Laughlin Company, yet that is plainly what it means, so that the only fair criticism is that the means or mode of operation do not appear in any way. How were the "preventing," causing to remain on the cars before their delivery to the building company, the "influencing" and "causing" the workmen not to unload-how were all these things to be done? What authority did defendants have over the haulers or unloaders, or over the railroads, to keep the loaded cars in their possession? If the indictment had disclosed (as the proof was) that defendants were business agents of labor unions, and as such had authority over the members, and that they influenced them to quit work, all would have been quite clear.

But there is nothing to show what influence defendants could have with the workmen, that there was any strike, that defendants levied blackmail on McLaughlin and called a strike to bring him to time, that the workmen quit, and that this caused the railroads to reroute the material cars, as a direct result. Not one of these things is even hinted at. The prosecution could equally well have proved threats to kill the workmen if they hauled for McLaughlin, or persuasion or any other form of influence. A labor dispute over wages with a teaming company for whom the teamsters worked, causing a lawful strike, might have been shown, and this was attempted by the defense. Defendants were in no way informed of the details of what they were required to meet and prepare to disprove. They were given no hint that they would be charged with collecting $2,000 blackmail from McLaughlin, and calling a strike on him because he refused to pay $500 more, or to comply with a later demand for $5,000.

The question is, therefore, whether this indictment can be held sufficient under the liberal rule now existing. Defendants have raised the question in every possible way, by demurrer, motion to dismiss and discharge on the trial, motion to direct a verdict, motion to quash, and finally in arrest.

. [3] Indictments under the Sherman Act are more simple than those under Rev. St. § 5440 (Comp. St. § 10201), because the offense is the agreement alone, no overt act being a part of it. The agreement being the crime, that must be charged, and nothing more. If the indictment relates the elements of the agreement in sufficiently clear terms, defendants are informed of what they are required to meet. They need not be told what means or measures they had decided on to carry out their agreement, or that any act was done by any person in the execution of the agreement.

The modified rule of sufficiency of indictment is stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals of this circuit in Jelke v. United States, 255 Fed. 264, C. C. A., October term, 1916, where the prosecution was under section 5440, requiring the pleading of an overt act. In that case it was alleged that defendants agreed that they would "cause" certain named persons to mix artificial coloring matter with oleomargarine to cause it to look like butter of a shade of yellow, and agreed among themselves to furnish and cause to be furnished to such named persons tub liners for packing the colored product, and paper wrappers for packing it, also to "cause" said persons to do other things definitely stated, all in order to escape taxation. How the defend

ants had agreed to "cause" the persons named to do the things charged does not appear. The court held that a conspiracy to defraud the government out of the tax on oleomargarine is an offense, even though the details of how they would carry it out, and cause such persons to assist, may not have been agreed on, and that the law does not require the defendant to be informed of all the details or means, which may not have been fully arranged.

The rule of the Jelke Case is thus stated by Judge Evans:

"An indictment is generally sufficient which charges a statutory crime substantially in the words of the statute, except in such cases where other precedents have been firmly established in analogous offenses at common law, or where such a charge would not fairly inform the accused of the nature of the charge."

This statement of the law rejects all objections merely technical, so that it is necessary only to consider whether this indictment fairly informs the accused of the nature of the charge. In applying this rule the court in the Jelke Case approves decisions holding that section 5440, by requiring the pleading of an overt act, intended to relieve the pleader from the necessity of setting out the means agreed on by which the conspiracy was to be carried out. United States v. Dennee, Fed. Cas. No. 14,948; United States v. Goldman, Fed. Cas. No. 15,225. Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 468, 15 Sup. Ct. 469, 39 L. Ed. 494, is also cited as authority, in which it is said:

"At common law it was neither necessary to aver nor prove an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and indictments therefor were of such general description that it was customary to require the prosecutor to furnish the defendant with a particular of his charges. Rex v. Gill, 2 Barn. & Ald., 204; Rex v. Hamilton, 7 Car. & P. 448; U. S. v. Walsh, 5 Dill. 58, Fed. Cas. No. 16,636. But this general form of indictment has not met with the approval of the courts in this country, and in most of the states an overt act must be alleged. The statute in question changes the common law only in requiring an overt act to be alleged and proved."

People v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268, 9 N. W. 406, is also approved, in which Judge Cooley said:

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本

"It is conceded that, if the act which the conspirators combine to perform is unlawful, it is not necessary to set out in the information the means intended to be employed in accomplishing it. But if the end in view is lawful or indifferent, and the conspiracy only becomes criminal by reason of the unlawful means whereby it is to be accomplished, it becomes necessary to show the criminality by setting out the unlawful means."

The Court of Appeals also distinguished United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 557, 23 L. Ed. 588, and Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584, 14 Sup. Ct. 934, 38 L. Ed. 830.

Since it is the agreement or conspiracy which is made unlawful by the Sherman Act, and no overt act is required to complete the offense, as is the case under section 5440 (United States v. Patten [C. C.] 187 Fed. 664, United States v. Cowell [D. C.] 243 Fed. 730), the question is only whether the agreement is sufficiently stated. The indictment purports to state the means by which the offense was to be carried out, but does not give all the particulars. The agency for the unions, the blackmailing, a further demand for money, and then

the strike are not stated. These, however are only the "means" of executing the offense. They may not have been considered at all by the defendants when they made their first, or even the last, demand on McLaughlin, deeming that the implied threat would be sufficient. Thus these things may not have constituted any part of the combination or agreement, only determined on at the last moment, when it was found that they could conceal their real purpose by using the dispute between the teaming company and the unions regarding wages, and use it for their own ends. It is the conspiracy which is denounced by the law, and that was complete when there was a meeting of minds to obstruct commerce. The commerce described in

the indictment and found by the jury was interstate, and was directly restrained by the acts of defendants. Southern Pac. T. Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S. 498, 31 Sup. Ct. 279, 55 L. Ed. 310; Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346, 37 Sup. Ct. 623, 61 L. Ed. 1181; Western Union v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 438, 62 L. Ed. 1006.

The motions in arrest of judgment should be overruled.

PRIMOS CHEMICAL CO. v. FULTON STEEL CORPORATION.

(District Court, S. D. New York.

November 20, 1918.)

1. COURTS 268-JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS-DISTRICT OF SUIT. A federal court has jurisdiction of a creditors' suit against a corporation, where defendant has either fixed or personal property within the district, although the greater part of its property is in another district, in view of Judicial Code, § 55 (Comp. St. § 1037).

2. COURTS 276—JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS-DISTRICT OF SUIT— WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS.

The jurisdiction of a federal court of a creditors' suit against a corporation cannot be questioned by creditors on the ground that it is a nonresident of the district, when the defendant has voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction.

An ancillary bill for sequestration of assets does not essentially differ from an original bill. Each is an equitable attachment of property within the district in which such bill is filed, and of that property only.

In Equity. Suit by the Primos Chemical Company against the Fulton Steel Corporation. On motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Denied.

See, also, 254 Fed. 454.

W. Cleveland Runyon, of New York City, for complainant.

Kellogg & Rose, of New York City (L. Laflin Kellogg, of New York City, of counsel), for objecting creditors.

AUGUSTUS N. HAND, District Judge. [1] Certain creditors, by a special appearance, question the jurisdiction of this court in the above cause upon the ground that the suit is of a local nature. The suit cannot be of a local nature, if there is personal property in this district

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and no fixed property. If the leasehold interest belonging to the defendant is fixed property in this district, the cause was properly brought here, and the receivers would have full jurisdiction over all the property in the circuit under section 55 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1102 [Comp. St. § 1037]). I allowed an amendment to the bill to set up these facts, without, however, passing in any way upon the effect of the allegations. About the time the original bill was filed, I suggested that an ancillary bill should be filed. in the Northern district, where the factory and most of the property were, and that is the practice that I still think should have been and should be followed. However, that this court would not 'have jurisdiction over all the property within the circuit does not in any way militate against its jurisdiction over property within this district.

[2] I am informed that there was at the time of the filing of the bill a leasehold interest, the equipment of an office and a bank account of approximately $4,000 within the Southern district of New York. There can therefore be no doubt about the jurisdiction of this court over that property. Moreover, its jurisdiction, as was said by the Supreme Court in the case of Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129, 14 Sup. Ct. 286, 38 L. Ed. 98, in a case like this, cannot be questioned by creditors, where the defendant has voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction.

[3] According to my understanding, an equity receivership, except in certain limited cases covered by the Judicial Code, extends only to property within the district in which the suit is brought. An ancillary bill for sequestration of assets does not essentially differ from an original bill. Each is an equitable attachment of property within the district in which such bill is filed and of that property only, and, whether the bill filed in the second district be termed "original" or "ancillary," orders in that district are necessary to affect property therein. If a reorganization is offered, it should be approved by the court in both districts. After a bill is filed in the Northern district, I should. say the offer should first be submitted to the court in that district, where by far the greater part of the property of the corporation is situated, and, if approved there, I can hardly imagine any doubt about its immediate approval here.

For the foregoing reason, the motion to dismiss the bill for lack of jurisdiction is denied.

Ex parte BERNAT.

Ex parte DIXON.

(District Court, W. D. Washington, N. D. December 17, 1918.)

ALIENS 54-GROUNDS FOR DEPORTATION-ADVOCATING AND TEACHING SA

BOTAGE.

Order for deportation of aliens under Act Feb. 5, 1917, § 19 (Comp. St. 1918, § 42891⁄4jj), for “advocating and teaching unlawful destruction of property," held sustained by evidence, where defendants testified that they believed in, and distributed I. W. W. literature, which openly advocated and urged sabotage by destroying and disabling machinery or other property used by employers.

Applications by Samuel H. Dixon and Charles Bernat for writs of habeas corpus. Denied.

Hinman D. Folsom, Jr., of Seattle, Wash., for the United States. Ralph S. Pierce and Geo. F. Vanderveer, both of Seattle, Wash., for defendants.

NETERER, District Judge. These cases were submitted to the court together. The issue is identical. The facts are similar, but of different emphasis. The cases will be disposed of together.

Each petitioner is ordered deported upon the ground "that he has been found advocating and teaching the unlawful destruction of property." -Dixon is a subject of England; Bernat is a subject of Russia. Each petitioner seeks release on the ground that he has been denied a fair hearing, that there is no evidence to support the charge against him, and that the order of deportation is arbitrary, and unsupported by fact or law. If the alien has been accorded a fair, though summary, hearing, and the finding is supported by competent testimony, however slight, the court may not interfere.

From an examination of the testimony, in the light of this rule, we find, after some testimony as to membership in the I. W. W. organization, the following questions and answers appear in Dixon's testimony: "Q. Being a member that long, and being a delegate and taking an active part in the order, you actually believe in the teachings as advocated by the I. W. W.? A. I do.

"Q. You have read their preamble and constitution? A. Yes. "Q. You believe in the teachings advocated in that? A. I do.

"Q. Are you familiar with the I. W. W. Song Book? A. Yes.

"Q. Do you believe in the teachings indicated in that book? A. Yes; most of them; I do. There are some I haven't seen, but what I have seen, I believe."

As to reading I. W. W. literature, he was asked:

"Q. "The I. W. W., its History, Structure and Methods,' by St. John? A. I have read that.

"Q. Believe in the teachings as advocated in that book? A. Yes. "Q. Have you read the Industrial World? A. Yes.

"Q. Believe in the teachings advocated in that paper? A. Yes; I do.

"Q. Now, you have been collecting for the defense fund; you have been a delegate quite a number of times; you have solicited members, sold the Industrial Worker, and distributed other I. W. W literature? A. Yes.

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