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Opinion of the Court.

268 U.S.

effect of this threatened non-union Bache-Denman operation. The conclusion they reached was that its success would affect so injuriously the trade of the Central Coal & Coke Company in shipping and selling coal in the neighboring States, that this company, the largest coal producer in that section, would have to become nonunion. He talked specifically to several members of the Board and of the Union who, the evidence shows, were shown to be actively engaged in the battle of July 17th.

In addition to this, the testimony of McNamara, already discussed, while ineffective to establish the complicity of the International Union with this conspiracy, contains much, if credited, from which the jury could reasonably infer that the purpose of the union miners in District No. 21 and the local unions engaged in the plan was to destroy the power of the owners and lessees of the Bache-Denman mines to send their output into interstate commerce to compete with that of union mines in Oklahoma, in Kansas, in Louisiana markets and elsewhere. It appeared that 80 per cent. of all the product of the mines in Sebastian County went into other States.

New and more elaborate evidence was also introduced in the second trial as to the capacity of the Bache-Denman mines under the open shop. In our previous opinion we declined to hold that the mere elimination from interstate trade of 5,000 tons a week, which we took to be the practical limit of capacity of the plaintiffs, was significant in the total tonnage of the country or state or that its stoppage furnished a basis of itself for inferring a palpable and intentional restraint of interstate trade with which the defendants could be charged even though coal could be produced at a reduced cost under non-union conditions. The amount we assumed was based on the averments of the third amended bill in which the normal gross income from the four mines of the plaintiffs used by them, and which were destroyed, was alleged to be in good times be


Opinion of the Court.


fore the trouble something more than $465,000 a year. At the price at which coal usually sold at the mine, this would make the output 5,000 tons a week. In a petition for a rehearing, plaintiffs urged upon us that this was an error and that the potential capacity of all the mines owned and leased by the Bache-Denman Company in that region, nine in number, was 5,000 tons a day rather than 5,000 tons a week. In the view we took of the evidence then before us, we had only the isolated circumstance of the reduction in shipment of the normal product of the four mines destroyed, without other evidence to show an actual intent and plan on the part of the defendants thereby to restrain interstate commerce. Whatever error therefore might have been made in stating the capacity of all the mines of the plaintiffs could not affect our conclusion, and the rehearing was denied. In the second trial, however, the total possible capacity not only of the destroyed mines but of the other unworked mines of plaintiffs became more important, in view of the direct testimony as to the moving purpose of District No. 21 to restrain and prevent plaintiffs' competition. The possible total to which their production might be brought was testified to by a number of new expert witnesess who were familiar with the mines and the business of mining and selling coal in the markets of the neighboring States. The conclusion of some of these witnesses was that with the union restrictions removed and a regular demand for the coal, the capacity of all the mines, owned and leased by the plaintiffs, those destroyed and those uninjured, could have been increased to substantially more than 5,000 tons a day. Such conclusion was possibly subject to criticism as exaggerated and speculative, and dependent on conditions probably not realizable, but it was all relevant evidence for the jury to consider and weigh as a circumstance with the rest of the new testimony in proof of intent of the leaders of District No. 21 to prevent shipments to neighboring States


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of such an amount of non-union coal at non-union cost. There was also new evidence tending to show the knowledge by Hanraty, Stewart and other leaders of District No. 21 of the character of plaintiffs mines and their capacity.

The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce. But when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Act. United Mine

a Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344, 408, 409; United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457, 471; Industrial Association v. United States, ante, p. 64. We think there was substantial evidence at the second trial in this case tending to show that the purpose of the destruction of the mines was to stop the production of non-union coal and prevent its shipment to markets of other States than Arkansas, where it would by competition tend to reduce the price of the commodity and affect injuriously the maintenance of wages for union labor in competing mines, and that the direction by the District Judge to return a verdict for the defendants other than the International Union was erroneous.

We affirm the judgment of the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals in favor of the International Union of United Mine Workers of America, and reverse that in favor of District No. 21 and the other local unions and the individual defendants and remand the cause as to them for a new trial.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Opinion of the Court.




No. 680. Argued May 4, 1925.-Decided May 25, 1925. 1. In extradition proceedings, form is not to be insisted upon beyond

the requirements of safety and justice, and the competent evidence establishing reasonable grounds for extradition is not neces

sarily evidence competent to convict. P. 312. 2. Habeas corpus can not be used to rehear the findings of a magis

trate in extradition, but only to inquire whether he had jurisdiction, whether the offence is within the treaty, and whether there was any evidence warranting the finding of reasonable ground to

believe the accused guilty. P. 312. 3. Complaint in extradition filed by an Assistant United States

Attorney, upon information, held sufficient, where it appeared at the hearing that it was ordered by the Attorney General upon request of the Secretary of State based on a request and a record

of judicial proceedings from the foreign country. P. 312. 4. Embezzlement or peculation of public funds by a public officer

is a crime in Mexico within the extradition treaty. P. 313. 5. Warrant in extradition (if required) held good in habeas corpus

over the objection of misnomer of the accused, where the name in the warrant was one of two applied to him in the proceedings and

he was identified by the testimony. Affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court remanding the appellant in a habeas corpus case.

Mr. John E. Benton, with whom Messrs. Robert W. Upton and Edward C. Niles were on the brief, for appellant, submitted.

Mr. Harold B. Elgar, with whom Mr. Jerome S. Hess was on the brief, for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant is charged with embezzlement of public funds while a public officer of the United States of Mex

Opinion of the Court.

268 U.S.

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ico. He was held for surrender to that Government after a hearing before a District Judge who found that there was probable cause to believe that he was guilty and that he was a fugitive from justice. Writs of habeas corpus and certiorari were issued by another District Judge who came to the same conclusion and remanded the appellant. The case is brought here directly upon the somewhat strained assumption that the construction of our treaty with Mexico is involved. Being here, out of a natural anxiety to save the appellant if possible from being sent from New Hampshire to Mexico for trial, it has been presented as if this were the final stage and every technical detail were to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

. This is not the law. Form is not to be insisted upon beyond the requirements of safety and justice. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512. Competent evidence to establish reasonable grounds is not necessarily evidence competent to convict. See e. g., Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U. S. 511, 517. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 317. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., $ 4(6), p. 21.

The foregoing are general principles relating to extradition, but there are further limits to habeas corpus. That writ as has been said very often cannot take the place of a writ of error. It is not a means for rehearing what the magistrate already has decided. The alleged fugitive from justice has had his hearing and habeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offence charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457. Re Luis Oteiza y Cortes, 136 U. S. 330. Bryant v. United States, 167 U. S. 104, 105. Elias v. Ramirez, 215 U. S. 398, 406. We pass to the consideration of the specific objections urged.

It is objected in the first place that the complaint and warrant are defective. The complaint was filed by an As

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