APPENDIX TESTIMONY Alan Taft Crane on Physical Vulnerability of Electric Systems to before the Committee on Governmental Affairs Good Morning, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here and to present the OTA report Physical Vulnerability of Electric Systems to Natural Disasters and Sabotage. You requested this study last year because of concern that utilities had not adequately prepared for disasters involving unprecedented damage in this country. This report largely confirms your concern, but also notes that electric systems have considerable resiliency. OTA was fortunate to have many sources of information for this project because of our recent completion of a study on the technical implications for the operation of generation and transmission systems if competition increases in the electric power industry. Our research for the vulnerability study included meetings with utilities, electric power analytical groups, the power equipment manufacturing industry, Government agencies, experts in sabotage, and others. We also held a workshop to discuss collectively issues of vulnerability and what could be done to reduce it. The draft report was reviewed by the workshop participants and others. Literally the only major critical comments we received concerned the wisdom of discussing some of these issues in public. No one questioned the accuracy or clarity of the draft. In fact, the opposite was true. Several reviewers felt strongly that the draft presented too clear and (37) -2 concise a handbook for terrorists seeking to cause major economic damage to utilities and to society. Other reviewers noted that all this information was already in the public domain. We finally decided to move all material on the vulnerability of specific equipment to a separate appendix that is under classification review by the Department of Energy, even though it was prepared entirely from public sources. This appendix will be made available only under appropriate safeguards by the Department of Energy. Our concern was not with sophisticated, international terrorist groups who already know how to attack electric systems, but with smaller, unsophisticated groups who might have been able to inflict greater damage with better information. I shall briefly outline our major conclusions. Most electric systems are designed to accommodate one failure without interrupting service, and that usually is adequate. However, last year's Hurricane Hugo and other countries' experiences with sabotage have shown that long-term blackouts can occur following widespread damage. Sabotage is particularly worrisome because key facilities can be targeted that could take months to repair while large parts of a system are incapacitated. Some of these facilities are unguarded and in isolated areas. Unless damage is extremely widespread, at least partial power could be restored in a matter of hours. If numerous key pieces of equipment have been destroyed, full restoration could take many months. In the interim, customers would be faced with frequent short-term blackouts and voltage reductions. Economic damage can be very great. Impacts include lost production and sales, damaged equipment and data, public health and safety threats, and the much higher costs of replacement power. An extended power shortage could cost billions of dollars. -3 Protection of key facilities against a large, sophisticated attack would be extremely expensive, but lower level attacks could be deterred with barriers, detection systems, and alarms. The cost would be a few percent of the replacement cost of the facility. These key facilities are those with large, expensive equipment that can take months to replace. However, transmission lines would still be vulnerable to rifle fire. Such damage can be repaired quickly, but the saboteur can repeat it even more quickly. Many such quick attacks would have much the same effect on the system as eliminating key facilities. Natural disasters, in particular hurricanes, earthquakes, and geomagnetic storms can also have a devastating effect on power systems. Hurricanes affect mainly distribution systems, which are easier to repair than generating plants and transmission systems. However, the lingering, local blackouts following Hurricane Hugo demonstrated that more advance preparation may be warranted. Earthquakes are capable of destroying generating and transmission equipment that could take many months to replace. Facilities can be designed to withstand earthquakes, as they are in California, but less prepared areas including the Central Mississippi valley, the southern Appalachians and the Indiana region are also vulnerable to major shocks. Geomagnetically induced currents in a power system may cause transformers to overheat, resulting in permanent damage or reduced life, or merely take equipment out of service during the storm. Many utilities have taken some steps to reduce vulnerability to the types of disasters analyzed in the OTA report. The North American Electric Reliability Council and the Edison Electric Institute have been active in suggesting improvements. However, more could be done by both industry and Government, as discussed in the report. For example, in addition to protecting key facilities, utilities could improve contingency planning for - 4 handling disasters and expediting recovery. Critical equipment could be backed up by a stockpile or by designated spares to avoid long manufacturing delays. Emergency programs at the Department of Energy have been aimed largely at assuring a reliable supply of power for key national security facilities. Much less attention has been paid to the civilian sector. Some redirection of priorities could help avoid major economic disruption. Thank you Mr. Chairman. This concludes my remarks. I would like to include the Introduction and Summary of the OTA report as a supplement to my testimony. My colleague, Dr. Robin Roy, will elaborate on the technical vulnerability of electric systems and remedial measures. |