is engaged in prospecting for and producing crude petroleum, under the provisions of the Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, c. 85, 41 Stat. 437, and, therefore, "is a governmental agency, means or instrumentality whose operations cannot be taxed by the state." The state supreme court held otherwise. 65 Mont. 414; 68 Mont. 550.

Whether the company under its leases is an agency, means or instrumentality of the United States, or in the absence of congressional consent would be outside the reach of state taxation, we need not stop to consider, since we are of opinion that the authority of the state exists in virtue of such consent. Section 32 (41 Stat. 450) of the act contains the following proviso: “Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed or held to affect the rights of the States or other local authority to exercise any rights which they may have, including the right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee of the United States."

The contention on behalf of the company is that this proviso, which saves from the effect of any possible adverse construction of the act, rights of the states "which they may have," relates to, and is confirmatory of, existing rights only,-that is to say, rights existing when the act was passed. But we find nothing in the body of the act which, by any stretch of meaning, purports to detract from or render less certain any such preexisting rights; and, in that view, the theory advanced fails for want of material upon which to operate. It fairly cannot be supposed that Congress would indulge in the altogether idle, ceremony of enacting a law to save rights which, being in no way challenged or affected, stood in no need of being saved. The more natural view, and the one we adopt, is that Congress, having provided for leasing the public lands to private corporations and persons whose

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Opinion of the Court.

property, income, business and occupations ordinarily were subject to state taxation, meant by the proviso to say in effect that, although the act deals with the letting of public lands and the relations of the government to the lessees thereof, nothing in it shall be so construed as to affect the right of the states, in respect of such private persons and corporations, to levy and collect taxes as though the government were not concerned. In other words, the purpose of Congress was to remove altogether from the field of controversy, among other questions, the very question which is here presented, and to put beyond doubt the authority of the states to impose taxes upon lessees in respect of their property, although arising from, and in respect of their taxable rights, although exercised under, the act, without regard to the origin thereof or to the interest of the United States in the lands or leases.

Further, it is said that the enumeration of particular objects of taxation causes it to be necessary to limit the general words, "or other rights," to things of the same nature in accordance with the doctrine of ejusdem generis; and that, thus limited, the right or privilege of carrying on a business or following an occupation is not included. These general words follow the more particular words, improvements [and] output of mines," and are followed by the equally general words, "property or assets," the entire clause being "improvements, output of mines, or other rights, [other] property, or [other] assets." The doctrine invoked is a rule of construction, to be used as an aid in the ascertainment of the intention of the lawmakers, and not for the purpose of subverting such intention when ascertained. Here, the enumeration of taxable things, including the general classes, property and assets, is so comprehensive that nothing remains to which the phrase in question can apply, unless to rights like the one here taxed; and to construe it as contended would,

in effect, therefore nullify it altogether. Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545, 553–554. No doubt, what Congress immediately had in mind was the necessity of making it clear that, notwithstanding the interest of the government in the leased lands, the right of the states to tax improvements thereon and the output thereof should not be in doubt; but the intention likewise to save the authority of the states in respect of all other taxable things is made evident by the addition of the three general categories, "other rights, property or assets." We think the proviso plainly discloses the intention of Congress that persons and corporations contracting with the United States under the act, should not, for that reason, be exempt from any form of state taxation otherwise lawful. Decree affirmed.

NAMPA & MERIDIAN IRRIGATION DISTRICT v. BOND, PROJECT MANAGER, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 135. Argued March 6, 1925.-Decided April 13, 1925.

1. When an irrigation system has been completed under the Reclamation Act, subsequent construction of a drainage system to remove injurious consequences of its normal operation on the lands included is chargeable to maintenance and operation rather than to construction, and § 4 of the Reclamation Extension Act, preventing increase of construction charges when once fixed except by agreement between the Secretary of the Interior and a majority of water-right applicants and entrymen affected, does not apply. P. 53.

2. This is consistent with attributing to construction the cost of drainage provided for in the original plan because the need for it was existent or foreseen. P. 54.

3. Where lands of an Idaho irrigation district were included in a federal reclamation project under a contract obliging the Government to furnish water and construct drainage works within the district, which was done and the cost assessed as a construction

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Opinion of the Court.

charge against all the project water users, the district agreeing that the project lands in the district should pay the same operation and maintenance charge per acre as announced by the Secretary of the Interior for similar lands of the project, Held that the project lands within the district were liable with the other project lands to bear, as an operation and maintenance charge, the cost of providing drainage for project lands outside the district which were being ruined by seepage water from the operation of the irrigation system. P. 53.

283 Fed. 569; 288 id. 541, affirmed.

APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a decree of the District Court which dismissed a bill by which the Irrigation District sought to enjoin an official of the federal Reclamation Service and a water users' association from withholding water from lands within the District for nonpayment of maintenance and operation charges.

Messrs. H. E. McElroy and Will R. King for appellant. Mr. Fremont Wood was also on the brief.

Mr. W. W. Dyar, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom the Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General Ira K. Wells were on the brief, for Bond.

Mr. J. D. Eldridge for Payette-Boise Water Users' Association, Ltd.

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant is an irrigation district organized as a public corporation under the laws of Idaho. In 1915, its supply of water being insufficient to irrigate the lands of all its members, it entered into a contract with the United States, at that time engaged in the construction of the Boise irrigation project, for water to irrigate the unsupplied lands and for the construction of a drainage system

within the district. The district undertook to represent these lands in their relations to the government and collect from their owners and pay over to the government construction installments and operation and maintenance charges. The drainage system was constructed in accordance with the contract and the cost thereof, after deducting the amount chargeable to the old water right nonproject lands within the district, was paid by the United States as a construction expense and, with other costs of construction, was charged ratably against all the project lands, being 40,000 acres within and 100,000 acres outside the district. After the construction cost, including this drainage, had been fixed by the government, it became necessary to drain project lands outside the district because they were being ruined for agricultural uses by the steadily rising ground level of seepage water due directly to the operation of the irrigation system. Thereupon, the Secretary of the Interior authorized the construction of a drainage system for these lands, the cost to be charged to operation and maintenance, and to be borne ratably by all the water users upon project lands both within and without the district. Appellant contended that this expenditure was not properly chargeable to operation and maintenance but was an additional charge for construction, which appellant could not be required to collect and pay over under § 4 of the Reclamation Extension Act of August 13, 1914, c. 247, 38 Stat. 636, 687, which provides that no increase in construction charges shall be made after the same have been fixed except by agreement between the Secretary of the Interior and a majority of the water right applicants and entrymen to be affected thereby. It was insisted further that appellant would be precluded by state law from collecting the charges from owners of non-project lands, because they were not benefited. The government having threatened that unless the charges were paid it would shut off the sup