Opinion of the Court. DOULLUT & WILLIAMS COMPANY, INC., v. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA. Nos. 317 and 318. Argued March 20, 1925.-Decided April 13, 1925. Admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit to recover damages for injuries inflicted by merchant vessels on clusters of piles, constituting no part or extension of the shore, driven into the bottom of a river, in that way only attached to the land, completely surrounded by navigable water, and used exclusively as aids to navigation. P. 34. Reversed. APPEALS from decrees of the District Court dismissing for want of jurisdiction two libels brought against the United States, under the Act of March 9, 1920, to recover damages for injuries to piling occasioned by its vessels. Mr. E. Howard McCaleb, for appellant, submitted. Mr. J. Frank Staley, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom the Solicitor General was on the brief, for the United States. MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. The pleadings and proof in these causes are substantially identical except as to names of vessels, dates of accidents and damages claimed. Relying upon the act of Congress approved March 9, 1920, c. 95, 41 Stat. 525, the appellant instituted proceedings in admiralty to recover damages from the United States for injuries inflicted by their merchant vessels, The City of Elwood and The Galveston, upon clusters of piling standing in the Mississippi River at New Orleans, one hundred and fifty feet from low water mark. The court below dismissed the libels for want of jurisdiction, and that action is now challenged. We copy from the libels and accept the following description of the injured structures— "Said piling cluster consists of five wooden piles or timbers, each of approximately sixty feet in length, firmly driven in and attached to the bottom of the river, fastened and held together as a unit having a diameter of not more than four feet, the depth of the water surrounding them being at all times not less than sixteen feet, said pile cluster extending perpendicularly about twenty-five feet out of and above the water. . That at no time has said pile cluster any connections either actual or anticipated nor has it any connections for any purpose whatever with the shore of said River or with anything on said shores, either of a temporary, prospective or permanent character and either actual or anticipated with any commerce on land or anything connected with land or with the shores of said River. That libellant had and has authority from the proper governmental authorities to erect, maintain and use said pile cluster for such marine purposes as said cluster may be adapted and used. That at times of the swift current of the Mississippi River and during bad weather said pile cluster is used by vessels to tie up to so as to avoid anchor dragging and likewise to lessen the dangers of collision with other vessels whilst navigating in said River. . . At no time do any vessels use said pile cluster to load or unload cargo or passengers, said pile cluster being incapable of so being used and incapable of being used for any commerce on land and incapable of being used for any purpose except in the operation, maintenance and navigation of vessels in navigable water and in aid of their navigation or in aid of commerce on water, and having no relation or connection with land or land commerce." The damaged piles constituted no part or extension of the shore as wharves, bridges and piers do. Although 33 Statement of the Case. driven into the bottom of the river and attached in that way only to the land, they were completely surrounded by navigable water and were used exclusively as aids to navigation. We think injuries to them by a ship come fairly within the principle approved by The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, and The Raithmoor, 241 U. S. 166. See Hughes on Admiralty, 2d ed., § 100. The District Court erred in denying jurisdiction, and its decree must be reversed. Reversed. THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD v. THE CITY OF PARKERSBURG. APPEAL FROM AND CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. No. 305. Argued March 19, 1925.-Decided April 13, 1925. 1. This Court has not jurisdiction of an appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals where the jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked solely on the ground of diversity of citizenship. P. 36. 2. A Maryland railway corporation, having purchased at foreclosure the property and franchise of a West Virginia corporation, declaring, pursuant to West Virginia statutes, that it "would become a corporation as to said property" by the name of the West Virginia corporation, and having become also the sole stockholder of the latter, sued a West Virginia municipality to enforce an alleged exemption of the property from taxes. Held, that the District Court had no jurisdiction, whether the plaintiff were treated as in effect the West Virginia corporation, suing as property owner, or as the Maryland corporation suing as stockholder, since in the latter case the West Virginia corporation would be an indispensable party plaintiff, and in either case diversity of citizenship would be lacking. P. 38. 296 Fed., 74, reversed. REVIEW of a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed a decree of the District Court in favor of the Railroad in a suit to enjoin the City from levying taxes on certain railroad property. The writ of certiorari was granted. Mr. Frank W. Nesbit, with whom Messrs. James W. Vandervort and Mason G. Ambler were on the briefs, for appellant. Messrs. R. B. McDougle and F. P. Moats, for appellee. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of West Virginia in 1894. The plaintiff is the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, alleged to be a Maryland corporation; the defendant is the City of Parkersburg, a West Virginia corporation. The relief sought was to enjoin the levying of taxes assessed upon certain railroad property. The federal jurisdiction was invoked solely on the ground of diversity of citizenship. A temporary injunction issued upon the filing of the bill. In 1895, the case was heard upon demurrer to the bill and upon a motion to dissolve the injunction. In 1897, a decree was entered, which overruled the demurrer, but made no order respecting the injunction. Within 30 days thereafter an answer was filed by leave. Then the cause stood without further action for 23 years. In 1921 activities were resumed leisurely. In 1923, upon demurrers and motions, the District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia (to which the case had been transferred pursuant to § 290 of the Judicial Code) entered a final decree for the plaintiff. The decree was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 296 Fed. 74. The railroad appealed to this Court. It also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, consideration of which was postponed until the hearing on the appeal. The decision in both lower courts was rendered on the merits. These we have no occasion to consider. There is no right of appeal to this Court, because the jurisdiction of the trial court was invoked solely on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Judicial Code, § 128. The writ of certiorari is granted. But, as the bill does not show that the trial court had jurisdiction of the controversy, the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be reversed with directions to remand the cause to the District Court. The claim asserted by the bill is this. In 1855, the Northwestern Virginia Railroad Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Virginia, acquired from the Town of Parkersburg an exemption from, or commutation of, municipal taxes on certain property within its limits. In 1863, the railroad and the municipality became domestic corporations of West Virginia, upon the organization of that State. In 1865 the property and franchises of the railroad were purchased by the Baltimore & Ohio at a foreclosure sale. Pursuant to the statutes of West Virginia then in force, the Baltimore & Ohio declared "that it would become a corporation as to said property, by the name of the Parkersburg Branch Railroad Company." The immunity from taxation asserted in the bill was claimed as an incident of the property acquired on foreclosure, and also as having been conferred by ordinances adopted, and contracts made with the Parkersburg Branch Railroad. The levy seems to have been made upon property of that company. It was a West Virginia corporation. The bill sought to enforce its right. The capacity in which the Baltimore & Ohio sued to enforce the right to immunity was not stated clearly in the bill. Apparently it sued either in its capacity as 1 Code of Virginia 1860, Title 18, c. 61, §§ 28, 29; Constitution of West Virginia (1863), Art. 11, § 8; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., Corporate History (1922), Vol. 1, pp. 243, 247. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 176, 182, 185; and Acts of West Virginia, 1891, c. 32, p. 57; 1889, c. 23, p. 81; 1887 (extra session), c. 73, p. 218; 1883, c. 12, p. 13; 1882, c. 97, § 30, p. 277; 1881, c. 1877, c. 106, p. 138; 1872-3. c. 8S, 1865, c. 73, p. 62. |