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through space. That is part of our program and it is one of the technical issues that we are trying to resolve within our exploratory development program.
Senator HEFLIN. How do the U.S. efforts in the ASAT technology compare with those in the Soviet Union in terms of both performance and schedule rather than just the numbers of the satellites that are dedicated toward that role?
Dr. COOPER. Well, there is one major difference, and that is that the Soviets have one and we don't. They have an operational antisatellite system which they test regularly [deleted] that they could use in times of hostility.
Now our program is still under development. [Deleted.]
Senator HEFLIN. One other question relative to laser technology development.
Is there any effort to coordinate the activities going on in the various branches of the service and the Department of Defense the energy in space to a little degree?
Dr. DELAUER. That one, Senator, I can answer with a resounding yes. If you haven't been aware of it, we have focused the whole coordination of the space-based laser program and the particle beam program all in an office that reports to Bob in research and engineering. We have got a Major General Lamberson in charge. He came out of the Air Force's laser activity. It is his job to essentially provide the focus and the management oversight on all the programs that are being done, no matter where, within the Department of Defense.
Senator HEFLIN. Are there duplications going on relative to this by various branches?
Dr. DELAUER. Well, not in any major way. You might find that some people are doing some basic materials work or things like that, but not as a program. The program is well managed and well planned and the duplication has been kept to a minimum.
Senator HEFLIN. That is all.
I will submit some questions in writing.
Senator GORTON. Thank you both very much for coming.
Dr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. DELAUER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator. [Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]
[The following information was subsequently received for the record:]
QUESTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE AND THE ANSWERS THERETO
Question. What are the major issues to be resolved in determining whether to concentrate on a laser or particle beam capability as ASAT technology is developed and deployed? When will the DoD be in a position to make these decisions?
Answer. The DoD is pursuing a number of Directed Energy technology efforts that have ASAT potential.
Included are mid infrared and short (visible) wavelength lasers and neutral particle beam weapons. For ASAT applications of lasers we are looking at ground, airborne and space based weapons. One of the primary questions that must be resolved is non-technical and is related to the type of directed energy ASAT capability that is required to complement the USAF Miniature Vehicle (MV) effort. The major technical issues are related to our ability to demonstrate that we can build the directed
energy systems with the performance capability dictated by the selected basing option.
The only concept for a particle beam ASAT weapon involves the use of a neutral particle beam from a space-based platform. This technology is substantially less mature than either the long wave or short wave laser technologies. We are presently pursuing a program to demonstrate the basic feasibility of generating a neutral particle beam with the necessary particle energy and beam current, and with sufficiently narrow beam spread to be useful as a space-based weapon. In addition, the technologies of space power source (including nuclear reactors) and power conditioning systems are being explored.
Both lasers and particle beams are likely to eventually find utility in a number of mission applications, tactical as well as strategic, terrestial as well as in space. A decision on laser versus particle beam technology for antisatellite application should not be made except when selecting a concept for validation in response to a formal operational need.
Question. GAO raised the issues of poor technical performance and affordability in critizing the F-15/ASAT program. What is the DoD's response to these charges? Answer. We do not agree with the GAO on their technical assessment of the ASAT program, nor do we concur with their cost escalation to "tens of billions of dollars." We are in the process of formally responding to their report.
Question. How do the U.S. efforts in ASAT technology compare with those of the Soviet Union? In terms of both performance and schedule? The answer should reflect the latest U.S. intelligence estimate of Soviet capability-not the numbers of Soviet satellites dedicated to the ASAT role.
Answer. At the request of the Congress, we are in the process of preparing a report that addresses this very question. The report is in the final stages of editing and coordination, and will be submitted shortly.
Question. Why has it taken the DoD until the 1980s to provide funding levels necessary to initiate ASAT technology for potential deployment? The situation is similar to DoD's handling of BMD activity for the last 12 years, i.e., lack of adequate funding and policy guidance.
Answer. We have always considered this program to be a technology-limited development as opposed to a funds-limited development and, in concert with the Congress, have structured the effort to meet an IOČ milestone in the most cost-effective manner. As for policy guidance, the latest version of the Defense Guidance contains very specific guidance on the development of an ASAT capability.
Question. What portion of the BMD budget in 1984-1988 is dedicated to space defense activities?
Answer. Space defense, from boost phase until just prior to reentry, accounts for approximately 15 percent of the fiscal year 1984 BMD budget. This allocation is programed to increase to approximately 35 percent of the BMD budget by fiscal year 1988.
Question. Why has SOFAS/FAS activity been reduced and/or terminated?
Answer. The budget for the Forward Acquisition System (FAS) Technology Development Program was reduced in fiscal year 1983 to make funds available for the higher priority Endoatmospheric Nonnuclear Kill Technology Development Program. Survivable Optical Forward Acquisition Sensor (SOFAS), an application of FAS technology to the tactical warning-assessment, was never approved or funded. Since FAS was reduced, the potential for near-term development of SOFAS was eliminated. We continue to believe that other technology areas warrant a higher priority than SOFAS/FAS; however, we are continuing a low-level of activity in the development of the critical signal and data processing technologies for FAS and SOFAS applications.
Question. From the DOD's standpoint, what are the key issues to be decided in determining the feasibility of a manned space station for military activities?
Answer. The focus is not the feasibility of a manned space station for military activities, because such an endeavor is clearly feasible. In our views the question is one of utility in a resource constrained environment. In that context, the key issues relate to whether a space station offers any unique benefits or the opportunity to perform military missions more effectively or efficiently than alternative means. We are also concerned about the prospective implications of a joint military-civil space station (particularly with international participation) on national security interests including classified operations and technology transfer. We are currently addressing these issues.
Question. Your written testimony says that "to constrain ourselves prematurely to a 4-orbiter fleet could erode confidence in the STS (Space Transportation System) as a dependable Space Transportation System.
The President's Science Advisor seems to feel that a 4-orbiter fleet is more than adequate for any foreseeable national needs. Do you agree?
You also strongly support the President's policy on this issue. What do you understand is the President's policy on 4 vs 5 orbiter fleet?
Answer. The following excerpt is from a policy directive signed by President Reagan: "The Senior Interagency Group (SIG) for Space, established to implement my National Space Policy, has examined the issue of whether Shuttle Orbiter production capability should continue beyond the four orbiters currently scheduled for delivery.
"After reviewing various options presented by the SIG (Space), I have decided that maintaining orbiter production capability is in the best interest of the nation. This objective will be achieved through the production of structural and component spares necessary to insure that the nation can operate the four orbiter fleet in a robust manner. These spares will provide the necessary assurance that Shuttle operations will continue in the face of minor problems, modifications or other periods of extended Orbiter outages.
"While this decision does not constitute approval for procurement of a fifth orbiter in fiscal year 1984, it does partially preserve this option for a future decision should optimistic estimates of demand materialize and other conditions dictate. It is my intent that the full potential of the Shuttle concept as originally envisioned is achieved and commercialization of space becomes a reality."
Because of uncertainties with respect to the ultimate need for additional Orbiters, as evidenced by the position you attribute to the President's Science Advisor, we believe that preserving the option for additional Orbiters at a reasonable near-term cost is the proper approach. The President's policy accomplishes this goal.
Question. How much of the Air Force's previous efforts in the 1960's on the Manned Orbiting Laboratory can be transferred to requirements in the year 2000 for the military potential for man in space?
Answer. Many of the same considerations still prevail, and the central issue still has to do with the identification of military missions whose performance can be enhanced sufficiently by the presence of man to justify the expenditures of resources for this purpose. It should be noted that the demise of the MOL program was attributed to the assessment that man was not an essential element for the classes of space missions under consideration at that time.
Question. Provide 1984-1988 costs for DoD space activities by major program element and line item.
Answer. The Department of Defense does not list "Space" as a major program, and extraction of space and space-related costs from the overall DoD program structure is a laborious procedure complicated by the fact that some space-related activity is included with non space-related activity within a single program element, and judgment must be applied to allocate these costs properly. We are in the process of accomplishing this task and will be pleased to respond when these data are availa
Question. In assessing the appropriate size of the orbiter fleet, how do you consider nongovernmental requirements? Or do you consider only the requirements of the government?
Answer. Consistent with the goals of our national space policy to develop the commercial potential of space, we recognize that responsive and economical access to space is a necessary ingredient. From our perspective, nongovernmental requirements represent a prospective demand for Shuttle services, and they are considered in that light. However, we recognize there are competing alternatives, both domestic and foreign, in expendable launch vehicles. Issues such as these contribute to the uncertainty with respect to the ultimate orbiter fleet size, and we believe that preserving options for additional orbiters is the proper course while we resolve these uncertainties and acquire operating experience with the Shuttle.
Question. Your testimony indicates that our spares posture for the orbiter fleet is "tenuous to inadequate." Do you mean that the $100 million proposed for spares in the fiscal year 1984 NASA budget is inadequate? What would be a more appropriate level? What are the most important considerations in determining an appropriate spares funding level? Would DoD fund part of the spares inventory if NASA funds are not available?
Answer. I was describing our current spares posture as "tenuous to inadequate" as evidenced by the current unavailablity of serviceable Shuttle main engines. This situation is the result of insufficient resources previously applied to spares, and the impact of funds requested in the fiscal year 1984 budget will not be felt for several years due to lead times.
With respect to the appropriate level of funding for Orbiter spares, we defer this determination to NASA who has the responsibility for this element of the Shuttle program. We are encouraged by recent increased attention to this issue by NASA management, and have made available to them trained DoD logisticians to assist in this difficult task.
From our perspective, the most important consideration in determining spares funding levels is achievement of the capability to responsively support user requirements. A corollary requirement is to maintain spares production capacity to enable efficient production of additional Orbiters if circumstances warrant.
Funding of Orbiter spares is a NASA responsibility under the NASA-DoD agreement for use of shuttle and is a reimbursable cost element. We believe that the recently renegotiated price per flight for use by the DoD reflects the cost projection for additional spares procurement by NASA. Under this agreement the DoD cost per flight has increased significantly from $12.2M to $29.8M in the post 1985 period (all costs in fiscal year 1975 dollars). DoD does fund for all spares associated with DoD operated elements of the system, such as Vandenberg AFB Shuttle facilities. Question. What are the prospects that DoD might require that an Orbiter be reserved for its own missions only? If there are such prospects, when might such a decision have to be made?
Answer. Due to the limited fleet size, we believe it is important that the Orbiters maintain scheduling flexibility to enable achievement of overall operational requirements. While the DoD might require the equivalent capability of a dedicated orbiter, we believe that setting aside one (or more) orbiters for "DoD only" use would be an inefficient use of the limited Orbiter resource.
Question. Are there any circumstances under which the DoD would consider production of a fifth orbiter on its own?
Answer. No. We firmly believe that all Orbiter production should be under the auspices of NASA who has, inbeing, the government-contractor team to manage this acquisition. We believe that any other alternative would be inefficient and inimical to the objective of commonality among orbiters.
Question. Do you see a point at which DoD payload weights will exceed the launch capacity of the Shuttle? If so, would DoD consider an alternative launch vehicle? Answer. Not in the foreseeable future. In the event such requirements develop, we would have the option to use the Shuttle's unique capabilities to support on-orbit assembly of a system that could not be deployed in a single Shuttle flight. We, of course, assume that the basic Shuttle will achieve the performance capability currently planned.
Question. Has consideration been given by DoD to "bumping" STS-9 to assure the scheduled launch of STS-10.
Answer. To satisfy critical national security needs, we require the launch of a DoD payload on STS-10 in November 1983 as currently manifested by NASA. We would hope that the delay caused by problems with STS-6 will not impact other users of Shuttle.
Question. DoD's projections of Shuttle payloads have decreased in recent estimations, adversely affecting the case for a 5th orbiter. To what do you attribute these reduced Shuttle requirements and do you agree with an assessment that these estimates are consistent with a 4 orbiter fleet?
Answer. In the early years of Shuttle operations, the DoD dropped requirements for three flights (one in 1984 and two in 1985) due to rescheduling and program redirection. Overall, based on the fiscal year 1983 President's Budget there was a prospective need for 120 DoD flights through 1994. The corresponding number based on the fiscal year 1984 President's Budget would be 117 for a 2.5 percent reduction. We do not believe that changes of this magnitude have any impact on orbiter fleet size decisions. The DoD has consistently maintained that a 3 orbiter fleet is sufficient if only DoD needs are considered.
Question. What are the approximate cost penalties for postponing a production decision on a 5th orbiter for one more year? For 2 more years? For 3 more years?
Answer. According to projections provided by NASA, to initiate procurement of OV-105 in fiscal year 1984, $200 million would be required in fiscal year 1984 with total costs estimated at $1,595 million (in fiscal year 1984 dollars). If procurement is initiated in fiscal year 1985, total costs are estimated as $1,750 million including $100 million in fiscal year 1984 for structural spares. No data are available for a 3 year delay.
Initiation of OV-105 in fiscal year 1983 is no longer possible because of the lead times required for such a procurement.
Question. Is private sector funding of a 5th orbiter an acceptable alternative to ?
Answer. The ultimate acceptability would depend on the terms and conditions associated with the private investment. We have nothing against the concept, in principle.
Question. What does DoD estimate should be the appropriate level for space shuttle orbiter spares acquisition for fiscal year 1984 and 1985?
Answer. The fiscal year 1984 Congressional Budget submitted by NASA includes $260 million for orbiter spares. This $260 million includes the $100M for major structural spares that is identified with the President's directive on Shuttle orbiter production capability. The NASA fiscal year 1985 budget includes $292M for orbiter spares including $120M to continue the major structual spares programs.
The DoD has not conducted an independent assessment of the adequacy of these funding levels.
Question. Under what circumstances would DoD consider bumping STS-9 for the launch of STS-10? When might such a decision have to be made?
Answer. The DoD requires launching of a national security payload in November 1983 as originally scheduled and manifested by NASA. If due to the delay in STS-6 NASA cannot accommodate the present overall schedule, we would expect NASA, as Shuttle operator, to determine what civil payload would be impacted. This determination would, in turn, identify when they must make such a decision.
Question. The major new start in the NASA aeronautics program is the Numerical Aerodynamic Simulator. Will the defense agencies be major users of this capability? If so, is there satisfaction that the NAS design is fully adequate for military aircraft design purposes?
Answer. The Numerical Aerodynamic Simulator (NAS) is envisioned to be the "Standard" for all aerodynamic computational activities in academia, industry and government agencies. Therefore, while DoD will be a user of the NAS, it is difficult at this time until the capabilities of the NAS are defined in greater detail-to specify to what extent the DoD will use the facility.
The only concern DoD has regarding the design of the NAS involves the security level of the computations. This area is being jointly explored by NASA and DoD, with recommendations regarding security level and procedures expected in approximately six months.
Question. We are generally familiar with the support by NASA of defense aeronautics programs. Do DoD programs, such as "modern technology demonstration engine program" or "mental-matrix composite materials" support NASA's propulsion and structures programs? How do these DoD programs find their way into civilian aircraft applications?
Answer. There are several mechanisms in place to assure the coordination and mutual support of NASA and DoD Aeronautics programs. Among these are the Aeronautics Panel of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), the Air Force Systems Command/NASA Interdependency Group and the Army/ NASA Memorandum of Understanding which provides for the Army Aviation Research and Technology Laboratories to be co-located at the NASA centers. The results of DoD programs find their way into civil aircraft applications primarily through the industry. The same contractors build military and civilian aircraft and engines. The normal course of events is that development of a civil version of the aircraft or component occurs sometime after the military version has entered service. Some examples are: the GE CF-6 high by-pass tubofan was derived from the TF-39 which powers the Lockheed C-5 aircraft; and, the GE CT-7 series shaft engines are civilian derivatives of the T-700 series engines developed by the Army for the UH-60 and H-64 helicopters.
Question. Your testimony indicates that you will "work closely with NASA to assist in whatever way we can to regain the test capability of the 40 x 80 foot wind tunnel (at Ames) as soon as practical." Would that assistance extend to shared funding, particularly if delays are encountered in completion of the work?
Answer. We have closely coordinated the schedule and costs to repair the 40 x 80 foot wind tunnel with NAŠA. They have informed us that they have sufficient funds indentified to complete the repair, and furthermore it is our understanding that additional funds will not speed up the repair due to the method by which the fan blades are fabricated. Our offer of assistance could include providing defense priority for any domestic procurements, and also stating the importance of the facility to defense needs to allow duty-free overseas procurement.
Question. Are you satisfied that the aeronautics budgets for DoD and NASA fulfill the federal responsibilities for support of aeronautics research and technology as announced by the President's Science Advisor last November?
Answer. In fiscal year 1984, the DoD and NASA will spend approximately one billion dollars on aeronautics research and technology. While there may be a few iso