336 Views of Department of State. the right to enter a country for purposes of trade, is the representative of an entity embracing his wife and children who are not to be dissociated from him. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that treaties with Japan, China, and other countries contemplate prolonged and undetermined residence for the purposes of trade, the occupation of dwellings, and by necessary inference the establishment of homes. [Citing treaties.] It would scarcely be suggested that each of these treaties should be interpreted differently in accordance with the exact words used. Such literal construction could not give effect to the intent of the contracting parties, nor could it avail to carry out the general purposes for which such treaties are concluded. It is believed that the varying terms of all these treaties may be properly paraphrased thus: "The contracting parties agree that their citizens and subjects, respectively, shall have a right to come into the territories of the other for the purpose of carrying on international trade, and they are accorded the privilege of remaining indefinitely in the country, of establishing their homes and of bringing with them for this purpose the members of their families so long as they are here for that purpose." An examination of the original signed copy of the treaty of 1880 with China, in the archives of the Department of State, reveals that there is nothing therein which can be regarded as a title, although in Malloy's compilation (Vol. 1, p. 237) it is given the caption, "Immigration Treaty." In so far as the Chinese treaty refers to merchants, and provides for their entry into the United States, it seems entirely reasonable and proper to consider it as a "treaty of commerce and navigation." It would be unreasonable to assume in the absence of convincing evidence that the United States and Japan, for example, sought, on the one hand, to give traders the right to enter, remain, and reside for an indefinite period for the purposes Views of Department of State. 268 U. S. of trade, and, on the other, to isolate them while exercising that privilege from their wives and minor children. An important social policy well recognized in the Anglo-American system lies at the foundation of this principle. Our courts have recognized the identity of interest which exists between husband and wife. The wife is an integral part of the husband's sphere of activity. Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694. The Supreme Court of the United States in deciding United States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459, interpreted the treaty between the United States and China of November 17, 1880 (22 Stat. 826), in a manner that sustains this conclusion. See In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 Fed. 398; Ex Parte Goon Dip, 1 Fed. (2d) 811; Ex Parte So Hakp Yon, 1 Fed. (2d) 814; Yee Won v. White, 256 U. S. 399; Woo Hoo v. White, 243 Fed. 541; see also In re Chin Hern Shu, D. C. Mass., Dec. 11, 1924 (unreported). It is never to be supposed that an Act of Congress overrides the provisions of a treaty unless its words are so clear that there is no escape from that conclusion. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536. Section 3(6) of the Immigration Act of 1924 classifies as a non-immigrant an alien entitled to enter the United States solely to carry on trade under and in pursuance of the provisions of a present existing treaty of Commerce and Navigation." Section 13(c) provides that "no alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States unless such alien . . . is not an immigrant as defined in Section 3." If we assume that aside from the Act wives and minor children of merchants are given by the treaty a right to enter the United States, it is obvious that no argument for their exclusion under the Act could arise except for the words "solely to carry on trade," which appear in § 3(6). It is argued that this phrase was directed against the wives and children of merchants, on the ground that any other construction deprives this phrase of all meaning. However, such is not the case. In view of its legislative history, it is believed that this phraseology was adopted with a desire to grant full rights to persons entitled to enter under treaties of commerce and navigation-to show that the treaty provisions referred to were only those provisions respecting privileges of commerce and navigation, and that the class of persons referred to was the merchant class within the scope of those provisions. There is another apparent reason for the use of the phrase "solely to carry on trade" as used in § 3(6). The various treaties of commerce and navigation do not refer exclusively to merchants. A right of entry is also accorded to ships (and necessarily to their crews) and to temporary visitors. Congress had already provided for alien seamen in § 19 of the Act and for visitors or travelers in § 3(2). The phrasing of § 3(6) seems to have been adopted partly to avoid a conflict with or repetition of §§ 3(2) and 19, and was designedly supplemental thereto. The evidence is abundant and convincing that Congress itself not only had no desire to curtail the treaty right, but also deliberately undertook to respect the treaty right to enter of all who were clothed therewith. Mr. Henry W. Taft filed a brief as amicus curiae by special leave of Court. MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners are alien wives and minor children of resident Chinese merchants lawfully domiciled within the United States. They departed from China on the Steamship President Lincoln, and upon arrival at San Francisco, July 11, 1924, sought permanent admission to the United States. The Secretary of Labor denied their applications and gave the following reasons therefor— "Neither the mercantile status of the husband and father, nor the applicant's relationship to him, has been Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S. investigated for the reason that even if it were conceded that both these elements exist the applicants would be inadmissible as a matter of law. This is made necessary because of the inhibition against their coming to the United States as found in Paragraph (c) of Section 13 and that portion of Section 5 which reads as follows: 'An alien who is not particularly specified in this Act as a nonquota immigrant or a non-immigrant shall not be admitted as a non-quota immigrant or a non-immigrant by reason. of relationship to any individual who is so specified or by reason of being excepted from the operation of any other law regulating or forbidding immigration.'" The court below has inquired, Jud. Code § 239: "Are the alien Chinese wives and minor children of Chinese merchants who were lawfully domiciled within the United States prior to July 1st, 1924, such wives and minor children now applying for admission, mandatorily excluded from the United States under the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924?" Prior to July 1, 1924, petitioners, if otherwise unobjectionable, might have been admitted notwithstanding their race and nationality. United States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459, 466, 468; Yee Won v. White, 256 U. S. 399, 400, 401. But it is said they are absolutely excluded by the "Act to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, and for other purposes," approved May 26, 1924, c. 190, 43 Stat. 153, applicable provisions of which follow"Sec. 13. (c) No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States unless such alien (1) is admissible as a non-quota immigrant under the provisions of subdivision (b), (d), or (e) of section 4, or (2) is the wife, or the unmarried child under 18 years of age, of an immigrant admissible under such subdivision (d), and is accompanying or following to join him, or (3) is not an immigrant as defined in section 3." "Sec. 3. When used in this Act the term 'immigrant' means any alien departing from any place outside the United States destined for the United States, except (6) an alien entitled to enter the United States solely to carry on trade under and in pursuance of the provisions of a present existing treaty of commerce and navigation." "Sec. 5. When used in this Act the term 'quota immigrant' means any immigrant who is not a non-quota immigrant. An alien who is not particularly specified in this Act as a non-quota immigrant or a non-immigrant shall not be admitted as a non-quota immigrant or a nonimmigrant by reason of relationship to any individual who is so specified or by reason of being excepted from the operation of any other law regulating or forbidding immigration." The present existing treaty of commerce and navigation with China, dated November 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826, 827, provides— "Article II. Chinese subjects, whether proceeding to the United States as teachers, students, merchants or from curiosity, together with their body and household servants, and Chinese laborers who are now in the United States shall be allowed to go and come of their own free will and accord, and shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation." An alien entitled to enter the United States "solely to carry on trade" under an existing treaty of commerce and navigation is not an immigrant within the meaning of the Act, § 3(6), and therefore is not absolutely excluded by § 13. The wives and minor children of resident Chinese merchants were guaranteed the right of entry by the treaty of 1880 and certainly possessed it prior to July first when the present Immigration Act became effective. United States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, supra. That Act must be construed with the view to preserve treaty rights unless clearly |