IN THE OPERATIONAL TEMPO, FLYING HOURS, STEAMING HOURS, AND TRAINING AMMUNITIONS. THESE CUTS HURT, BUT WITH INTENSE MANAGEMENT, THE REDUCTIONS CAN BE ABSORBED WITHOUT SERIOUS LOSS IN READINESS. ONE TROUBLESOME DEFICIENCY IN READINESS IS THE LOW STATE OF PREPAREDNESS OF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS ASSIGNED TO THE PACIFIC. THESE UNITS, ACTIVE AND RESERVE, ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE SUPPORT OF OUR COMBAT FORCES AND ARE NEEDED EARLY IN A CONFLICT IN A "READY" STATUS. AN IMPORTANT DETERMINANT OF OUR OWN READINESS POSTURE IS AN EXTENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE PROGRAM OF COMBINED EXERCISES WITH FRIENDS AND ALLIES. SUCH AN EXERCISE PROGRAM IS A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR ALL NATIONS IN THE REGION. FURTHER, COMBINED COMMAND-AND-CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY CAN CONTRIBUTE IMPORTANTLY TO OUR REGIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE BUT IT PRESENTS DIFFICULT SECURITY, PROCEDURAL, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS. IN OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE, WE HAVE RELEASED BASELINE DOCUMENTATION ON JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND ENCOURAGED PROCUREMENT OF INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS, AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS. I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THE OVERALL MILITARY READINESS POSTURE OF FRIENDS AND ALLIES CONTINUES ΤΟ IMPROVE AS DEMONSTRATED THROUGH THIS COMBINED EXERCISE PROGRAM. WHEREAS I AM GENERALLY PLEASED WITH FORCE READINESS, OUR ABILITY TO SUSTAIN THOSE FORCES IS A DIFFERENT STORY. EVEN THOUGH IMPRESSIVE GAINS HAVE BEEN REALIZED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, STAYING POWER REMAINS A SERIOUS CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING CONCERN. WE LACK ADEQUATE WAR RESERVE STOCKAGE OF MODERN MUNITIONS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY AND TO SECURE OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS. SIMILARLY, WE LACK ADEQUATE QUANTITIES OF REPAIR PARTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT FEED OUR HIGH TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS, WHICH, BY THEIR NATURE, ARE HIGH COST, LOW DENSITY ITEMS REQUIRING LONG LEAD TIMES TO PROCURE. OF COURSE, HAVING LARGE STORES OF SUPPLIES AND REPAIR PARTS MEANS LITTLE UNLESS WE CAN MOVE THEM WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED. OUR WARTIME SHORTFALL OF INTERAND INTRA- THEATER SEA AND AIRLIFT CAPACITY IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN. THESE SHORTAGES COUPLED WITH THE DISTANCES UNIQUE TO THE PACIFIC THEATER COMPOUND OUR SUSTAINABILITY PROBLEM. OUR ALLIES ARE IN NO BETTER SHAPE TO SUSTAIN A WAR. MOST HAVE LESS THAN ADEQUATE LOGISTICS, TRANSPORTATION, AND SERVICE SUPPORT FORCE STRUCTURE. SOME POSITIVE EXCEPTIONS DO EXIST. THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A WAR RESERVE FOR THAILAND, THE ON-GOING EFFORT TO DEVELOP AN UMBRELLA HOST NATION SUPPORT AGREEMENT WITH KOREA, AND THE EXTENSION OF THE NATO MUTUAL SUPPORT ACT TO KOREA AND JAPAN HAVE ALL CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS IMPROVING SUSTAINABILITY. ALTHOUGH THESE INITIATIVES ARE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, A GREAT DEAL MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO IMPROVE SUSTAINABILITY FOR A SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES AND DEFICIENCIES WHICH, IF IMPROVED, WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE AND WARFIGHTING FOLLOWS: - • ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE OPERATIONS (ASW) THE SOVIET SUBMARINE IS OUR GREATEST THREAT AND IT'S GROWING. FORTUNATELY, WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT IN ASW IN PAST YEARS AND THE INVESTMENTS HAVE PAID OFF. THE NEW SURFACE TACTICAL ACOUSTIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (SURTASS) IS A CASE IN POINT, BUT THERE ARE MANY OTHER SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS. THE BEST ASW VEHICLE IS ANOTHER SUBMARINE AND IN THE PACIFIC, WE HAVE QUALITY SUBMARINES BUT ON THE QUANTITY SIDE WE ARE BADLY OUTNUMBERED. PROGRAMS WITH POTENTIAL TO IMPROVE OUR PERFORMANCE IN ASW SHOULD BE SUPPORTED. - • AIR DEFENSE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AEGIS CRUISER TO THE PACIFIC PROVIDES NEEDED ASSURANCES ABOUT OUR AIR DEFENSE POSTURE AT SEA AND THE AVAILABILITY OF THE AWACS IN OKINAWA FILLS A SERIOUS AIR SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL GAP IN NORTHEAST ASIA. WITH THE GROWING LONG-RANGE BOMBER FLEET IN THE SOVIET INVENTORY, THE PROBLEM IS AIR DEFENSE OF THE REST OF THE PACIFIC THE - ALEUTIANS, ALASKA, HAWAII, GUAM, JOHNSTON ISLAND, AND THE PHILIPPINES. NEEDED ARE LONG-RANGE RADARS, INTERCEPT RADARS, INTERCEPTORS, POINT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, AND THE SUPPORTING COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE. • MODERN MUNITIONS STAND-OFF, PRECISION MUNITIONS, BOTH AIR-TO-AIR AND AIR/SURFACE-TO- SURFACE ARE THE EQUALIZER, IF AVAILABLE IN ADEQUATE NUMBERS. IN ALL CASES, OUR STOCKAGE IS BELOW INVENTORY OBJECTIVE. TWO NEW MISSILES WHICH SHOW PARTICULAR PROMISE ARE AMRAAM AND CONVENTIONAL TOMAHAWK. • AERIAL REFUELING LAND-BASED, AIRBORNE TANKERS CAN BE USED TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOTH LAND-BASED AND SEA-BASED TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. AVAILABLE LAND-BASED TANKERS HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND. THEY MUST ALSO BE USED TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED TRANSPORTATION COMMAND IN THE FLOW OF HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE THEATER. IN WARTIME, THERE WILL NEVER BE ENOUGH. - • AIRLIFT/SEALIFT WE STILL DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT LIFT ASSETS AVAILABLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO A CRISIS. WHILE THE ADDITION OF A SECOND SQUADRON OF MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS HAS GREATLY IMPROVED THE REACTION TIME OF OUR MARINES, ADDITIONAL SHIPPING FOR THE READY RESERVE FORCE AND THE TIMELY INTRODUCTION OF C-17 AIRCRAFT INTO THE INVENTORY ARE ESSENTIAL PROGRAMS IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THE MOBILITY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT OUR STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC. - • LONG-RANGE, ALL WEATHER ATTACK NEEDED IS A CAPABILITY TO STRIKE QUICKLY, AT LONG RANGE, IN ANY CONDITION OF WEATHER, DAY OR NIGHT. THE ONLY LONG- RANGE, ALL WEATHER ATTACK CAPABILITY IN THE PACIFIC TODAY RESIDES IN THE CARRIERS WHICH CAN'T BE EVERYWHERE AT ONCE. THEATER BASED F-111S, THE F-15E, AND LANTIRN PROGRAMS COULD AUGMENT THAT CAPABILITY. •CHEMICAL WARFARE DETERRENCE THE SOVIET UNION HAS STOCKPILED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND IT MUST BE ASSUMED SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE USED BY THE SOVIETS OR SURROGATES WHEN IT SERVED THEIR PURPOSE. SUCH USE CAN BE PREVENTED BY A CREDIBLE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY. PRODUCTION OF THE BINARY WEAPON WILL GIVE US THAT CAPABILITY. • MINE WARFARE A WARFARE AREA OFTEN UNDERAPPRECIATED, THAT OFFERS BOTH OPPORTUNITY AND PROBLEMS. MINES USED OFFENSIVELY HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO DISRUPT AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES. THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE OF THIS FACT AND HAVE STOCKPILED A WIDE VARIETY OF MINES WITH A RANGE OF CAPABILITIES. SUPPORT FOR MINE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAMS IS NEEDED. SYSTEM CAN BE THE IS RELIABLE, CONTROL AND PROGRESS NEED • COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS ACHILLES HEEL IN WARFIGHTING UNLESS THE REDUNDANT, AND ROBUST. THE COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS NOW IN PROTECTION. OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE IS THE ACQUISITION OF A LONG HAUL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THAT WILL PROVIDE ASSURED COMMAND AND CONTROL UNDER STRESSED CONDITIONS. THE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE ALEUTIANS, IN PARTICULAR, IS IN NEED OF MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS. PEOPLE - WE HAVE HIGH QUALITY TODAY. SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE, DURING A PERIOD OF DIMINISHED MANPOWER AVAILABILITY, WILL BE DETERMINED BY SUPPORT FOR "PEOPLE" PROGRAMS. SPARE AND REPAIR PARTS THOUSANDS OF SEEMINGLY INSIGNIFICANT ITEMS PLAY A KEY ROLE IN SUSTAINING OUR FIGHTING FORCES. OUR POLICIES REQUIRE WE HAVE RANGE AND DEPTH IN PARTS TO SUSTAIN OUR FORCES IN COMBAT FOR 60 DAYS. WHILE OUR POSITION HAS IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS, DEFICIENCIES STILL EXIST. • MODERNIZATION - NEEDED FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE AND IF WE PAUSE IN THE CONTINUING FORCE UPGRADE PROGRAMS, THE SOVIETS WILL SURPASS US. CONCLUSION ON BALANCE, WE ARE DOING WELL IN THE PACIFIC. OUR FORCES ARE EQUIPPED WITH HARDWARE THAT WORKS, AND OUR RANKS ARE FILLED WITH AMERICA'S FINEST. WE BENEFIT FROM A NETWORK OF ALLIANCES, AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOTH ALLIES AND FRIENDS ARE GOOD. GOVERNMENTS AND ECONOMIES CONTINUE TO MATURE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION TO OUR STRATEGIC INTEREST WILL CONTINUE TO GROW IN THE FUTURE. OUR CONSTANT OBJECTIVE IS TO DETER CONFLICT WHILE REMAINING PREPARED TO FIGHT DECISIVELY IF NECESSARY. WE EMPLOY A TWO PART STRATEGY ONE FOR PEACETIME THAT IDENTIFIES BEST USE - OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND MILITARY FORCES TO FURTHER NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND ONE FOR CONFLICT THAT ADDRESSES THE THREAT. CONCERNS ARE FOR THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE IMBALANCE ON OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS, THE GROWING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AN UNPREDICTABLE AND THREATENING NORTH KOREA, THE CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA BY THE VIETNAMESE, AND BY FAR THE GREATEST CONCERN, THE DRAMATIC GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES. - THE SOVIET UNION HAS MADE THE DECISION TO BECOME A PACIFIC POWER, A STATUS IT HAS NEVER ENJOYED. IN RECOGNITION OF THE NEW REALITIES OF THE PACIFIC, THE SOVIETS HAVE ASSEMBLED A POWERFUL MILITARY FORCE TO USE AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR A GROWING DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE. IT IS A FAMILIAR STRATEGY THAT ENTAILS ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE, POLITICAL PENETRATION, INTIMIDATION, POLITICAL COMPROMISES AND, EVENTUALLY, DOMINATION. OUR SECURITY INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY MAINTAINING CONVENTIONALLY SUPERIOR FORCES, FORWARD DEPLOYED IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS, TO REASSURE FRIENDS AND REMIND THE SOVIETS. THAT WE DO TODAY, BUT TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE, WE MUST CONTINUE PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS, INCREASE SUSTAINABILITY, TAKE CARE OF OUR PEOPLE, AND IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES IN CERTAIN WARFIGHTING CATEGORIES. WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS AND THIS COMMITTEE TO ACHIEVE THESE PRIORITIES, I AM CONFIDENT THAT, WITH OUR TWO PART STRATEGY, WE CAN PROTECT OUR NATION'S INTEREST IN THE PACIFIC. YOU. THANK YOU, MR CHAIRMAN, FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral. General, we will go ahead with your statement, and then we will have questions. STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE C. CRIST, U.S. MARINE CORPS, General CRIST. All right, sir. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am most pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the U.S. military strategy within my area of responsibility. I have submitted a prepared statement which I request to be included in the record, and am prepared to make my overview statement. Each member of the committee has been provided with a small handout for ready reference during my remarks. It has a little logo on the front. With an area of responsibility shown on that first map, which encompasses 19 countries in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa, and stretches some 3,100 miles from east to west, and 3,400 miles north to south, our strategy must be, of necessity, one of economy of force, a constrained regional strategy which incorporates the significance of the area, the threats to our interests, U.S. national and military objectives, the forces available, and finally military options which satisfy those regional objectives within a framework of limited resources. I would like to touch on each point briefly. |