members of the United States Armed Forces (including the Philippine Scouts); (2) Those dealing with members of the Philippine Army; and (3) Those dealing with nonmilitary guerrillas.

"The Department of the Army does not question the liability of the United States with respect to claims falling within the first category where such claims are substantiated."

This in itself shows the inconsistency of the arbitrary action taken by the Department of the Army in denying pay to the Philippine Scouts whom they recognize as being authorized military agents of the United States in the above question.

In opposing legislation to correct this complete breach of contract by the Department of the Army, the Defense Department has said that if we paid the Philippine Scouts we might also have to pay the soldiers of the Philippine Army who were likewise paroled. This, you realize, is a most unfair statement because if we were contractually obligated to them we certainly should pay our obligations. But that is not the intent of our proposed legislation; neither is it considered necessary because the Philippine Government has recognized the rights of its own soldiers who were similarly paroled, and by Republic Act No. 897, enacted in July 1953, the Philippine Government evolved a program for the payment of those claims over a period of time consistent with their economic ability to do so. Such argument therefore carries no weight whatsoever.

During the course of the past 4 years I have tried to convince the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army that the honest and decent recourse would be to bring about administrative relief to these four or five thousand remaining Philippine Scouts. I have met with failure in every instance and we have not been told the reason why such payment was refused except the fallacious statement that they were not in casualty status. We have positive proof to refute such statements because many of these parolees in the alleged noncasualty status were taken by the Japanese and executed summarily for minor violations of parole; many were brutally and severely mistreated and their families were molested and maligned.

I request favorable action on H. R. 2208 and/or H. R. 3674.

Mr. DILWEG. And there is one other statement, that of Father Duffy, who testified before the House committee. He is Father Duffy, chaplain for the American Legion, and who served with the Philippine Scouts in the Philippines at that time. I ask permission to insert it in the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. That will be inserted in the record, and we will hear you when that bill gets before us, but I do not think it would be good procedure to open this bill up at this minute, for the committee to do that.

Mr. DILWEG. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are quite welcome.

(The following testimony of Father Duffy, referred to above, is taken from a hearing held on May 28, 1956, before subcommittee No. 1 of the House Armed Services Committee regarding H. R. 2208, a bill to amend sec. 2 of the Missing Persons Act so as to provide that benefits thereunder shall be available to certain members of the Philippine Scouts.)

Mr. BROOKS. At this time we have a very distinguished witness before us, Father Duffy. You represent the American Legion. You want to testify on this bill. We will hear you right at this point. I understand you have to catch a train, too, probably at noon today.

We are very happy to have you and have Mr. Kennedy here and other representatives for the Legion. We are glad to have your testimony on this bill.

Now I have had some little misgiving because Mr. Teague had been very anxious to have a hearing on this bill and had talked to the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Vinson, about it. When we call the hearing, though, he is out of town. I do think it would have been advisable to have had him present. But since you are here, sir, we will be very happy to hear from you. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt just a moment. Mr. BROOKS. Surely.

Mr. KENNEDY. I am Miles Kennedy, legislative director. Mr. Olson can come back anytime at all because he is here. We do appreciate your taking Father Duffy a little bit out of order.

Mr. BROOKS. I want to hear from Father Duffy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. Due to the fact that Mr. Olson was in the Philippines personally, and he is also our assistant legislative director, Mr. Chairman, while I usually have the privilege of introducing our witnesses at this time, I am going to yield to Mr. Olson to introduce Father Duffy.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Olson.

Mr. OLSON. Mr. Chairman, my name is Charles H. Olson and as Mr. Kennedy said I am assistant director for legislative program.

I would like to make a brief statement, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen of the committee, before introducing Father Duffy. The basic reason the American Legion is here today is to urge upon this committee to correct a grave injustice that was imposed on the Philippine Scouts by action of the United States Army upon the conclusion of World War II.

We are here by virtue or under authority of a resolution which was approved by the Washington convention in 1954, No. 189.

Prior to that, going back to 1951, there were several similar resolutions.

I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that this resolution is not an ordinary one. That is, it is not a routine one, excuse me. The National Legislative Commission of the American Legion itself considered the resolution before recommending its approval by the national convention.

The commisison is made up of eminent jurists, lawyers, business leaders, and executives.

They had the matter under advisement for a period of about 6 months before they arrived at their conclusion.

Now, I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Kennedy said, to make my statement to you first, because I wanted the father to back me up and fill in the gaps. But since the timing won't permit it, I would like to introduce him. Father Duffy, among other distinguishing connections, has been the I mean the national chaplain of the American Legion. He served as General Wainwright's chief executive officer during the time he was national commander of the Disabled American Veterans. He is a retired officer from the Chaplain Corps of the Army. He was in the Regular service, entering in 1933, and was discharged by enemy-inflicted, foreign enemy-inflicted disability upon the conclusion of World War II or shortly thereafter.

He served two tours of duty in the Philippines, from 1933 to 1937.

His second tour began in 1940 and ended on December 13, 1944, when he was moved with other American prisoners of war toward Korea and most of you know what a bad time they had.

Father Duffy was quite a soldier. Among his decorations are the Purple Heart with five oak-leaf clusters. He has the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, a Navy commendation and of course the usual array of campaign ribbons.

Now he does not have a prepared statement, I'm sorry, but I think he will tell you something about the conditions of the Philippines at the time these paroles were given and some of of the factors subsequent thereto which I believe will help justify the demands of you gentlemen that a gross injustice was done and that legislative action should be taken to correct it.

We address ourselves to 2208, to 3674, and to H. R. 9500. We hope you will amend the latter at the proper time.

Father Duffy.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you very much, Mr. Olson.

Reverend DUFFY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROOKS. We are privileged to have you, Father Duffy.

Reverend DUFFY. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, and Congressmen, I think that this denying the Philippine Scouts pay and allowances solely because they were paroled to their home by the Japanese was a distinct injustice.

Now I would like to handle this subject in the following manner. I served with the Philippines in peace and in war and I do not think that we had a finer outfit of troops anywhere than the Regular Scouts.

I would like to present to you my knowledge of the Scouts in peace, what they did during the Bataan campaign and the impossibility of them doing anything but accepting the parole that was forced upon them by the Japanese.

I served with the Philippines in their maneuvers in 1934, 1935, 1936, and 1937, and in 1940 and through the campaign in northern Luzon and in Bataan. I was

the post chaplain at Fort Stotsenburg, which was composed of 2 Philippine units, in the early days, the 24th Field Artillery and the 26th Cavalry, and of course prior to World War II, a year before, we expanded the Philippine Division to a strength of 12,000 and we added the 88th and the 86th Field Artillery.

The majority of these people were Catholics and as a result I had many intimate associations with them.

I think that they were as well-I do not think we ever had a more well-disciplined group of troops. In fact, they were considered recruits in the outfit until they did 12 years of duty. All of them were permitted to be married. And I would say at least 93 percent of the troops on the post were married men. The average family was about 10 or 12 children. They didn't live on the post, but they lived in barios, adjoining the reservation. It is a Spanish term that means a little village. These Filipinos lived a normal married life as well as being very good soldiers. They were proud of their outfits. And we had no disciplinary troubles. It was an exceptional thing to have a Filipino in the guardhouse. We had a few spare parts of Americans on the post, but I do not think my guardhouse reports ever showed more than one or half or one and a half men per day per month in the guardhouse, and the majority of them were Americans.

We used to well, we baptized at least a hundred a month. It wasn't unusual to have 50. And probably 25 or 30 marriages. And the same thing with funerals of dependents. The chaplain had a full-time duty looking after the spiritual welfare of these men as well as being a member of the unit.

The maneuvers paid extremely good dividends because we fought the war in the Philippines just the way we had maneuvered for 4 or 5 years prior to that. Now, you haven't a lot of time. I don't want to take up your time going into a lot of details with you that might be interesting. But I think I do know the Philippine Scouts. And I know that a couple of commanding generals put on my efficiency report that "this officer has a better knowledge of the Philippine problem than anyone in my command."

I have talked with General King who surrendered Bataan and General Jones who succeeded Wainwright in the Frst Philippine Corps and they told me that they would back me up in my views in trying to get the Scouts recognized, because they feel as I do that a great injustice is done them by being denied this. And Colonel Lawrence who was the quartermaster on Bataan concurs in it and also Colonel Gaskill who was the surgeon of the First Philippine Corps. When Pearl was hit we were alerted about 2: 30 in the morning. I happened to live next door to General Wainwright. We had been waiting for this alert for some 2 or 3 days. I expected the cannons to be sounded, but they weren't. The outfits were all sent to the field by telephone orders. That was done so as not to disturb the Philippine population and create any type of riot. That meant that all the Scouts-the last time they saw their families was about 2:30 in the morning of December 8, which was December 7 here in the United States. From then on they never had a chance to have any contact with them.

One of our problems after we were hit at Clark and at Stotsenburg and before I was ordered to join the northern Luzon forces because I happened to be a staff man at the time, was to do something for these Filipinos, because as we saw things these families had to be evacuated and Stotsenburg was a very dangerous place for them.

So we tried to persuade them to go back to their homes and their barios, wherever they came from, and take their children with them. We didn't have transportation to give them to handle this thing. In fact, we were at that time commandeering every truck and everything over the highway and taking it. In fact, we even took the Filipinos off of the trucks and made soldiers out of them. It would have probably delighted the old General Hagood of former days who used to claim you could train a good soldier in 10 days. We, of course, had to do that on the battlefield and did a pretty good job of it.

Now some of these people were from the Visayan Islands and they were from the south. There are about 7,500 islands in the Philippines. Of course, they did not have anyplace to go. But we did everything we could to persuade them to get out of the vicinity of Stotsenburg and to go to the north or go over to the Pacific side of the island where it was away from highways that the enemy might come down.

Another problem we had, of course, was trying to pacify the civilian population. These dry runs and this alert business creates a great deal of panic on the part of the civilians and I would say that one of our big problems during the war in the

Philippines was to keep the civilians out of our way, and even at that we got 100,000 of them back to our lines when we got back to Bataan.

But in the northern Luzon campaign I reported for duty there at orders of General MacArthur, at Wainwright's request, because he had requested my assignment, there, on the evening of the 21st of December, at the headquarters in northern Luzon which at that time was located at a distance of about, oh, 30 or 40 kilometers from Pasrobia. That evening we received the intelligence that 100 Japanese ships were sighted about 250 miles off of Lingayan Bay and were expected to land that morning. The only thing we had to defend ourselves: We had 3 batteries of 2 guns each of 155's in the 88th stationed in the vicinity of Lingayan. One was at Danalupan and the other one was at San Fabian, and a third one was up at Santo Tomas, I think.

Then we had the 26th Cavalry in the vicinity of Rasario.

Off the record.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Olson is familiar with all those names and the reporter can check with him later.

Mr. BROOKS. All right.

Reverend DUFFY. We had the 11th Philippine Army in the vicinity of San Fernando, La Union. We had the 21st stretched along Highway 13 from Lingayan down to Tarlac and we had the 71st in the vicinity of Pasrobia.

Now, the Philippine Army was a misnomer. Many of these people had had 6 weeks' training but they believed, you know, in the Sunday-school army of giving them training with wooden rifles and none of them, even though they had had 6 months' training, had ever fired a gun. They brought 75's up, the old ones that were left over from 1917, and with the old wooden wheels. I remember especially with the 21st Division, these people didn't know a muzzle from a breechblock. The officers had to go out and try and instruct them while the enemy was coming in how to fire a 75.

The Filipinos had had no training. They had never had any rifle practice of any kind.

So we had a lot of people, but we didn't have anybody that could do anything. When the Japs came in-we also had one company of self-propelled mounts in the vicinity of Bauang.

Now, these self-propelled mounts had been delivered to us at Stotsenberg on the 6th day of December. That was 2 days before we were hit, on a Saturday. The cadre-we took cadres out of the Philippine Scouts to form the basis of these self-propelled batteries. And the personnel-we went out on the highways and we took the Filipinos off the trucks and we brought them in and made soldiers out of them. And on Monday morning we moved them out into the hills in the vicinity of Stotsenberg and started training them in the operation of these self-propelled mounts. And by the 21st we had them moved up in the vicinity of Bauang.

Captain Jones, who was lost on the hell ships that I happened to survive from, was in command of that battery up there.

Now, when the Japs moved in, the 105's waited until they got in very convenient range and then they opened up on them and they sunk 2 or 3 of the boats. The Japs immediately pulled anchor and pulled back and when they got out of the range, the 155's were useless and we had to move them-we moved them back. They were ordered back that evening to Tarlac and the

rear.

Jones gave them his muscle-bursting shrapnel until they got through in numbers, overwhelmed them on the beach, and, of course, the play of the guns from the Japanese naval boats became too strong for them, and he retreated up the Bauang Road up to Baguio. At Baguio, Colonel Horan wouldn't let him go. So he left his self-propelled mounts and took his men and retarded down to the other end of the mountain and rejoined the forces about 10 days later in San Fernando where we reequipped them.

About 2 days later the Japanese after they got ashore and had tanks landedwe had no tanks up there at that time. We had two tank outfits that had come over about a week before. One was the 192d and the 194th. But there were no tanks assigned to us at that time. The only thing we had to resist these tanks was the 26th Field Artillery, a horse-drawn outfit, which at that time was commanded by Colonel Pierce. Pierce's men put up-they had 4 halftracks and 3 of their very fine officers were-excuse me. [Witness weeping.]

Well, they met them and we had to throw horse cavalry against mechanized troops. You know, that is almost an impossible situation. And half of that

regiment was decimated. But we threw a considerable scare into the Nips, much more than we anticipated.

Now, if it hadn't been for the cavalry, we wouldn't have been able to do anything.

Two days before, Brougher was up making a big speech with all the generals at Basrobia in the 71st Infantry. A couple of bombers came over and they threw the Philippine Army into panic. They loaded into these buses and got down to San Fernando before we could stop them.

Now, we had ordered this Scout outfit-you see, it was only Scout outfits that had given any resistance. We ordered them back to Mexico for rest and reorganization. But the Filipinos ran so fast that we got a tank outfit in. We had one other self-propelled outfit that was composed of Scouts. The 26th had to fight the rearguard action all the way down. And, of course, our purpose there : we had to cover the San Fernando bottleneck to get all the troops out, if we were going to make any type of stand in the Bataan Peninsula. And while we had a line across the Agno River and we had a line at Tarlac and another line at Bamban-and while we stayed there as long as we were supposed to, it was only because of the work that the Scouts had done.

The first real line of resistance was from Porac to Guagua. Again, the remnants of the 26th Cavalry was put into the line there. And all of the effective work that was done against the enemy was done by our Scout artillery. And we had them lined up through that whole section. It was the 24th, the 86th, and the 88th.

We knew that we had effected pretty good damage to the enemy. But our estimations were entirely too low. I didn't realize that until later, when I was with the guerrillas and an escaped prisoner myself, the terrific amount of damage that had been done by our people at that time.

And after a stand there of 6 days we moved back into Bataan and we took a stand that became the main line of resistance. It extended from Moran down to Bagac and over to-I forget the name of the town on the bayside. But that was the main line of resistance until the fall came.

Now our major battles: We had one-the first thing the Japs did about the 18th of January was to cut off this thumb at Moran. The Philippine Army panicked. We had one battery of Scout mountain artillery there commanded by Major Fitch. In fact I was there with them the night before because they had no chaplain and had moved up practically all the ammunition to them. I was the last one to get through back to our headquarters before the line was cut. In fact I wouldn't even believe it when the line happened to be cut. I saw Fitch. Now the stand that the 23d Field Artillery Scouts made there at Moran before we straightened the line out to Bagac put terror into them. We relieved the commander of the 1st Philippine Division because of the manner in which they retreated and we had to reequip that whole outfit. And there would have been no resistance if it hadn't been for Fitch's stand with this pack artillery. And he stayed there until he shot all of his ammunition. I ran into him about 4 weeks later up on the front and I asked him what happened to him up there and he said, "Padre, it was an artilleryman's dream. I had targets in front of me I had targets behind me I had targets on all sides of me and I was able to stay there until I shot the last shell and we took the breechblocks down and threw them in the bay and got on back."

Then the next penetration they tried to make was along the Pantinguan River. Along the same time they tried landings at Longaskawayan. The 57th was sent in there and drove the Japanese off. At Agloloma we brought in another battalion. The 75th and 45th and reinforced them with a battalion of the 24th Field Artillery and a battalion of the 88th Field Artillery. We drove them off of the island there. In other words, their beachheads were not established. At that time they tried to penetrate through the Pantinguan River with a reinforced division. Colonel Lathrop had one battalion. The 45th Field Artillery-45th Infantry, and he had them at the headquarters machinegun company. That entire reinforced division was destroyed. In fact, it took 3 or 4 days, but they did a beautiful piece of work.

This, of course-the 45th was a Scout outfit. They mowed them down. We wanted prisoners and we didn't get over 50 or 60 prisoners, because we wanted to know where they were and what they were doing and so forth. It was a very difficult thing to get Japanese prisoners.

When we cleared up the mess, if you wanted to get the bottom body, you would have to take 60 or 70 bodies off. It took us a couple of weeks and many bulldozers to bury that group of Japs.