The 479 active and reserve installations that have not received a higher headquarters assessment may be critical to DOD's operations in different ways. For example, the installations include the Army's reserve centers and ammunition plants, the Navy's reserve centers and some of its hospitals, and the Air Force's fuel storage facilities, communication annexes, and air stations. Table 2 details the types of active and reserve installations by service that did not receive a higher headquarters vulnerability assessment. Table 2: Type and Number of Active and Reserve Installations Not Assessed by *Other includes those installations and facilities that did not clearly fit into the categories in the table. For example, some Army installations were referred to as an annex or a complex without any identifying functional description. Source: GAO analysis. In addition to the large number of installations not assessed, at those installations that were assessed, we identified some critical facilities that were not included in the assessments. For example, we visited two installations with fuel storage facilities containing between 50 to 70 million gallons of fuel that were not included in the vulnerability assessment process. Critical Structures Have Important buildings and structures at each installation are not being systematically evaluated so that commanders can determine resource priorities. As discussed earlier, the Department recommended installation commanders conduct this evaluation (called a criticality assessment) using six specific factors (value, materials, significance, accessibility, reconstitution, and mission impact) to identify and prioritize antiterrorism improvement requirements." These six elements are important because they provide the commander specific criteria to evaluate the installation's assets in terms of how important they are to accomplishing the Department's missions, the time that would be required to reconstitute this capability, and the potential cost to repair or replace the structures. Without the systematic assessment of critical structures, lower priority facilities may receive improvements while higher priority facilities remain vulnerable to an attack. The Department does not have a system in place to determine if these criticality assessments have been completed or if they were used to help prioritize antiterrorism requirements. At the installations we visited, officials were able to identify their most critical structures, but none had completed a criticality assessment using the six factors. In addition, headquarters officials responsible for force protection from each of the services were unaware of the usefulness of such an evaluation, or how it should be completed. They also stated that they were not surprised the evaluations were not being completed because the installation personnel were not required to complete them. The antiterrorism standards updated on June 14, 2001, now require installation commanders to conduct these criticality assessments. But, unlike vulnerability and threat assessments, which are clearly described in the standards, there is no specific standard that describes a criticality assessment, the six relevant elements, and the resulting analysis to guide resource decisions. Without this degree of specificity, installation officials 11 Information on criticality assessments is contained in DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H (Feb. 19, 1993) and in the Joint Staff antiterrorism installation assessment guide for installations. Threat Assessments May Threat information weaknesses may be unsure of how to conduct the assessments or how the assessments can be used to support resource decisions. The threat assessments developed by the service investigative agencies The standard Department of Defense threat assessment methodology, when used by the service investigative agencies, provides information on organized terrorist groups, militias, domestic gangs, and local criminal activity that may threaten the military. For example, the service investigative agents, with input from the FBI and other law enforcement organizations, use this methodology to develop information on militia group activities, intentions, and capabilities in the vicinity of an installation, and then evaluate the significance of that potential threat. In addition, the services' investigative agencies analyze local crime data to determine patterns in criminal and drug-related activities that might affect installation security. Using this methodology the investigative agencies can collect, analyze, and In addition, the threat methodology does not address the consequences of changing business practices at installations, which may create new threats and new opportunities for individuals not affiliated with the military to gain access to installations. For example, Navy officials told us approximately 4,900 Department of Defense positions were affected by recent Department downsizing initiatives at several installations in one |