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finally denied permanent admission. In support of this action the Secretary of Labor said
"Neither the citizenship of the alleged husband, nor the relationship of the applicant to him, has been investigated for the reason that even if it were conceded that both elements exist she would still be inadmissible, as Section 13 of the Act of 1924 mandatorily excludes the wives of United States citizens of the Chinese race if such wives are of a race or persons ineligible to citizenship, and the Department has no alternative than to recommend exclusion."
The court below inquires, Jud. Code, § 239: "Should the petitioners be refused admission to the United States either, (a) because of the want of a visé; or (b) because of want of right of admission if found to be Chinese wives of American citizens?"
This cause involves no claim of right granted or guaranteed by treaty and is therefore radically different from Cheung Sum Shee et al. v. John D. Nagle, etc., this day decided, ante, p. 336.
The excluded wives are alien Chinese ineligible to citizenship here. Rev. Stat. 2169; Act May 6, 1882, c. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61. Notwithstanding their marriage to citizens of the United States they did not become citizens and remained incapable of naturalization.
Prior to September 22, 1922, Rev. Stat. 1994 applied. It provided
"Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen."
Since that date c. 411, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022, has been in force. It provides
SEC. 2. "That any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, or any woman whose husband is naturalized after the passage of this Act, shall not become a citizen of the United States
by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete compliance with all requirements of the naturalization laws.
Sec. 13(c), Immigration Act of 1924, declares
"No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States unless such alien (1) is admissible as a non-quota immigrant under the provisions of subdivision (b), (d), or (e) of section 4, or (2) is the wife, or the unmarried child under eighteen years of age, of an immigrant admissible under such subdivision (d), and is accompanying or following to join him, or (3) is not an immigrant as defined in section 3."
Subdivisions (b), (d) and (e) of § 4 apply to immigrants previously lawfully admitted, immigrants who seek to enter as religious ministers or professors, and to students. They are not controlling here. An immigrant is defined in § 3 as "any alien departing from any place outside the United States destined for the United States," with certain exceptions, none of which describes the pres ent applicants.
Taken in their ordinary sense the words of the statute plainly exclude petitioners' wives.
We cannot accept the theory that as consular officers are required to issue visés to Chinese wives of American citizens therefore they must be admitted. A sufficient answer to this is found in § 2(g)
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to entitle an immigrant, to whom an immigration visa has been issued, to enter the United States, if, upon arrival in the United States, he is found to be inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws."
Nor can we approve the suggestion that the provisions contained in Subdivision (a)* of § 4 were omitted from
"An immigrant who is the unmarried child under 18 years of age, or the wife, of a citizen of the United States who resides therein at the time of the filing of a petition under section 9."
the exceptions in § 13(c) because of some obvious oversight and should now be treated as if incorporated therein. Although descriptive of certain "non-quota immigrants," that subdivision is subject to the positive inhibition against all aliens ineligible to citizenship who do not fall within definitely specified and narrowly restricted classes.
In response to the demand for an interpretation of the Act which will avoid hardships and further a supposed rational and consistent policy, it suffices to refer to what we have said in Yee Won v. White, 256 U. S. 399, 401, 402; Chung Fook v. White, 264 U. S. 443, 445, 446; Commissioner, etc. v. Gottlieb, 265 U. S. 310, 314.
The applicants should be refused admission if found to be Chinese wives of American citizens. It is unnecessary now to consider the requirements of the Act in respect of visés.
WALLACE BENEDICT, RECEIVER, v. RATNER.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 11. Argued October 5, 1923.-Decided May 25, 1925.
1. By the law of New York a transfer of property, as security for a debt, which reserves to the transferor the right to dispose of the property or to apply its proceeds for his own uses, is fraudulent and void as to creditors.
2. This rule applies to the assignment of present and future book accounts as well as to assignment of chattels, since it does not result from the retention of ostensible ownership by the assignor, but from the fact that the reservation of dominion by him is inconsistent with the effective disposition of title and creation of a lien. P. 361.
3. Held that an assignment made by a mercantile corporation, more than four months before it was adjudged bankrupt, of its present and future accounts receivable as security for a loan, was void under the above rule, so that delivery of a list of accounts, and payments made within the four months, were inoperative to perfect a
Argument for Petitioner.
lien in the assignee, but were unlawful preferences, under the Bankruptcy Act. P. 364.
282 Fed. 12, reversed.
CERTIORARI to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the District Court requiring a receiver and trustee in bankruptcy to pay over money collected from accounts receivable to a creditor of the bankrupt claiming them as security under an assignment, and denying the trustee's petition that the creditor be required to pay over collections made by him under the assignment.
Mr. Selden Bacon, for petitioner.
A contemporaneous agreement that, despite an assignment of property as collateral security to secure the assignee for a debt due him from the assignor, the assignor may continue to use and dispose of the property as his own, retaining and using the proceeds in his business, without accounting therefor in any way to his assignee, renders the assignment fraudulent and void as against creditors, not only in the case of ordinary chattel mortgages but also in the case of assignments confined to accounts receivable. In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 Fed. 886; Russell v. Winne, 37 N. Y. 591; Skilton v. Codington, 185 N. Y. 80; Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 N. Y. 581; Southard v Benner, 72 N. Y. 424; Zartman v. First Natl. Bank, 189 N. Y. 267; In re Volence, 197 Fed. 232; Robinson v. Elliot, 22 Wall, 513.
Cases implying that the rule is not based on any appearance growing out of possession but on the fraudulent character of the arrangement, we find in abundance. See cases above cited, and Wood v. Lowry, 17 Wend. 492; Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 213; Vilas Bank v. Newton, 25 App. Div. N. Y., 62, 66; Mittnach v. Kelly, 3 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 301; Gardner v. McEwen, 19 N. Y. 123; In re Marine Construction Co., 144 Fed. 649; Worrall v. Smith, 1 Camp. 322; Paget v. Perchard, 1 Esp. 205.
Argument for Respondent.
The decisions in Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U. S. 90, and in Chapman v. Hunt, 254 Fed. 768, in no way conflict with the rule we invoke.
Even were the rule predicated on a false appearance of ownership, the facts here supply the equivalent, and more than the equivalent, of any false appearance of ownership arising from possession of tangibles. There was the actual appearance of ownership deliberately preserved and sustained, and deliberate concealment of the assignment to avoid the obvious and contemplated consequences of disclosure of the fact of the assignment of all receivables present and future.
If the assignment was galvanized into actuality by Ratner's taking over the checks as they came in, during the last week before the bankruptcy, that galvanization process went no further than his actual receipts of about $12,000, and the decree for further payment to him of some $18,000 is erroneous. Moreover as to the $12,000 the transaction was preferential. The main question presented is of the utmost importance to the business community and to the administration of the Bankruptcy Act.
Mr. Louis S. Posner, for respondent.
An assignment of property to be acquired thereafter operates by way of present contract to give a lien which, as between the parties, takes effect and attaches to the subject of it as soon as it comes into the ownership of the assignor. Such lien becomes perfected and ripens into a right at law which is enforcible against third parties if, after the property is acquired, the assignee take possession thereof prior to an execution or attachment levy thereon, or the like, by third parties, or the appointment of a receiver upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against the assignor. McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 463; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516.
The facts here constitute the equivalent, and more than the equivalent, of taking possession of the accounts re