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shall make all needful rules and regulations for carrying the provisions of this Act into effect."

Sec. 2 provides—“ That it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the aforesaid drugs except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.” [The giver is required to retain a duplicate and the ac-. ceptor to keep the original order for two years, subject to inspection.] Nothing contained in this section shall apply

“(a) To the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act in the course of his professional practice only: Provided, That such physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon shall keep a record of all such drugs dispensed or distributed, showing the amount dispensed or distributed, the date, and the name and address of the patient to whom such drugs are dispensed or distributed, except such as may be dispensed or distributed to a patient upon whom such physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon shall personally attend; and such record shall be kept for a period of two years from the date of dispensing or distributing such drugs, subject to inspection, as provided in this Act. “(b) (c)

(d) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall cause suitable forms to be prepared for the purposes above mentioned.

It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain by means of said order forms any of the aforesaid drugs for any purpose other than the use, sale, or distribution thereof by him in the conduct of a lawful business in said drugs or in the legitimate practice of his profession.

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Sec. 8. “That it shall be unlawful for any person not registered under the provisions of this Act, and who has not paid the special tax provided for by this Act, to have in his possession or under his control any of the aforesaid drugs; and such possession or control shall be presumptive evidence of a violation of this section, and also of a viola

a tion of the provisions of Section One of this Act: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any employee of a registered person, or to a nurse under the supervision of a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act, having such possession or control by virtue of his employment or occupation and not on his own account; or to the possession of any of the aforesaid drugs which has or have been prescribed in good faith by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act; or to any United States, State, county, municipal, District, Territorial, or insular officer or official who has possession of any said drugs, by reason of his official duties, or to a warehouseman holding possession for a person registered and who has paid the taxes under this Act; or to common carriers engaged in transporting such drugs: Provided further, That it shall not be necessary to negative any of the aforesaid exemptions in any complaint, information, indictment, or other writ or proceeding laid or brought under this Act; and the burden of proof of any such exemption shall be upon the defendant."

Sec. 9. “That any person who violates or fails to comply with any of the requirements of this Act shall, on conviction, be fined not more than $2,000 or be imprisoned not more than five years, or both, in the discretion of the court."

Section 1 was amended by the Act of February 24, 1919, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1130. This increased the special annual tax to twenty-four dollars on importers, manufacturers, producers and compounders, twelve dollars on wholesale dealers, six dollars on retail dealers, and three

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dollars on "physicians, dentists, veterinary surgeons and other practitioners lawfully entitled to distribute, dispense, give away, or administer any of the aforesaid drugs to patients upon whom they in the course of their professional practice are in attendance.” It also added a provision requiring that stamps—one cent for each ounceshould be affixed to every package of opium, coca leaves, any compound, salt, derivative or preparation thereof, produced in or imported into the United States and sold or removed for consumption or sale, and then, the following paragraph,

“It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute any of the aforesaid drugs except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps from any of the aforesaid drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section by the person in whose possession same may be found; and the possession of any original stamped package containing any of the aforesaid drugs by any person who has not registered and paid special. taxes as required by this section shall be prima facie evidence of liability to such special tax: Provided That the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply

to the dispensing, or administration, or giving away of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a registered physician, dentist, veterinary surgeon, or other practitioner in the course of his professional practice, and where said drugs are dispensed or administered to the patient for legitimate medical purposes, and the record kept as required by this Act of the drugs so dispensed, administered, distributed, or given away.”

Manifestly, the purpose of the indictment was to accuse petitioner of violating § 2 of the Narcotic Law, and the trial court so declared. Shortly given the alleged facts follow: Petitioner, a duly licensed and registered physician, without an official written order therefor, know

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ingly, wilfully and unlawfully did sell, barter and give to Ida Casey one tablet of morphine and three tablets of cocaine; he knew she was addicted to habitual use of these drugs and did not require administration of either because of any

disease other than such addiction, and he did not dispense them for the treatment of any other disease or condition; they were not administered by him or by any nurse or other person acting under his direction, nor were they consumed or intended for consumption in his presence; the amount was more than sufficient to satisfy the recipient's cravings if wholly consumed at one time; petitioner put the drugs into her possession expecting that she would administer them to herself in divided doses over a period of time; they were in the form in which addicts usually consume them to satisfy their cravings; the recipient was in no way prevented or restrained from disposing of them.

Petitioner maintains that the facts stated are not sufficient to constitute an offense. The United States submit that, considering United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, the sufficiency of the indictment is clear.

The trial court charged

“If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that this woman was addicted to the use of narcotics, and if he dispensed these drugs to her for the purpose of catering to her appetite or satisfying her cravings for the drug, he is guilty under the law. If, on the other hand, you believe from the testimony that the defendant believed in good faith this woman was suffering from cancer or ulcer of the stomach, and administered the drug for the purpose of relieving her pain, or if you entertain a reasonable doubt upon that question, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.”

In effect, the indictment alleges that the accused, a duly registered physician, violated the statute by giving

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to a known addict four tablets containing morphine and cocaine with the expectation that she would administer them to herself in divided doses, while unrestrained and beyond his presence or control, for the sole purpose of relieving conditions incident to addiction and keeping herself comfortable. It does not question the doctor's good faith nor the wisdom or propriety of his action according to medical standards. It does not allege that he dispensed the drugs otherwise than to a patient in the course of his professional practice or for other than medical purposes. The facts disclosed indicate no conscious design to violate the law, no cause to suspect that the recipient intended to sell or otherwise dispose of the drugs, and no real probability that she would not consume them.

The declared object of the Narcotic Law is to provide revenue, and this court has held that whatever additional moral end it may have in view must “ be reached only through a revenue measure and within the limits of a revenue measure." United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 402. Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Federal Government. And we accept as established doctrine that any provision of an act of Congress ostensibly enacted under power granted by the Constitution, not naturally and reasonably adapted to the effective exercise of such power but solely to the achievement of something plainly within power reserved to the States, is invalid and cannot be enforced. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 423; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41; Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20. In the light of these principles and not forgetting the familiar rule, that “a statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is

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