64 Opinion of the Court. The Government relies with much confidence upon Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, and Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; but the facts there and the facts here were entirely different. Both cases, like the Coronado and the United Leather Workers cases and the present case, arose out of labor disputes; but in the former cases, unlike the latter ones, the object of the labor organizations was sought to be attained by a country-wide boycott of the employer's goods for the direct purpose of preventing their sale and transportation in interstate commerce in order to force a compliance with their demands. The four cases and the one here, considered together, clearly illustrate the vital difference, under the Sherman Act, between a direct, substantial and intentional interference with interstate commerce and an interference which is incidental, indirect, remote, and outside the purposes of those causing it. Third: That persons in other states were directly prevented or discouraged from shipping into California. In respect of the alleged instances of direct interference with interstate sales and shipments, the evidence is sharply conflicting, with the preponderance in most cases, we think, on the side of appellants. In many of them the interferences had no connection with the "American plan" or the system and efforts employed to effectuate it, but were in furtherance of independent trade policies or other isolated and disconnected purposes. One such case was that of the Golden Gate Building Material Company, consisting of five plastering contractors, where the basis of the refusal to accept orders for supplies was a protest by certain dealers that the company was buying for individual use and not for resale, and had been formed merely to obtain dealers' prices. A class of interferences strongly pressed in argument was that in respect of plumbing supplies, practically all of which were manufactured outside of the State of California. Lists of plumbing con Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S. tractors who were not observing the "American plan were sent to the plumbing supply houses, and some of them refused to sell materials to such contractors. That there was, at least, a sympathetic connection between this action and the "American plan " may be assumed, although plumbing supplies were not within the scope of the permit list. However this may be, and whatever may have been the original situation, the practice was abandoned long before the present suit was instituted, and nothing appears by way of threat or otherwise to indicate the probability of its ever being resumed. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for present relief by injunction. United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 444 445. By the foregoing process of elimination, the interferences which may have been unlawful are reduced to some three or four sporadic and doubtful instances, during a period of nearly two years. And when we consider that the aggregate value of the materials involved in these few and widely separated instances, was, at the utmost, a few thousand dollars, compared with an estimated expenditure of $100,000,000 in the construction of buildings in San Francisco during the same time, their weight, as evidence to establish a conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce or to establish such restraint in fact, becomes so insignificant as to call for the application of the maxim, de minimis non curat lex. To extend a statute intended to reach and suppress real interferences with the free flow of commerce among the states, to a situation so equivocal and so lacking in substance, would be to cast doubt upon the serious purpose with which it was framed. The decree of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the bill. Decree reversed. Counsel for Parties. BARRETT, AS PRESIDENT OF THE ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY v. VAN PELT CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. No. 160. Argued January 6, 1925.-Decided April 13, 1925. 1. The first Cummins Amendment, to § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, concerning the duty of carriers to issue receipts or bills of lading for interstate freight and their liability for loss or damage, provides: "That if the loss, damage, or injury complained of was due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence, then no notice of claim nor filing of claim shall be required as a condition precedent to recovery." Held that the words "carelessness or negligence " qualify the whole clause; "damaged" should be read "damage' and the comma after "unloaded" should be omitted. P. 87. 2. Thus read, carelessness or negligence is an element of each case of loss, damage or injury included in the clause, and in such case carriers are not permitted to require notice or filing of claim as a condition precedent to recovery. P. 91. 3. In an action against an express company for damages due to delay, the shipper, not having given notice and filed a claim, as required by the uniform express receipt, must prove the delay was due to the carrier's carelessness or negligence. P. 91. 205 App. Div. 332, reversed. CERTIORARI to a judgment of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirming a judgment for damages based on delay of an express company in transporting and delivering a carload of eggs. Mr. K. E. Stockton, with whom Mr. Charles W. Stockton was on the brief, for petitioner. Messrs. Selig Edelman and Ralph Merriam for respondent. Messrs. Lamar Hardy and Louis C. White were on the briefs. Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S. Messrs. H. S. Marx and A. M. Hartung filed a brief as amici curiae, by special leave of Court. Mr. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court. February 23, 1918, at Louisville, Kentucky, respondent's assignor delivered to the Adams Express Company, a carload, consisting of 522 cases of fresh eggs, for transportation to New York City, there to be delivered to Harold L. Brown Company. The shipment was so delivered, March 4, 1918. This action was brought to recover damages for loss in market value due to delay in transportation. At the trial, respondent contended that the express company was bound to make delivery of the eggs within a reasonable time, which he claimed to be not more than 30 hours. It was shown that the price of eggs in New York declined between the time respondent claimed delivery to consignee should have been made and the time when it was made. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of respondent. A judgment was entered thereon. Petitioner appealed. It was affirmed by the Appellate Division. 205 App. Div. 332. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York was denied. This court granted certiorari. 263 U. S. 697. The case involves the construction of a provision of the Act of Congress of March 4, 1915, known as the first Cummins Amendment, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196, 1197, amending § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 386, as amended by § 7 of the Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 593, 595. Chapter 176 requires any common carrier receiving property for transportation in interstate commerce to issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and makes it liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage or injury to such property, and contains certain provisos, the last two of which are: "Provided further, That it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to provide by rule, contract, regulation, 85 Opinion of the Court. or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice of claims than ninety days and for the filing of claims for a shorter period than four months, and for the institution of suits than two years: Provided, however, That if the loss, damage, or injury complained of was due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence, then no notice of claim nor filing of claim shall be required as a condition precedent to recovery." At the time of the delivery of the property for transportation, the express company issued and delivered a receipt or bill of lading therefor, which contained the following: "Received from Ky. Creameries the shipment hereinafter listed, subject to the Classification and Tariffs in effect on the date hereof, which shipment the Company agrees to carry upon the terms and conditions of the Uniform Express Receipt in effect on date of shipment." Section 7 of the uniform receipt contains the following: Except where the loss, damage or injury complained of is due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence, as conditions precedent to recovery claims must be made in writing to the originating or delivering carrier within four months after delivery of the property or, in case of failure to make delivery, then within four months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed; and suits for loss, damage or delay shall be instituted only within two years and one day after delivery of the property, or, in case of failure to make delivery, then within two years and one day after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed." (Official Express Classification No. 25, filed May 18, 1917. I. C. C. A-2130.) No claim was made or filed within four months after the delivery of the property to the consignee. We are required to decide whether the case is one where notice. or filing of claim may be required as a condition precedent to recovery. If the first clause of the above quoted pro |