Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Law-Intensity Conflict
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. Q: Are we learning from our mistakes? For example, in FEMA's After Action report on Mirage Gold (1994), a number of problems are listed, I will read each one of them and ask you what FEMA has done or any other agency done to address each problem.

On page 8, it is noted, "there is no specific FEMA plan, agreement, procedure or other formal guidance detailing the relationships between the Agency and these organizations for the type of incident depicted in the exercise scenario."

What have you done about this?

On page 11 of FEMA's report, it is noted that "There were questions regarding command and control of DOD tactical forces; however they are outside the sphere of this report."

What does that mean? What has DOD done to fix this?

On page 12, it is noted, "The interface between FEMA, DOD, DOE and the State was generally good. The interface between FEMA, the State, and the FBI was initially nonexistent and it wasn't until the State aggressively elevated its play to the Presidential level that the FBI acknowledged the validity of State (and probably FEMA) involvement. It was obvious that consequence management planning was not an FBI item of interest."

That is pretty strong language, in essence, the FBI would not share any information with anyone until the President got involved and told them to do so? What would that mean in terms of a real incident? Does that mean we would never be prepared for the possible consequences if a nuclear device went off?

A: It is inappropriate for me as an Assistant Secretary of Defense to comment on specific actions by other government agencies or address their alleged shortcomings. Those questions should be addressed to each agency in question. That notwithstanding, from a DoD prospective of the interagency process, I believe we are making steady improvements.

a. Since MIRAGE GOLD, there have been a series of interagency table top exercises supported by my office that have focused on noted shortcomings identified by the interagency counterterrorism (CT) community. Resulting from these exercises and subsequent actions taken by the interagency CT community the following has occurred: 1) FEMA is now a permanent member of the interagency counterterrorism working group that provides recommendations to the senior Washington leadership and the President on counterterroism responses; 2) Presidential Decision Directive/ PDD-39 has been published which revised standing counterterrorism responsibilities; 3) interagency CT coordination and operational guidelines for responding to

overseas terrorist incidents are in the final stages of revision; 4) new domestic response guidelines are being drafted by the FBI in close coordination with the interagency CT community; 5) DoD operational CT plans are being revised to mirror the interagency guidelines; and finally; 6) FEMA is developing, in close coordination with the interagency CT community, a specific annex to the Federal Response Plan (FRP) focused on terrorism consequence management.

b. A problem identified in MIRAGE GOLD with regards to DoD CT procedures was that our domestic procedures did not mirror those used overseas. The Secretary of Defense directed a review of those procedures as well as to the procedures and policies of providing assistance to outside agencies. This study resulted in revised approval and operational procedures to ensure a single DoD response to terrorist incidents. As such, the SECDEF is in charge assisted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operationally manage any DoD response to such an incident.

c. At the time of Exercise MIRAGE GOLD, federal counterterrorism plans were specifically focused on crisis management of a terrorist incident. It was Exercise MIRAGE GOLD that identified, to counterterrorism planners, the importance of coordinating consequence management with crisis management during a terrorist incident. This will be done in the future.

2. Q: My staff tells me that DOD representatives noted the following:

"The initial focus of the federal response is a law enforcement and counterterrorism, with the FBI as the Lead Federal Authority. Should a detonation occur, the FBI is no longer the appropriate Lead Federal Authority. The procedures to conduct the transfer of Lead Federal responsibility are lacking."

What was the impact on you mission? What have you done about this problem? Has it been fixed?

A: DoD is always in support of the lead federal agency during a terrorist incident. There would be little impact on DoD's ability to support the lead federal agency during a transition from crisis to consequence management. The CT interagency identified the importance of consequence management planning during the response to a terrorist incident and directed the drafting of specific procedural guidelines for a federal response. The various federal agencies are currently staffing a draft of these guidelines. Procedures to transfer lead federal responsibility have been put in place and are now being routinely exercised and addressed.

3. Q: The Sewell Report stated that it did not have a high level of confidence that the mechanisms to seek high levels of review and approval in the event of an actual nuclear terrorist threat were in place and ready to function on short notice. The Report's authors further stated that they suspected that many of the officials in the approval chain are not fully aware of the types of decisions they will be asked to make or the potential consequences of such decisions. On behalf of each of your individual agencies, how do you respond to these concerns?

A: Within DoD we are well aware of the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism. We have identified specific authorities and decisions that must be made and have considered the level of approval required. The Secretary of Defense has taken a personal interest in this and has

directed that specific changes be made to expedite required NCA action. The NSC has highlighted such concerns and potential issues to the President.

4. Q: To what extent do you integrate state and local agencies in your exercise? Do you conduct "no notice" exercises? No notice field exercises?

A: An Interagency Working Group Exercise Committee was established to coordinate all federal counterterrorism exercises. The FBI and FEMA, not DoD, are the agencies responsible for coordination with state and local authorities. The interagency CT community is in the process of developing an overarching exercise program to address this concern. In addition to the IWG coordinated exercises, there is an increased involvement of local and state agencies in exercises coordinated at the individual agency level.

DoD also conducts a robust "no notice" exercise program which includes field training exercises.

5. Q: What interagency-related problems continue to surface during exercises?

A: The coordination of crisis and consequence management are frequently an issue. We found that a lack of understanding of other agencies capabilities and procedures led to confusion at times. However, due to our collective and concerted effort to improve synergism, this confusion is lessening in gravity and in impact on collective operations. Each exercise tends to identify some new facet of interagency cooperation that needs improvement.

6. Q: Did Operation Mirage Gold reveal any problems with the way in which DOD handles a nuclear incident in the United States? If so what was the most significant? What have you done to fix these problems?

A: As previously mentioned, DoD is always in support of a lead federal agency. In response to a nuclear incident in the United States the FBI is that lead federal agency and Department of Energy is responsible for providing technical expertise. DoD is always in a supporting role. The concept for command and control of DoD tactical forces in support of crisis resolution and other DoD forces in support of the consequence management was perceived as a DoD "problem" and not clearly understood by all of those outside DoD. This has also been an issue within DoD when responding to a nuclear related terrorist incident. At the direction of SECDEF, DoD is finalizing a revision of procedures for all military assistance to civil authorities.

7. Q: Were there any problems with DOD's command and control arrangements that were identified in the Mirage Gold exercise?

A: There were no problems with DoD's command and control arrangements during Exercise Mirage Gold. The command and control of DoD tactical forces in support of crisis resolution and the Defense Senior Representative (DSR) in support of consequence management were handled separately. Existing DoD Directives with regard to DSR responsibilities for consequence management or a response to a nuclear accident are dated and conflict with interagency counterterrorism procedures. These DoD directives are currently under review for revision or cancellation. An additional area identified as needing improvement was the lack of commonal

ity between domestic and overseas iteragency counterterrorism procedures. Changes have been made made within the interagency CT community and within DoD to address the noted areas.

8. Q: DOD: My staff has found out that DOD representatives at Mirage Gold noted that: "Current DOD command and control arrangements involve the Joint Staff, the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Director of Military Support acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. The chains of command from these organizations run parallel, with a high potential for conflicting operational guidance." Would you agree with that assessment? Has the command and control structure changed since then? How has it? Has it fixed the problem?

A: There were no specific problems during MIRAGE GOLD regarding the operational guidelines for DoD CT forces. However, the structure established and procedures used during MIRAGE GOLD did differ from those defined under established DoD nuclear incident directives and interagency MOU's established at the time. The existing DoD directives provide for a DoD response to a nuclear accident/incident and were not intended to provide for a response to terrorism. The key leaders charged with the mission during MIRAGE GOLD had a clear understanding of relationships, procedures etc. However, there was some confusion among individuals not cleared for classified-compartmented counterterrorism plans. There were differing opinions and understandings as to approval authorities for certain actions found necessary and essential in dealing with a nuclear WMD terrorist incident. Thus, there was the potential for confusion. That notwithstanding, the SECDEF directed review on DoD support to outside agencies has corrected areas of concern and established clear procedures and approved authorities for action dealing with terrorism. There have been command and control changes since then which now mirror those used for responding to terrorist incidents overseas. We believe the changes have fixed the problems identified, but we will continue in the months ahead to evaluate the changes made, particularly in preparation for the 1996 Olympics.

9. Q: My staff found out that DOD representatives at Mirage Gold noted that:

"When taken together DOD directives... create confusing situation for the Defense Senior Representative trying to command the DOD effort... A policy revision is required to permit the Defense Senior Representative and Staff to obtain the needed support without unnecessary delay."

Would you agree with that assessment? Have you changed the conflicting directives, I believe they are DOD Directives 3150.5, 3025.1 and 5100.52. ?

A: Yes, the DoD directives you have noted do provide conflicting guidance. As previously mentioned the Secretary of Defense conducted a complete review of all DoD military assistance to civil authorities and established revised policy in a memorandum of December 12, 1995. All DoD directives related to DoD support to civil authorities are currently under review to ensure conformance with the December 12, 1995 memorandum.

10. Q: Are there any other lessons learned form DOD's perspective from the Mirage Gold exercise? What do you do differently today than you did 18 months ago?

A: Two significant lessons learned from Exercise MIRAGE GOLD were first, the requirement to consider consequence management during crisis resolution of a terrorist WMD incident and second, the procedures for DoD support to civil authorities and counterterrorism.

11. Q: Did elements of the Department of Defense participate in the recently concluded exercise called Mirrored Image? What was their assessment of the results? Was this the same type of exercise as Mirage Gold? Did it test all of the same elements?

A: Yes, DoD did participate in Exercise MIRRORED IMAGE. This was a Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), formally called the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), sponsored Command Post Exercise. The exercise was not a field exercise and did not focus on the same issues as Exercise MIRAGE GOLD. DSWA provided comments on Exercise MIRRORED IMAGE during a Senate Governmental Affairs Committee of March 21, 1996. Exercise MIRRORED IMAGE was not a terrorism related exercise and my office, therefore, did not participate.

12. Q: Did the DOD representatives learn anything from the Mirrored Image exercise? Were there any problems there that occurred in Mirage Gold 18 months before? Any new issues?

A: As previously mentioned, DSWA provided comment on Exercise MIRRORED IMAGE during a Senate Governmental Affairs Committee of March 21, 1996. DSWA lessons learned included: a) The basic operational concept that the United States uses in response to a WMD threat is sound. b) The Joint Operations Center and Joint Information Center worked well. c) Federal operational plans and guidance are not fully integrated to provide a coordinated response to a WMD incident. d) The Department of Defense needs to address the requirements for technical assistance including requests for support from agencies other than the Lead Federal Agency. e) The Department of Defense should refine its command and control relationships for a WMD incident. f) The hand-off between the FBI and FEMA needs to be exercised more fully. It must be understood, however, that Exercise MIRRORED IMAGE was not a counterterrorism related exercise, and DSWA is not responsible for coordinating DoD's response to terrorism. As noted in earlier questions, the action being taken within the CT community addresses all of DSWA's lessons learned. Furthermore, a very clear delineation of DOD command and control procedures for a domestic terrorist incident has been approved by the Secretary of Defense.

13. Q: In a memo from an attendee of the Mirrored Image exercise that my staff obtained, it is noted that by the end of the Mirrored Image exercise, the transition had not yet been fully implemented and the FBI was still running the show? Did this occur and was it still a problem?

A: In the context of your question the meaning of, "the transition had not yet been fully implemented" is unclear. Within the CT community, FBI is the lead federal agency for a federal response to a WMD terrorist threat. At some point there could be a transition of lead agency responsibility from FBI for "crisis management" to FEMA for "consequence management." The specifics of this transition are being addressed and exercised within the CT community.

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