event, the Court of Claims shall include in the papers certified by it the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, and the judgment or decree, as well as such other parts of the record as are material to the errors assigned, to be settled by the Court. The Court of Claims shall promulgate rules to govern the preparation of such record in accordance with the provisions of this section. In such cases the Supreme Court shall have authority to review, in addition to other questions of law, errors assigned to the effect that there is a lack of substantial evidence to sustain a finding of fact; that an ultimate finding or findings are not sustained by the findings of evidentiary or primary facts; or that there is a failure to make any finding of fact on a material issue. (c) All judgments and decrees of the Court of Claims shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court as provided in this section, and not otherwise. Sec. 3, act of Feb. 13, 1925 (48 Stat. 939); act of May 22, 1939 (53 Stat. 752); 28 U. S. C. 288. This section has been amended as above. False claims against the United States, 806. Member of Congress or officer receiving pay (Criminal Code, sec. 35.) Purchase or receipt in pledge of property is- Unlawfully entering military reservation, 815. 816. in matters affecting United States, 842. (Criminal Code, sec. 113.) Member of Congress interested in contracts, 843. (Criminal Code, sec. 114.) Accepting a bribe, 846. (Criminal Code, sec. 117.) Stealing, secreting, or embezzling mail matter, or attempting to do so, 853a. (Criminal Code, sec. 194.) Transportation of high explosives, 854. (Criminal Code, sec. 232.) Jurisdiction of Federal courts over crimes, 855. (Criminal Code, sec. 272.) Jurisdiction of United States commissioners of offenses on Federal reservations, 855a. Laws of States adopted for punishing criminal acts, 857. (Criminal Code, sec. 289). 803. Impersonating an officer (Criminal Code, sec. 32). The second paragraph of this section, based on section 6, act of November 23, 1921 (42 Stat. 224); 18 U. S. C. 77, was expressly repealed by section 1, act of August 27, 1935 (49 Stat. 782). 806. False claims against the United States (Criminal Code, sec. 35). The running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to any offense against the laws of the United States (1) involving defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States or any agency thereof whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, or (2) committed in connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance, payment for, interim financing, cancelation or other termination or settlement, of any contract, subcontract, or purchase order which is connected with or related to the prosecution of the present war, or with any disposition of termination inventory by any war contractor or Government agency, or (3) committed in connection with the care and handling and disposal of property under the Surplus Property Act of 1944, shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities in the present war as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress. This section shall apply to acts, offenses, or transactions where the existing statute of limitations has not yet fully run, but it shall not apply to acts, offenses, or transactions which are already barred by provisions of existing law. Sec. 1, act of Aug. 24, 1942 (56 Stat. 747); sec. 19(b), act of July 1, 1944 (58 Stat. 667); sec. 28, act of Oct. 3, 1944 (58 Stat. 781); 18 U. S. C. 590a; 50 U. S. C. App. 1637. The above provision is added as a new paragraph of this section. By section 19 (d), Contract Settlement Act of July 1, 1944, post, 2191d-19 (d), the provisions of subsection (A) of the original text of this section are made specifically applicable to any statement, representation, etc., made or used or caused to be made or used under that Act or under any regulations issued pursuant to that Act. For Surplus Property Act of 1944, to which reference is made in the text, supra, see 2191e, post. Notes of Decisions In general. (2d paragraph.)-Change cita- | the United States is not limited to actual tion to read: U. S. v. Mercur Corp. (C. C. A., 1936), 83 F. (2d) 178; certiorari denied (1936), 299 U. S. 576. claims filed against the Government nor need it be shown thereunder that the Government suffered any financial loss. Cr. Code, sec. 35 (A), 18 U. S. C. 80, U. S. v. Schneider (D. C., E. D. Wisc., 1942), 45 F. Supp. 848. Willfully procuring a false affidavit pertaining to a claim for veterans' benefits within jurisdiction of the Administrator of That part of section 35 of the Criminal Code, as amended by the act of June 18. 1934, which makes it a crime knowingly and willfully to cause to be made or used any false affidavit, etc., knowing the same to the contain any fraudulent statement, "in any Veterans' Affairs is punishable under this matter within the jurisdiction of any de- section. Sanchez v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1, 1943), partment or agency of the United States," 134 F. (2d) 279. is not restricted to cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the United States. U. S. v. Gilliland (1941), 312 U. S. 86; reversing (D. C., 1940), 35 F. Supp. 181. The language and history of the amending act show that it was intended to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described. Id. Force and effect of statute designed to prevent frauds upon the Government, such as statutes relating to presentment of false claims against the Government and conspiracy to defraud the Government, may not be frittered away by mere literal construction. 18 U. S. C. A. 80. Spivey v. U. S. (C. C. A. 5, 1940), 109 F. (2d) 181; certiorari denied (1940), 310 U. S. 631. The statute relating to presentment of false claims against Government extends to situations involving only negotiations with the Government and is not limited to actual claims filed against the Government. U. S. C. A. 80. Id. 18 Allegations of financial or property loss are not necessary to sustain conviction of making false statements and concealing material facts by trick, in matters within jurisdiction of department or agency of the United States, under amended statute. 18 U. S. C. A. 80. U. S. v. Goldsmith (C. C. A. 2, 1940), 108 F. (2d) 917; certiorari denied (1940), 309 U. S. 678. Appeal from a conviction on two counts of making a false and fraudulent statement in a matter "within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States," in violation of sec. 35 of the Criminal Code, as amended. In a hearing before the Exclusion Board appointed by the Commanding General, Eastern Military Area, the defendant had made two false statements as to his relationships with an individual who had been convicted of espionage against the United States. Affirmed. Held: The Army and Navy are certainly departments of the United States and the omission to enumerate them specifically hardly indicates more than that Congress did not then think much about the possibility of another war. It is unnecessary to consider whether or not the Exclusion Board was in fact a validly constituted tribunal, as the defendant was not in a position to raise the question in this proceeding. The courts have consistently held that the unconstitutionality of the operation or proceeding in relation to which a deception was practiced is not a defense in a prosecution for such deception. As long as a department or agency has colorable authority to do what it is doing, the constitutionality of the statute or order granting the authority in the first place is immaterial. And here the combination of Executive Order No. 9066, Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, and the rules for exclusion proceedings, vests the Exclusion DeBoard with ample apparent authority. fendant's contention that the section was intended only to include written statements is without merit. U. S. v. Meyer (C. C. A. 2, 1944), 140 F. (2d) 652. The statute providing for the punishment of one who knowingly and willfully falsifies or conceals a material fact or makes a fraudulent statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of 807. Purchase or receipt in pledge of property issued to a soldier (Criminal Code, sec. 35).—*** Whoever shall purchase, or receive in pledge from any person any arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing, military stores, or other property furnished by the United States under a clothing allowance cr otherwise, to any soldier, sailor, officer, cadet, or midshipman in the military or naval service of the United States or of the National Guard or Naval Militia, or to any person accompanying, serving, or retained with the land or naval forces and subject to military or naval law; or to any former member of such military or naval service at or by any hospital, home, or facility maintained by the United States; having knowledge or reason to believe that the property has been taken from the possession of the United States or furnished by the United States under such allowance, or otherwise, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Sec. 35, act of Mar. 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1095); act of Oct. 23, 1918 (40 Stat. 1016); act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 997); act of Apr. 4, 1938 (52 Stat. 197); act of Apr. 30, 1940 (54 Stat. 171); 18 U. S. C. 86. This section has been amended as above. 808. Embezzlement of military stores (Criminal Code, sec. 36).-Whoever shall steal, embezzle, or knowingly apply to his own use, or unlawfully sell, convey, or dispose of any ordnance, arms, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, stores, money, or other property furnished or to be used for the military or naval service, shall be punished as prescribed in section 35 (C) of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 82). Sec. 36, act of Mar. 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1096); act of Nov. 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 591); 18 U. S. C. 87. This section has been amended as above. For section 35(C), to which reference is made in the text, supra, see 806, ante (original text). 809. Conspiring to commit offense against United States (Criminal Code, sec. 37). Notes of Decisions Proof. To sustain charge of conspiracy, Government need not prove unlawful plan or agreement, but evidence showing concert of action in commission of unlawful acts or proof of other facts from which natural inference arises that such acts were in furtherance of common design of alleged conspiracy is sufficient. 18 U. S. C. A. 88. U. S. v. Holt (C. C. A. 7, 1939), 108 F. (2d) 365; rehearing denied (1940), 309 U. S. 698. where they were such as are usually, if not necessarily, done pursuant to previous scheme and plan. Id. The gist of the offense of conspiracy as defined by section 37 of the Criminal Code, is agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense attended by an act of one or more of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy. One who sells materials knowing that they are intended for use, or will be used, in the production of illicit distilled spirits, but not knowing of a conspiracy to commit the crime, is not chargeable as co-conspirator. Sec. 37, Crim. In determining whether conspiracy existed, Code, 18 U. S. C. sec. 88. U. S. v. Falcone parties' overt acts may be considered with et al. (1940), 311 U. S. 205; affirming other evidence and attending circumstances, (C. C. A., 2, 1940), 109 F. (2d) 579. If evidence is as consistent with innocence as with guilt of alleged conspirator, no conviction for conspiracy can be had. Id. 812. Interested persons acting as Government agents (Criminal Code, sec. 41). Notes of Decisions In general.-The proposed assignment of an of the profits of his law firm so long as he Army officer to maintain liaison with a private corporation in which he is an officer and a stockholder is So doubtful as to legality and priority that the assignment should not be made. A man whose duty it is to serve the public should not be put into a position where he can also serve his selfish interests. (Mar. 31, 1942), 40 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 42. law as took no part in the firm's activities and did not engage in any activities as an Army officer in which the interests of the United States might conflict with his private interests. (Apr. 23, 1942), 40 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 48. The Federal law does not prohibit a public officer from carrying on a private business activity for compensation except when It would not be a violation of Federal the private activity touches upon some interfor a patent attorney commissioned est of the Government and falls within the an officer in the Army to receive part statutes and principles of law aimed at 646631°-45-14 improper conflicts of interest, or when the regulations governing the conduct of private officer is subject to one of several statutes forbidding specified officers to engage in private business activities. The head of any executive department or agency has the power to prescribe rules and business affairs by his subordinates and is not limited by the prohibitory statutes and elementary legal principles of fiduciary conduct outlined in the opinion. (Apr. 27, 1942), 40 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 47. 815. Injuries to fortifications or harbor defenses; (Criminal Code, sec. 44). defensive sea areas Defensive sea areas established under authority of this section are declared to be "vital military and naval installations" within the meaning of 2187a, post, by Executive Order No. 8381, March 22, 1940. The President by Executive Orders has established the following Naval defensive sea areas: No. 7747, November 29, 1937, as amended by Executive Order No. 8536, San Clemente Island, California. No. 8143, May 26, 1939, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. No. 8680, February 14, 1941, corrected by Executive Order No. 8729, April 2, 1941, Islands of Kiska and Unalaska, Alaska. No. 8681, February 14, 1941, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. No. 8682, February 14, 1941, corrected by Executive Order No. 8729, April 2, 1941, Islands of Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and Kingman Reef, Pacific Ocean. No. 8683, February 14, 1941, corrected by Executive Order No. 8729, April 2, 1941, Islands of Rose, Tutuila, and Guam, Pacific Ocean. No. 8684, February 14, 1941, Culebra Island, Puerto Rico, No. 8717, March 22, 1941, Kodiak Island, Alaska. No. 8718, March 22, 1941, Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. No. 8749, May 1, 1941, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. No. 8853, August 16, 1941, Manila Bay, Philippine Islands. No. 8953, November 27, 1941, supersedes Executive Order No. 8403, May 7, 1941, Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor, California. No. 8970, December 11, 1941, as amended by Executive Order No. 9342, May 19, 1943, Portland, Maine; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Boston, Massachusetts; Narragansett Bay; San Diego, California; San Francisco, California; Columbia River Entrance; and Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound. No. 8978, December 16, 1941, New York Harbor; New London; Delaware Bay and River; Chesapeake-Norfolk; and Charleston Harbor. No. 8987, December 20, 1941, Honolulu Defensive Sea Area. No. 9168, May 20, 1942, Matagorda Bay, Texas (For danger zone regulations see F. R. Aug. 4, 1942, page 6010 and January 30, 1943, page 1320). No. 9266, November 6, 1942, Buzzards Bay and Vineyard Sound, Massachusetts. 816. Unlawfully entering military reservation (Criminal Code, sec. 45).— Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, including the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands, shall go upon any military reservation, army post, fort, or arsenal, for any purpose prohibited by law or military regulation made in pursuance of law, or whoever shall reenter or be found within any such reservation, post, fort, or arsenal, after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. Sec 45, act of Mar. 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1097); act of Mar. 28, 1940 (54 Stat. 80); 18 U S. C. 97. 818. Embezzling public moneys or other property (Criminal Code, sec. 47). Notes of Decisions In general.-The statute penalizing embez-| any new situation that may arise. Cr. zlement of United States property uses the Code, sec. 47, 18 U. S. C. A., sec. 100. words "steal or purloin" not synonymously Crabb v. Zerbst, Warden (C. C. A., 5, 1938), but in view of differences in their meaning, 99 F. (2d) 562. to cover cases that may shade into larceny |