aircraft spares during NASA flight testing. NASA is responsible for selected wind tunnel tests, simulations, and research type flight testing. (2) The responsibilities and costs for the X-wing rotor program are shared equally by NASA and DARPA through a Memorandum of Agreement. The shared responsibilities include a joint program office manned by both NASA and DoD personnel.

In both cases the results of all the tests are shared equally and will be available for dissemination through the aeronautics community, subject of course to any security limitations.

Question. To what extend does DoD rely on NASA research and development in space applications such as communications, navigation, earth remote sensing, and meteorology? How would this dependence be affected if operational responsibilities, e.g. for Landsat, are transferred to the private sector? Does DoD depend on its own continuing R&D in such circumstances?

Answer. For development of those applications that are uniquely military in nature, the DoD relies on DoD R&D organizations and private contractors. Activities that are mutually beneficial to both civil and military applications are handled on a case by case basis to determine funding levels and overall management responsibility. In general, NASA's emphasis has been on basic scientific understanding of terrestrial processes whereas the DoD has stressed contributions to operational missions. Within the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, a joint NASA/ DoD activity, and its various sub-panels, there are provisions for mutually exchanging ideas and for coordinating and planning future activities of both organizations. DoD reliance on NASA R&D should not be affected by the transfer of operational systems such as Landsat to the private sector. However, NASA R&D is expected to continue to enhance or upgrade those operational systems. Where areas of mutual R&D interest are identified, we will continue to work together to define joint endeavors that will further our respective goals within the guidelines of national security, policy, and non-duplication of commercially available data products.

Question. Did the transfer of communications satellites responsibilities from NASA to the private sector present any problems to the DoD in maintaining a strong related R&D capability?

Answer. The transfer of all communications satellite responsibility from NASA to the private sector does create some problems in that it is more difficult to focus technology into particular areas of interest by working with individual elements of the private sector than by working through a single responsible agent. In addition, we believe that having NASA involved in advanced communications satellite activities such as ACTs helps provide a good technical base that the DoD can draw upon. Many of the components and technologies are very similar. Many are not. MILSATCOM systems must emphasize survivability and endurance while that is not a driver in NASA's program.

Question. Your testimony indicates that DoD strategy "provides for expendable launch vehicle backups for the first two years of Shuttle operations from the Kennedy launch site" and that this backup capability will be provided by the newly developed TITAN III (34)D boosters.

You also indicate that, with the exception of one program, the transition of all national security spacecraft from their current expendable launch vehicles to the Shuttle will occur by fiscal year 1989, or more likely fiscal year 1986. NASA considers that their Space Shuttle became operational in November 1982, so there is a question about what is meant by the transition period.

Could you clarify when and how you plan to terminate Expendable Launch Vehicle acquisitions and commit entirely to the Space Shuttle launch vehicle? Answer. Our plan is to discontinue expendable launch vehicle production followthe successful completion of STS-6 which will demonstrate the flightworthiness

1

of the second orbiter and lightweight external tank, the compatibility of the Inertial Upper Stage with other elements of the Space Transportation System, and the operational readiness of additional launch processing elements such as the second Mobile Launch Platform. STS-6 is currently scheduled for Spring 1983. Termination at this point will provide sufficient TITAN launch vehicles to satisfy prime mission requirements as well as satisfy our backup criteria. The baseline plan envisions not completing TITAN III (34)D vehicles No. 17 and No. 18 and reprograming the funds appropriated for these vehicles in our fiscal year 1983 budget to other priority DoD needs. Termination of vehicles No. 15 and No. 16 is also under consideration. The last TITAN launch from Cape Canaveral is projected for fiscal year 1986 and the last DoD Atlas Centaur launch is projected for fiscal year 1987. The last TITAN launch from Vandenberg AFB is projeced for fiscal year 1986, with Atlas E launches for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program continuing through fiscal year 1988.

The DoD refers to the "transition period" as the span of time from first DoD use of Shuttle to last DoD use of expendable launch vehicles including prospective backups.

Question. You say in your testimony that "in some critical programs we have already optimized our spacecraft for the Shuttle and as such, we can no longer fly them on current expendables." Would this incompatibility with the expendables be generally the case? Our understanding is that Space Trans plans to offer a Shuttlecompatible TITAN (34) D as a commercial vehicle. If the need arose, could this vehicle be adapted for defense payloads?

Answer. Incompatibility with expendables (TITANS) is not currently the general case for DoD payloads. However, we are evolving toward this posture, and have procured adequate TITANS for those remaining spacecraft that are compatible with 1 this launch vehicle. With respect to use of the Space Trans proposed TITAN configuration, it might be useful in limited applications. We do not believe there is any plan to make this configuration available on the West Coast and the performance would be less than that of the current TITAN III (34) D because of the burden of the large diameter payload fairing required for Shuttle compatibility. These two considerations severely limit its attractiveness for DoD missions.

Question. Your testimony says that a decision regarding TITAN production will be made "if STS-6 is successful." What would constitute "successful" for purposes of this decision?

Answer. We would consider a "successful" mission one that demonstrated nominal performance of all elements of the system. STS-6 is particularly important because it will employ, for the first time, the second operational Orbiter and lightweight External Tank, and demonstrate the compatibility of the Inertial Upper Stage with other elements of the Space Transportation System for geosynchronous spacecraft deployments.

Question. Is there any concern that abandoning ELV's in favor of the Space Shuttle would leave the defense space program particularly vulnerable to the loss of an orbiter or critical spare parts?

Answer. Yes. That is precisely why we structured a transition plan that is keyed to orbiter deliveries. The third orbiter will be delivered in September 1983 and the fourth in December 1984. Therefore, we will have sufficient orbiters to accomplish the DoD missions (given DoD priority) even on a contingency basis at the completion of transition. We remain concerned about the adequacy of spare parts and are encouraged by NASA attention to this issue.

Question. You express concern in your testimony about the "adequacy of continued DoD launch support with both TITAN and ATLAS/CENTAUR vehicles through the period prior to Shuttle transition and the potential impacts-both positive and negative-of additional launch alternatives on the Shuttle program." Would you clarify or elaborate this statement?

Answer. We understand that some of the proposals to "commercialize" expendable launch vehicles envision a near-term take over of launch operations including current commitments for DoD launches. Before we would support any such proposal, we would want to make absolutely certain that national security launch requirements would be met.

Commercialization could potentially impact the Shuttle program both positively and negatively. Commercial expendable launch vehicles could supplement Shuttle capabilities during transition (and perhaps longer) and, as I pointed out in my statement, provide limited backup without continued government investment as well as the potential for the U.S. to capture a greater share of the commercial and international market. The prospective negative impact includes consideration of the introduction of additional competition with the Shuttle for the launch services market

and the influence that could have on the cost of Shuttle operations. We are working to understand these issues better to provide a sound basis for our commerialization policies.

Question. Your testimony described DoD's planned uses of the IUS and Centaur G upper stages. You indicated some shifts from IUS to Centaur G but that "our remaining spacecraft programs will remain on the IUS at least for the near term." Does that mean that the DoD may need fewer IUS's later than have been contemplated so far?

Answer. Because of the decision for some DoD space programs to use Centaur, there will be a one-for-one reduction in the numbers of IUS's required. The ultimate viability of the IUS programs will depend on its economic competitiveness for payloads within its performance capabilities.

Question. Is there any joint planning going on between NASA and DoD for a higher energy upper stage than Centaur? Have both civilan and defense applications been identified?

Answer. Selection of the Centaur for NASA and DoD applications exceeding the performance of the IUS has curtailed planning for the previously envisioned higher energy upper stage (HEUS). We continue to work with NASA in defining concepts for future potential applications such as reusable or manned orbit vehicles, but we have identified no firm requirements necessitating near-term developments.

Question. If CSOC is not completed on schedule in 1987, can DoD turn to Johnson Space Center for launch operation controls? How would the NASA schedule be affected in accommodating the DoD operations? Have contingency plans been made by NASA and DoD?

Answer. If CSOC is not completed by 1987, JSC can continue to support DoD operations albeit with less than desired security and perhaps at the expense of civil missions.

It is not clear at this time how the NASA launch schedule would be affected. Generally, JSC is becomming more optimistic about the number of DoD missions they could support as they gain operational experience and the number of civil missions becomes more conservative. Commercialization of domestic expendable launch vehicles could also reduce the demand for NASA shuttle operations.

No specific contingency plans have been made, but we believe we retain the option, through exercise of priority, if necessary, to guarantee support of national security missions until the CSOC shuttle planning and control capability is operational.

Question. You have just created a new Space Technology Center at Kirkland Air Force Base in New Mexico to "focus on the major scientific disciplines for launch vehicle and spacecraft technology." How will this realignment affect the dependence of DoD on work which is conducted in the NASA centers? In other words, is the Space Technology Center a step toward a DoD capability which is parallel to or independent of existing NASA capabilities?

Answer. The establishment of the Space Technology Center was an organizational realignment consolidating three existing Air Force laboratories-the Rocket Propulsion Lab, the Geophysics Lab, and the Weapons Lab-under a single headquarters reporing to the Commander of the Air Force's Space Division. This consolidation did not change the scope of activities of the individual components, but was intended to facilitate coordination among AF R&D efforts which are devoted to military requirements. The presently established cooperative working relationships with NASA will continue.

NASA AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 1983

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND

TRANSPORTATION,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m. in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Slade Gorton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORTON

Senator GROTON. I am pleased to chair these hearings of the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space in this, the 25th anniversary year of NASA. This Nation has become increasingly aware of the contributions which NASA has made and is making to our technological and scientific leadership. Partly as a result, our high technology exports now rank second only to agricultural products.

Equally important, NASA's achievements have been enormously important to our national stature and aspirations. In the 2 years that I have been in the Congress, the Space Shuttle has progressed from its stunning maiden voyage to an operational system. The first joint effort between NASA and industry has been undertaken to prove the commercial possibilities of space. Images of the rings of Saturn have been returned from space. Images of such clarity that previously unsuspected details have both amazed and puzzled observers.

Today, we will be considering the NASA authorization for fiscal year 1984. There is much to recommend the budget and programs which the President has proposed. The attention given to space, science and applications, including planetary exploration and to aeronautics is closer to the position which this committee has held in recent years. The first new planetary start in 5 years, the Venus Radar Mapping Mission, is a very welcome initiative.

Increases proposed for the Explorer program are an important commitment to providing affordable opportunities for smaller experiments on free-flying spacecraft. These missions comprise the majority of those conducted by our universities and national labo

ratories.

(39)

A most exciting new start, one which the subcommittee has supported in recent years, is the Numerical Aerodynamic Simulator. I do not have to understand the mathematics of three-dimensional fluid dynamics to appreciate the importance which this capability will have in new aircraft design and, consequently, to the competitive posture of the United States in this important international market.

That importance was reinforced by the report in this morning's Washington Post that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) chose the aerospace industry as one in which Japan could achieve technological progress and long-term growth by moving in on a field previously dominated by other industrialized nations, just as (MITI) did with electronics and computers.

The article goes on to describe a number of joint agreements which the Japanese have concluded with U.S. manufacturers for development and production of advanced propulsion systems in aircraft. It seems clear the advantages to the Japanese in these agreements are notably greater than those to this country, and I will include a copy of that Washington Post article in this statement. [The article referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1983]

JAPAN PLANNING MAJOR MOVE INTO AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

(By Thomas W. Lippman)

The government of Japan has organized, and is helping to finance, a long-range campaign to carve out a major place in the worldwide aerospace industry for Japanese manufacturers, Commerce Department researchers reported yesterday.

Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) chose the aerospace industry as one in which Japan could achieve technology progress and long-term growth by moving in on a field previously dominated by other industrialized nations-just as MITI did with electronics and computers-the report says.

The alleged targeting of the U.S. electronics and computer industry-which has provoked loud complaints from U.S. manufacturers-is continuing as MITI seeks the lead in the development of the next generation of those products, the report

says.

"Currently, certain high-priority projects in areas such as software, the fifth-generation computer and the supercomputer are receiving unprecedented attention," including loans, subsidies, tax breaks and outright grants from MITI to the manufacturers," the report says.

According to Robert L. Eckelmann and Lester A. Davis of the International Trade Administration's trade research division, the same techniques of financing and organization now are being applied to the aerospace industry, and the Japanese are being aided-if unwittingly-by U.S. manufacturers who have brought Japanese firms in on coproduction deals.

As if to confirm this analysis, the Pratt & Whitney division of United Technologies Corp. announced yesterday that it has reached an agreement to undertake joint development of a new commercial jet engine with a Japanese consortium and with British, German and Italian firms.

It is no secret to aerospace executives that Japan's unique government-industry partnership has begun to build up Japan's weak aerospace sector. Cessna Aircraft Corp., for example, already has reported losing some sales to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' new executive jet, the nine-seat diamond.

The scope of Japan's aerospace effort, however, has been less-well-publicized in this country than MITI's well-documented legal and financial assistance to computer manufacturers.

According to the Commerce report, the Japanese government is expected to contribute $581.7 million in the 1981-1987 period to assist five major aerospace projects. These are the "YX," or the 15 percent share of the development of Boeing's 767 commercial jet subcontracted to Mitsubishi, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Fuji Heavy Industries; a short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) plane scheduled for test fight