the Russians. It looks as if they will come to a successful conclusion. In fact, there is a high-level Peruvian mission in Moscow right now to try to wrap up that agreement.

Essentially, what they have said is that they have to make a financial arrangement with the Russians partly because the banks have made it very clear that, if they are going to in effect roll over their debt, they expect other people with substantial amounts of similar debt to do the same thing.

Mr. YATRON. What is the extent of Cuban involvement with insurgent groups targeted against Rhodesia?

Mr. BUSHNELL. We have some intelligence that the Cubans have some people, less than 300 altogether, in Mozambique and in Zambia, some of whom at least appear to be involved in training the guerrilla-type forces moving in and out of Rhodesia.

Mr. YATRON. In what ways has administration dissatisfaction with Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa been expressed to the U.S.S.R.? Mr. BUSHNELL. I think I will have to say that issue is not fully my bag to deal with as it has been dealt with at a great many levels of the U.S. Government through our representatives in Moscow, through Dobrynin here, and through a whole series of high-level contracts that we maintain on a regular basis with the Russians. I cannot, myself, give you a rundown on it.

Mr. YATRON. Do you know of any dissatisfaction that has been expressed to Cuba?

Mr. BUSHNELL. Yes; we have explained our dissatisfaction very strongly. Both Wayne and I have explained this to Mr. Sanchez-Parodi, their chief representative here; and our representative in Cuba, Lyle Lane, made high-level demarches on the Cubans to indicate very forcefully our position.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I have one more question that I would like to ask. I received a document from the Argentine Embassy this morning that had a picture, a reprint from a newspaper, and it showed a picture of Yassar Arafat and people identified as members of the Montoneros Group in Argentina. What information do we have about the relationship between the PLO and the terrorists in South America generally? Mr. BUSHNELL. We have very little. A number of people that are believed to have been terrorists in Argentina have moved to Europe. Some of them may have moved into training camps run by countries which also train the PLO. That may be the basis for such a picture. There is, I think, a general belief that there is increasing contact among various terrorist groups around the world.

This is an area where my own view would be that we wish we had better concrete intelligence, but obviously that is some of the hardest intelligence to gather.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you. We want to thank you gentlement for taking the time to be with us here today.

Mr. BUSHNELL. It has been our pleasure.

Mr. YATRON. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

28-631-78-6

IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIETS TIES IN THE WESTERN

HEMISPHERE

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. YATRON. Today the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee will hold its fourth session on the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties in the Western Hemisphere.

We previously had briefings by the Defense Intelligence Agency and State Department officials on Soviet activity in Cuba and the use of the Cuban military force in Africa.

We were also briefed on the political aspects of Cuban-Soviet influence in the hemisphere, reviewing upcoming elections, areas of unrest and possible future trouble spots.

This session will be devoted to the views of public witnesses on this most important subject.

Our witnesses are Prof. Lourdes Casal, assistant professor of social psychology at Rutgers University; Prof. Edward Gonzalez, of the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles; Dr. Roger W. Fontaine, director of Latin American studies in the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University; and Prof. Alfred Stepan, Department of Political Science at Yale University.

We have a copy of your prepared statements before us. Therefore, you can give a brief summary and additional remarks, which will be followed by questions of the subcommittee.

We will start with Professor Casal.

Dr. Casal, I understand you were recently hospitalized. I am sure I speak for the others members of the subcommittee when I say I appreciate you accepting the Chair's invitation to testify under these

circumstances.

We have a rollcall. I would suggest we take about a 10-minute break so we can go over and answer the rollcall. I will be right back and resume the hearing immediately. I am sorry this had to happen at this

time.

[At this point a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. YATRON. I will resume the hearing.
Dr. Casal.

STATEMENT OF LOURDES CASAL, PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J.

Ms. CASAL. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on InterAmerican Affairs, thank you very much for your invitation to address the subcommittee. I am a Cuban-born American citizen living in this country since 1961. I have visited Cuba in 1973, 1974, 1976, and 1978. I am currently a member of the Executive Council of LASA. Beginning in September of 1978, for a period of 1 year, I will be a Woodrow Wilson Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, to complete my book, "Cuba: On the Transition to Socialism." The present testimony concerns certain trends and characteristics of Cuban foreign policy and the appropriate U.S. response to them.

A recent article published in a popular African monthly, New African Development, April 1978 issue, and entitled: "How the Ogaden War Changed Carter's Africa Policy," discusses the strategies and motives of the main international actors in the Ogaden conflict. A paragraph concerning Cuba states that Cuba's motives appear essentially ideological. Fidel Castro has said that "Mengistu is a true revolutionary and that an important revolution is unfolding in Ethiopia and Cuba is demonstrating its solidarity." Page 23.

Lest anybody suspects that New African Development is some sort of leftist rag, let me clarify that it is published by International Communications Magazines, Ltd., a London-based concern and it is an executive-oriented type of magazine; some sort of cross between Time and the Economist.

The statement about Cuba's motives in aiding Mengistu would have probably never been printed in a U.S. mass circulation magazine except with a disclaimer, and its mere utterance would probably be received with a chuckle in the knowledgeable circles where U.S. foreign policy is discussed and/or decided. And yet it is the main contention of this testimony that Cuba's foreign policy has been seriously misunderstood, grossly mispredicted and inadequately responded to, because the U.S. policymakers have based their analysis of Cuban international behavior on the wrong set of assumptions.

The most persistent of such assumptions for a long time has been the viewpoint that Cuba is an appendix of the Soviet Union; that the Cubans are "guns for hire," as attributed to a White House official by Newsweek in their issue of March 13, and as a variant, that they are paying their economic debts to the Soviets by serving as their shock troops in unsavory African adventures.

The nature of the Cuba-U.S.S.R. relationship is complex; much more complex than any such assumption would reflect, and it will be discussed later in this testimony. Any of those simple assumptions. used as the basis for analysis-and worse, for policymaking-is going to lead to the wrong conclusions and the wrong options.

It seems to me that Cuban foreign policy, for all the strategic and tactical variations which have been observable throughout the 19 years of revolutionary change within the island, is characterized or springs forth from a relatively limited set of principles or central objectives.

The central objectives of Cuban foreign policy are, in my opinion,

two:

First, the survival of the revolution itself; the development of a network of associations and relationships at the international leveldiplomatic, economic, and political-which would counteract the U.S. persistent and systematic efforts during nearly the whole lifetime of the revolution, to destroy it militarily, strangle it economically, and provoke its demise by engineering the assassination of its leaders.

In spite of recent changes, U.S. policy still denies diplomatic recognition of Cuba and still maintains an aggressive policy of embargo. This leaves U.S. policymakers with restricted channels for normal negotiating with Cuba and with limited options in terms of attempts to influence Cuba's behavior. Furthermore, it remains being perceived by Cuban leaders as a basically hostile country which only reluctantly and grudgingly may move towards normalization.

The second central objective is the principle of proletarian interrationalism as interpreted by the Cuban leadership.

-Proletarian internationalism" is a term which tends to be received with knowing cynical smiles in the United States. However, the Cubans take it very seriously. As interpreted by the Cuban leadership, proletarian internationalism means that:

Caba, in carrying out its foreign policy, subordinates its interests to the general interests of the victory of socialism and communism, of national liberation of the peoples, to the purposes of defeating imperialism and eliminating colonialism, neocolonialism and all forms of exploitation and discrimination of mer and peoples ***

as it reads in the first section of the Resolution on Foreign Policy of the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party.

The Cubans have taken this principle seriously; of course, guiding its application by a concrete analysis of the international situation, the correlation of forces both internal and external in different regions and countries at a given time; et cetera.

But it is my opinion that, within the constraints of objective reality, the Cubans have, by and large, behaved as independent actors in making such judgments and have also, by and large, adhered to this principle with a moral fervor totally removed from opportunism and narrow self-interest.

This moral dimension is another characteristic of Cuba's foreign policy which has been completely ignored or discounted in most U.S. analyses I have seen. Yet it is a central aspect to understand Cuba's behavior and particularly the behavior of Fidel Castro; not the only source of Cuba's foreign policy decisions, as held by some American mythologists of the Cuban revolution, but definitely a central figure whose political power and moral authority remain towering on the Cuban scene.

Fidel Castro, strange as this statement may sound to American ears, may be considered as a man obsessed by moral concerns, as a true moralist who is inclined to throw his weight on the side of whatever he may consider to be the moral option at a given juncture, even when his moral option may be contraposed to legalistic or even legitimately "pragmatic" considerations.