IMF Staff Papers, Volume 51, 2004, Special Issue: IMF Fourth Annual Research Conference
This is the 2004 (Volume 51) Special Issue of IMF Staff Papers, which includes 6 selected papers (from more than 20) that were presented at the IMF's Fourth Annual Research Conference, November 6-7, 2003.
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adjustment analysis assets average base country base interest rate base rate bilateral trade borrowing Cambridge capital controls capital markets central bank classical gold standard closed nonpegs coefficient constraints consumption volatility crawling peg creditor countries crises crisis current account deficit current account reversals debtor default dollar domestic dummy Economic Research effect empirical episodes equation estimates exchange rate regime expected Global gold interest rate gold standard gross capital flows growth volatility half-life inflation inflows instrumental variables interwar investment lending levels relationship macroeconomic Model of Sovereign monetary policy monthly monthly monthly Mozambique nominal interest rate nonpegs nontraded observations Obstfeld open pegs panel PDIFFS percent of GDP period Prasad real exchange rate real interest rate regressions reserves Robust standard errors Rogoff Rose and Spiegel sample sector Shambaugh shocks significant Sovereign Debt statistically sudden stops Table Tanzania target zone trilemma U.S. dollar Uganda unit root
Page 5 - It follows that an increase in a current account deficit that results from a shift in private sector behavior — a rise in investment or a fall in savings — should not be a matter of concern at all.
Page 5 - In the 1994 Brookings Panel Session on Mexico, Stanley Fischer supported the view that large current account deficits are dangerous. He argued that: The Mexican current account deficit is huge, and it is being financed largely by portfolio investment. Those investments can turn around very quickly and leave Mexico with no choice but to devalue . . . And as the European and especially the Swedish experiences show, there may be no interest rate high enough to prevent an outflow and a forced devaluation.