After that, we had very little activity on our side. 155's over on the other side.

Colonel Scott had his

Now, the only American outfit we had there was at Balanga, the 31st Infantry. They were decimated that day and what was left-we took the soldiers that were left and made second lieutenants out of them and sent them up to the Philippine Army. You see, the Philippine Army and the Scouts are two different things. And they had no training. They were good fill-in.

Mr. BROOKS. This bill applies only to Scouts?

Reverend DUFFY. Yes; this bill is Scouts, and Scouts is all I am interested in. Mr. BROOKS. Yes.

Reverend DUFFY. Because they were Regular troops of the United States Army and I think by act of Congress of 1902 they became members of the United States Army, but they had a different pay scale and so forth.

Mr. BROOKS. We paid them half-scale.

Reverend DUFFY. Half-scale.

Mr. BROOKS. Yes.

Reverend DUFFY. But the Scouts were the ones that made this possible. Now, you must remember that after the attack we had no supplies. You had panic. They moved a few things into Bataan. But our ration, our official ration per day was about 6.2 or 6.3 ounces of food per man per day for all of Bataan. Well, you know how much that filtered down into the front line when the people in the different echelons grabbed off what they wanted and they weren't chiseling too much. The result-we had the Filipinos that were sick in the trenches. We had every hospital jammed. It wasn't with wounded, with people that were sick of malaria and dengue and dysentery. If you wanted to attack, why you simply couldn't wage it. We had people sick in the trenches.

We would put them in there and told them they at least ought to have enough strength to pull the trigger on their gun. Of course, when the end came, we had 1 day's fire left and we had no food. And that was the thing that licked us there.

Well, on that, from the time of the surrender up until the time they got them to Camp O'Donnell, there was no food. Then there was no water. People were killed for trying to go after water. And the Jap doesn't think anything of lopping your head off with a Samorai sword.

The first thing they wanted to do, though, was to keep the Scouts away from their officers, and of course the Filipinos. They didn't let any American and Filipino be together. Which was a distinct disadvantage for the Scouts who had always been used to being cared for by their officers.

After they got to O'Donnell, they had, I think, about 80,000 Filipinos and all the Americans in there. And O'Donnell was the place they were building up to be a camp, but it was not completed before the attack came.

There was one water spigot to feed all these men. And they were lined up day and night. And of course the sick couldn't get out to even get water. And the ration was practically nothing. And, of course, the medical officers had been through this mess. They were just as wornout as everybody else. And many of them were sick. And they had no medicine.

There wasn't anything they could do for these people. The result was that you had five, six, seven hundred people dying every day. And the ones that were strong enough were trying to build trenches to bury them in. In the course of 3 months up to the time they began this liberation period, the so-called parole, there were some 29,000 Filipinos and about 1,800 Americans that had died at O'Donnell.

Now, remember, these people hadn't seen their families or anything. Now, of course, some of them escaped. Some of them were told to. I told my men to get out. "You know the Philippines. One order you don't have to obey is surrender. You get home."

This bill doesn't concern those because if they escaped and went--but the ones that went on through with their outfits and went to O'Donnell and tried to endure that mess that was there, why, of course, they are being penalized.

Now, the first thing the Japanese did-I happened to be in a hospital. I was secreted there, at Santa Rita, at the time. The Japanese put a list of paroles out. Their paroles, the first ones, were all those that were sick. They were sent home because they were sick. There were no Americans. They had been abandoned. They had heard Roosevelt's speech, you know, here to the Congress, and Mr. Churchill telling them what he was going to do for England, but he was going to redeem the Philippines. That was on the 28th of December, before we had even made our stand along the Guagua line.

You know when you are told that you are going to get help and so forth all along and nothing comes and you are ordered to surrender-well, there wasn't much these people could do.

When the Japanese-they had a choice really of dying in this mess at O'Donnell or taking freedom at home and have a hope to fight another day.

I think it is a distinct injustice to them. I met some of them when I was with the guerrillas afterwards and they told me about this oath. I told them, I said, "Why don't worry about that oath." I said, "There wasn't any freedom. Your only choice was to go home. I am sure our Government is going to be sensible enough so as not to hold you to that, and do what resistance work you can do. And when our forces come back, you report to the first military outfit that comes." And I pacified them, a lot of them over there. And as far as some of these people that deserted, that went to go home to look after their families according to the decision that somebody made-and I know it was none of the responsible people in Bataan that knew what the thing was about. Probably one of these armchair strategists that sat out the whole war here in Washington and went out afterwards to get some decorations and so forth, he decides that these people shouldn't be paid.

I think it is a thorough-and the only reason apparently is because they went home to look after their families. They are apparently interpreting that thing in the light of this bill that we passed to take care of the families.

Well, our Government couldn't take care of the Filipinos. We couldn't even reenforce our troops. As far as getting any money to the children or wives or things like that, it was utterly impossible. If it was possible, they would have had forces out there to liberate it before.

Why the decision is made, I don't know. Apparently, it is a lack of knowledge of these people and their aspirations. Of course, I feel very kindly toward them because not only having fought with them but as a guerrilla, I never went any place that I wasn't welcomed, and when they didn't have anything-they would share their rice with me, whatever they had, and even scare around the neighborhood and try to find a chicken and cook it up.

They would do that for any Americans that dropped in. In fact, it was rather disappointing to come into an American POW camp later and find the selfishness that was there after the generosity of the Filipinos. They felt very bad that we were dying for their country and suffering for their country.

Now, to deny these men their pay and allowances solely because they were forced to sign that oath-I think you would have to deny paying allowance to everybody that was forced to surrender. And of course we were ordered to do that. It wasn't our fault that we had to surrender.

And I think any of us who happened to survive only about 15 percent of us that surrendered did survive we all feel that it would have been a lot more merciful if we had stayed there and died.

Now, if you got any questions I think that is about the essence of things. I don't want to take much of your time. If you have any questions I would like to try to answer them.

Mr. BROOKS. Father, I would like to ask you a question. Suppose these Filipino scouts surrendered and then were paroled

Reverend DUFFY. Yes.

Mr. BROOKS. Was he eligible under that parole when our forces came in that vicinity to join them and participate in the future?

Reverend DUFFY. Well, he should. The basic military principle when I was in the Army was that if anything happened to you, you report to the first military commander as soon as he arrives.

Now, of course, once they were paroled, the Scouts couldn't do very much. I didn't mention that. I just happened

Mr. BROOKS. They couldn't go back in our service, then?

Reverend DUFFY. Well, they should have been able to because they were members of the Regular force. And I don't see personally, I don't see how an Executive order or a decree of somebody, some Chief of Staff or some general, can be a legislative body and a judiciary body. The only way I know you can deprive somebody of pay allowances is by trial and due process of law, and I don't think any of these people have been tried or anything has been proved against them. In fact, the whole essence of this order that I have seen is they put the burden of proof upon the Scouts rather than upon the Government. It is a reversal of our whole concept of judicial and legal process.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, we certainly thank you, Father, for a very brilliant statement that you have made extemporaneously here.

I see it touches you very deeply and personally.

Are there any further questions?

General, do you have anything?

Mr. DEVEREUX. Just what was this parole? Do you have the wording of it? Reverend DUFFY. Somebody has. I never saw it until afterwards, General. What they did with the parole: They made-the governor of the Province and the presidente of the town were responsible for these people. In addition to that, every citizen of any barrio that the Japanese were in-and if he wanted to move about, he had to have an identification card. If he didn't they just lopped their head off. It wasn't uncommon, that is if they found a Scout doing anything, they would cut his head off and they would stick a pole through it and put it up in the center of the town. They did that outside of some of the prison camps. And, of course, human life wasn't worth very much to them.

Of course, once they got into their homes—there wasn't a whole lot you could do. Now, take in your guerrilla activities, for example. We effected, oh, a considerable amount of sabotage, around in the area down on Highway 7, on the way to Olangapu. When they weren't over the pass into Olangapu, Sergeant Boone had an outfit up there any of these small convoys they completely sabotaged. What the Japanese did, they sent over Barios, around that area, bombers and they leveled them. Well, we couldn't do anything. What they were getting was the old men and women and children, but they weren't getting the guerrillas. We had to stop that type of activity. The only thing you could do was to lay low until some strong force came. Because, after all, with the rifle and the will to fight, you can't do much against somebody that has complete superiority of the air and has tanks and machineguns and everything else against you. Mr. BROOKS. Were they forced to sign these, or just by circumstances? Reverend DUFFY. "Well, you either sign this or you can stay here and die." Mr. DEVEREUX. That is all.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Winstead?

Mr. WINSTEAD. No questions. It is a very impressive statement.

Mr. BROOKS. If there is no objection, I would like to put the oath that they made into the record at this point. I would like to read it, too.

"To Whom It May Concern:

"This document is accepted by the Adjutant General's Records Depository, United States Army in Manila, Philippines, as proof of veteran as a prisoner of war under the Japanese and confined at Camp O'Donnell, Capis, Tarlac, from April 9, 1942 to January 23, 1943.

"The issuance of this document by the Japanese Army to a veteran does not mean that the man worked with the Japanese. Because those that were taken into the Bureau of Constabulary were first brought to Dau, Pampanga (close to the present Clark Field) for training. After about 2 or 3 months they were moved to Manila where they were assigned to different parts of the Philippines to serve the Japanese. These men were taken out of Capis, Tarlac, a short time after the surrender.

"This document was given to POW's released direct from Capis, Tarlac. The POW to whom this document was issued to left the camp on the closing day, January 23, 1943. This man has enjoyed the ‘GI' bill of rights through schooling in Manila. "HOWARD D. NEWHOUSE, "Department Adjutant, Philippine Department, the American Legion."

OATH

"TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES.

"I, the undersigned, hereby solemnly pledge myself that I will strictly comply with the following:

"1. I shall never in future resort to any hostile action against the imperial Japanese forces, and I will in no way make any utterance or commit any hostile conduct against Japan;

"2. I will submit to the Japanese Military Administration and do my best to serve for the realization of the objective of the said administration;

"3. I will in no way make any utterance or commit any conduct which may benefit Japan's enemies;

"4. I will in no way make any utterance or commit any conduct which may be harmful to the tranquillity, peace, and order and economic stability of the country;

"5. I will in no way employ or instigate others for the execution of any act which I have pledged myself not to commit in the preceding paragraphs;

"6. I will never fail to present myself at an appointed place when I shall be called up by the Japanese Army.

"Prisoner of war:

"Address: Guinobatan, Albay.

"Signature: Remigio Yaronhilo.

"Guarantor of the above person: "Address:

'Signature:.

"Date: January 23, 1943."

Mr. BROOKS. If there are no further questions, we certainly thank you, Father. We hope we get you away in time to catch your train there. We certainly appreciate your coming.

Reverend DUFFY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. I will say, again, you made a very brilliant statement to the committee.

Reverend DUFFY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. Which the committee appreciates very greatly.
Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Kennedy, did you have some statement?

STATEMENT OF MILES KENNEDY, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Miles Kennedy. I am the legislative director of the American Legion.

In the interests of saving time, Mr. Chairman, I heard your comments to Mr. Dilweg and, of course, I am in the same position as he is, and we will be very happy to abide by your wishes in the matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the committee has any different view, why, of course, I am not undertaking to speak for the whole committee, but I just do not think it would be good parliamentary practice to delay this missing-persons bill to get witnesses up here from the Department to discuss this Philippine Scout matter.

We will have to have extensive hearings on that matter. Nobody is opposed to this bill. You are not opposed to the missing-persons bill?

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And I am sure you would not want to do anything to defeat its passage at this session.

Mr. KEENDY. We would be very happy to abide by your wishes, Mr. Chairman.

I have only one request. If the hearing had continued, I had with me a statement by Mr. Clarence H. Olson, who served as a colonel in the Philippines, and I have submitted copies to the clerk for distribution, and I would respectfully request that that statement be included in the record of the hearings this morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. It will be inserted in the record. (The statement referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF CLARENCE H. OLSON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my official position in the American Legion is assistant director of the national legislative commission. We address ourselves to the Missing Persons Act, the extension of which is

being considered today. On the basis of this act, as amended, the Department of the Navy paid its Insular Naval Force (Filipinos) and its civilian employees in the Philippines for the period during which the Japanese occupied, dominated, and controlled the Philippines.

On the basis of this same act the Army refused to pay the Philippine Scout survivors of Bataan and Corregidor who were in identical status with the Insular Naval Force. Denial was based on the premise that they were not in a casualty status because, to escape practically certain death, they had accepted parole from the stinking hellhole known as Camp O'Donnell.

To us it seems that nothing could be less honorable than to willfully, and without cause, withhold contractually obligated payment to our soldiers. The Philippine Scouts were soldiers of the Regular Army of the United States, even though their pay was at a much reduced rate, $9 per month for the private.

In this session of Congress, after 5 years of effort, we are given our first chance to speak for the four to six thousand surviving Philippine Scouts, or their widows, etc., a small group whose voices have gone unheeded. We are most happy to inform this committee that after bringing this matter before the Brooks subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the Brooks subcommittee, on June 19, 1956, reported H. R. 11787 to give permanent status to the Missing Persons Act, and included a mandate to the Army to pay the Philippine Scouts in accordance with our Government's contractual responsibility and obligation. The full House Armed Services Committee reported said bill on June 29, 1956. We believe the favorable report was unanimously subscribed to, and we feel that the House knowing the truth will not fail to speed belated justice on its way. We surely believe this committee and the Senate will see no other course of action. We are not unmindful of the fact that the Department of Defense opposes legislation that would force it to correct the Army's wrong of 10 years ago. It would be another wrong, and two wrongs do not make a right, if we clearly see the injustice and then fail to correct it. You have but to look at the Army testimony in opposition to H. R. 2208 before the Brooks subcommittee, and the testimony given by others, including the American Legion, to see how indefensible their position really is. Hypotheses and conjecture, with not a legitimate trace that would lead to an intent of Congress that the armed services may arbitrarily deny pay to its soldiers whose only offenses were to surrender on orders of their commanders, and to be paroled from Japanese prisoner-of-war camps at a time when death had taken 1 of every 3 in 4 months.

My interest in this matter may be a little deeper because I came to know many Philippine Scouts during my World War II experiences in the Southwest Pacific area, especially the year I spent in the Philippines, and I have had a continuing interest in them.

As we go into more detail in behalf of the Philippine Scouts, I want it known that the American Legion is aware of the provisions contained in title 50, United States Code Annotated appendix, section 1009, which states:

"When circumstances warrant reconsideration of any determination authorized to be made by this act *** the head of the Department concerned, or such subordinate as he may designate, may change or modify a previous determination."

The Department of the Army has used the above provision in redetermining the pay status in a number of cases. Reversal of previous decisions denying pay because of parole were made in favor of individuals or estates embracing 1 general, 5 colonels, and 5 lieutenant colonels. Moreover, it is pretty generally established that some of these individuals, at least, were employed by the Japanese puppet government of the Philippines. But when we sought administrative redress for the privates and the intermediate grades, we met with impregnable resistance. In the opinion that this was a matter for administrative rather than legislative correction, we appealed to several Secretaries of the Department of Defense, and to the White House itself. In no case were we given any encouragement. During the course of the past 5 years we have caused the introduction of several bills in the House and in the Senate which would legislatively correct the unwholesome situation. We had hoped that such legislative steps would cause the Department of the Army to take a new and fresher look at the problem.

While in office several of our national commanders did, in addition to the work of the staff, ask direct questions of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army as to the reason why the United States Philippine Scouts were denied their pay, and, upon what basis of law the Army claimed the right to break the enlistment contracts providing for military pay as prescribed by the