Senator LIEBERMAN. What would be your recommendations to utilities as to relatively low-cost, high-priority actions that they could take to protect against this kind of action?

Mr. CRANE. I think the first thing would be to do more contingency planning on the basis that this kind of accident may happen, and then start thinking through how to counter it, how to recover from it quickly. Planning is very cheap. If they do discover some particular weak points-as I think most of them would-I think you can start to harden them at relatively low cost, just a few percent of the cost of the facility, which would be pretty invisible to your ratepayers later.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Dr. Roy, did you want to add to that?

Dr. Roy. I agree with the contingency planning. That is a very low-cost area. Also, to begin to examine in detail what types of physical hardening would be possible. Again, it is planning and analysis rather than actually doing any hardening of any facilities. Senator LIEBERMAN. So at the outset you are really talking about is contingency planning, and then some modest investment in hardening facilities against what you would consider to be the most obvious vulnerabilities.

Dr. Roy. That is right. The types of hardening that would be successful or could be useful against some very basic attacks would be a few percent of the cost of the facility, but a very, very small percent of the cost of an overall utility's costs, because the facilities that are the key facilities are typically low-cost, relatively low-cost facilities. They are not the utility's big expenses.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Are there a lot of them? You tell me. Aren't there a lot of critical points of vulnerability in a typical metropolitan electric system, or are they truly limited?

Dr. Roy. They are fairly limited. Of course, every facility has its purpose to be there, but some combinations of them are particularly important. It can be just a very few, a handful. Less than a dozen.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Less than a dozen.

Dr. Roy. For each metropolitan area. This is a rough number.
Senator LIEBERMAN. I'm sorry?

Dr. Roy. As a rough number for a metropolitan area, less than a dozen facilities of truly great importance.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. Well, that is a manageable number. Let me just ask one other question about the mock experience that you carried out for a blackout in the New York City area for the 2to 3-week period. Can you estimate the cost of such a blackout? Did you get into that at all?

Mr. CRANE. We did not do that. FEMA will talk about that, I think, and DOE. The blackout in 1977 in New York City was estimated to cost 200-some million dollars for just one day.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. CRANE. Some of those are deferred costs, so you can't just extrapolate. That is not a daily cost. An extended blackout in any major area would be in the billions of dollars.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GLENN. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen. We appreciate it. We may want you to respond to additional questions later on from other members of the Committee once we have

reviewed the record. We appreciate the work you have done. It is a good report, one that lets us know what the potential vulnerability is. Now it is up to us to do something about it. Thank you.

Mr. CRANE. Thank you.

Dr. Roy. Thank you.

Chairman GLENN. Our next witness is Mr. William F. Jones, Associate Director, National Preparedeness Directorate, FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Mr. Jones, welcome this morning. We look forward to your statement or an abridged version, whichever you care.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F.W. JONES, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 1

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Good morning, Senator Lieberman.

I am pleased to appear here today to discuss FEMA's responsibilities and activities with repsect to the consenquences of a major domestic terrorist incident disrupting the electrical energy supply in a large metropolitan area. I will also summarize for you a recent simulation game that FEMA sponsored.

In general, FEMA's focus in the event of a terrorist attack on the electrical power infrastructure is on the consequences of the incident. This is in clear contrast to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the incident management lead agency, and the Department of Energy, the resource management lead agency. Thus, while we need information on the threat and the incident as it may unfold, we would receive that from the FBI. Similarly, DOE would serve as lead agency for restoration of power during the emergency, and be the cognizant agency on vulnerability matters. FEMA's role extends to the coordination of planning and preparedness for the consequences of the major domestic terrorist act, and to recovery activities required as a result of those consequences.

How do we carry out this mandate? We provide leadership and participation in working groups, cooperative efforts and studies that touch on energy disruption. We are involved in coordination and support of National Security Emergency Preparedness programs and plans. We provide advice to the National Security Council on National Security Emergency Preparedness, civil defense, and technological disaster issues. We are involved in planning for and coordinating the Federal response in Presidentially declared disasters. We are also involved in exercises, coordination and preparedness activities to build capability and evaluate how well the executive branch can respond.

We would note an important fact here that FEMA views the consequences of such a terrorist incident as similar to the consequences of other types of large-scale emergencies. The same needs may arise. They are medical care, food, shelter, evacuation, special supplies, equipment, goods or services, and the same response and capabilities are called for: disaster relief and assistance to States and local government, coordination of the response, emergency op

1 See p. 46 for Mr. Jones' prepared statement.

erating centers, emergency communications and data systems, emergency teams and staff, and public information.

FEMA would support a coordinated Federal response both from its Washington, D.C., headquarters and regional offices, and in the event of field operations, set up a Federal response center. We would bring to bear trained emergency teams and staff, nationwide emergency communications systems, data bases and assessment means, and would support establishment of a joint information center. When large-scale consequences State and local capabilities, we expect the President would declare an emergency under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistant Act, or in response to a request from the Governor of an affected State.

Finally, we sponsor and also participate in many exercises and games each year to enhance emergency planning and preparedness at all levels. We seek to integrate various governmental and private sector capabilities into a coherent, coordinated response entity. One of these was the Greater New York City Electric Energy Emergency Simulation Game, which was held May 23rd this year. This game focused on the catastrophic consequences arising from a major terrorist incident. Senior staff from 16 Federal departments and agencies, two States, the city of New York and two public utility companies participated in workshops and the game.

The scenario and administration of the game centered on the participants' attention on national issues and priorities. The major objective was for those participants to determine and clarify the roles and authorities of the Federal agencies in responding to the consequences of this interruption. Achieving this entailed analysis of the situation; an understanding of the roles and authorities of each agency and the States and locality; review of the response organization; and determination of which of those problems and issues were of national scope and of their recommended priority. The scenario the players confronted presented monumental problems. At about 3:00 on the George Washington's Birthday holiday, February 18, 1991, terrorist simultaneously attacked multiple electric power distribution points in New York and New Jersey, plunging the region into darkness with States from Maine to Maryland temporarily affected.

The assessment was that the power in the region would be off for -2 to 3 weeks in sub-freezing winter temperatures. The consequences were immediate with massive disruptions to road, rail and air transport, to the water supply, to commerce, and with mounting danger to the health and safety of the people in the region.

The charge to the players was that they were senior officials of their organizations called together in Washington, D.C., almost 12 hours after the outage to consider the national issues and priorities and to provide their views to the President.

They discussed eight areas: national concerns and priorities; organization and coordination of the Federal response; health and welfare; impact on the financial community; impact on area businesses, the workforce, and Government services; transportation impacts; foreign policy implications; and, finally, defense and national preparedness impacts.

The ensuring discussions were wide-ranging. They provided assessments of the individuals and their sense of policy recommenda

tions and priorities. Their summary comments they made best characterized the results of the game.

First, saving lives was paramount, the paramount and principal priority. Delay in response hazards the well-being of many people. Federal assistance will be furnished in response to State requests in such areas as food, transportation, water, sanitation, environmental hazards, mass care and shelter, emergency power supply and law enforcement assistance.

Secondly, plans and preparations were key. Restoration of power as soon as possible is vital. Thus, availability of critical electrical parts and components and/or spares is basic to deal with such an interruption. Backup generators and fuel will be needed. Government and industry must work closely together in planning and preparedness.

In terms of organizing the response, joint information centers to provide the public with timely, coordinated, and consistent information are vital. Basic mechanisms are in place and should be used. For example, the Federal plan for response to catastrophic earthquakes is designed to respond to a disaster of this magnitude to meet similar life-saving and emergency assistance needs of the State and local government.

Fourth, in the area of setting priorities, a viable mechanism to resolve conflicts as to regional and national priorities should be in place.

Fifth, restoration of business is very vital. It is important not only from an economic point of view, but also for assistance in responding to the emergency.

Sixth, on the tempo of the response, at the Federal level we should rely on State and local assessments of need in the initial response phase. We should avoid over- or under-reaction in the response.

Seventh, and lastly, telecommunications restoration and connectivity are fundamental to the response and recovery and should receive a high priority.

The lessons of the game are important. They form a sound basis for future planning and preparedness efforts. The game attracted a sizable and full representation of senior managers from Federal, State and local governments, and the public utilities, and afforded them an opportunity to deal with difficult issues and fashion recommendations under some time pressure, not unlike the initial hours of a major emergency. They gained a new appreciation for the difficulty and the vast variety and complex inter-relationships of the issues and problems. They had a strong sense of the need to assure competence in response and to keep the public and the Congress informed. Participants called for more such games and deeper involvment of the private sector in planning and response. Consequently, FEMA is considering the development and conduct of more simulation games and fashioning them for "hand-off" to a variety of audiences at various agencies and governmental levels. We are currently assessing the lessons learned on both game administration and substance. Clearly, FEMA must engage in a dialogue with DOE and other lead and participating agencies to determine when it would be appropriate to move to additional response planning and exercises.

Given the players' positive reactions, strong department and agency support and the information collected, we believe this game was a significant step in planning and preparedness for effective response in the face of this type of catastrophic incident.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to answer your questions.

Chairman GLENN. Thank you very much.

The FEMA Advisory Board asked FEMA to redefine its role in responding to a major electrical energy emergency resulting from a terrorist incident. Was there any basis for that request, or was it just a general view that you should be more prepared? Was there a reason for it, and did the Advisory Board believe that a terrorist attack was more plausible now than previously?

Mr. JONES. Well, the suggestion came from one of the members of our FEMA Advisory Board in 1988. That was in the wake of hearings which were held by Senator Leahy in the Commitee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, on the subject of technological terrorism, high-tech terrorism. Based on the record in that particular hearing-there were two hearings held in that general area—and the comments of the agencies, the sorts of resources and the like, and the fact that FEMA was mentioned prominently in those hearings and testified in a second one, it was felt that it was important to give impetus in this area, and we began working on the game. So there was a general feeling in the executive branch as well as the comments of the various Senators who participated.

Chairman GLENN. In the scenario that you set up for the game, you assumed a major terrorist attack on several power distribution points in New York and New Jersey, which resulted in the power outages. Was the scenario you set up considered to be realistic? It wasn't just set up just to make the worst case for how certain parties would react or whatever? Did the utilities you consulted agree with the plausibility, and did DOE agree with that plausibility?

Mr. JONES. DOE furnished us with the scenario. We had a number of working level meetings with DOE and with the State and local authorities who were involved in our game, and all felt that the scenario that was selected here was a credible, responsible and appropriate one for the purposes of this game.

Chairman GLENN. Was NERC part of the games?

Mr. JONES. We had people from the utilities who were participating in this. NERC itself was not. DOE was most helpful in arranging for the participation of the utility people.

Chairman GLENN. What were the results? Was there a lack of equipment or transformers or response teams? This would be a rather enormous disaster if the blackout lasted for 2 or 3 weeks. Everyone agrees with that. I would presume that no one, including FEMA, is completely equipped to handle something of that magnitude, are they?

Mr. JONES. The situation with respect to spares or availability of electrical transformers and supplies and the like is an area where DOE has the lead in the restoration of the outage.

Chairman GLENN. Was DOD part of the game?

Mr. JONES. Oh, DOD was there and participated throughout.