the officer making the assessment. Anderson, 257 Fed. 576, 1919.)

(New York Life Ins. Co. v.

A suit to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed and collected under the corporation tax law may be brought directly against the United States in the United States district court under the act of March 3, 1887, known as the Tucker Act, now incorporated in section 24 of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911. Remedy by suit against the collector is not made exclusive by the provisions of subdivision 8 that all laws relating to collection, remission, and refund of internal revenue taxes so far as applicable are extended to this tax. (United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 1915.)

A statement made by a corporation's auditor to an internal revenue agent that the corporation had no paid-up capital stock is admissible in proceedings to recover taxes under section 38 of the act of August 5, 1909. (Associated Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 258 Fed. 800, 1919.)

INCOME TAX.

ACT OF OCTOBER 3, 1913, SECTION II.

Repealed by act of September 8, 1916, section 24. Provision for refund of taxes collected, act of March 4, 1915, and act of September 8, 1916, section 14 (a). Jurisdiction-Judicial Code, section 24 (1).

DECISIONS UNDER ACT OF OCTOBER 3, 1913-SECTION II, INCOME TAX.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

Constitutionality.

The income-tax provisions of the tariff act of 1913 are not unconstitutional by reason of retroactive operation, the period covered not extending prior to the time when the sixteenth amendment was operated; nor are those provisions unconstitutional under the due process provision of the fifth amendment; nor do they deny due process of law by reason of the classifications therein of things or persons subject to the tax. The provisions for collecting income at the source do not deny due process of law by reason of duties imposed upon corporations without compensation in connection with the withholding and collection of tax at source.

When there are differences between the subjects taxed, Congress does not transcend the limit of its taxing power by taxing them differently.

A want of due process of law does not arise from want of wisdom in Congress in levying taxes and thus give the courts power to overrule the action of Congress by declaring it to be unconstitutional.

Arguments as to the expediency of levying a tax which is within the power of Congress to levy are beyond judicial cognizance. (Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 1915. Followed in Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 1916.)

There is no authority for taking taxation of mining corporations out of the rule established by the sixteenth amendment; nor is there any basis for the contention that, owing to inadequacy of the allowance for depreciation of ore body, the income tax of 1913 is equivalent to one on the gross product of mines, and as such a direct tax on the property itself, and therefore beyond the purview of that amendment and void for want of apportionment.

Brushaber case followed as to constitutionality of the act. (Stanton v. Baltic Mining Company, 240 U. S. 103, 1916.)

Brushaber case followed to the effect that the provisions of the income-tax act 1913 are not unconstitutional either because not sanctioned by the sixteenth amendment and otherwise beyond the general taxing power of Congress, or because of its retroactive operation for a designated period, or because of discriminations, inequalities, or progressive increases on incomes of individuals or the method provided for computing income of corporations. (Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U. S. 115, 1916.)

The unconstitutionality of the law and of the surtaxes which it imposes have been considered and adversely disposed of in Brushaber case, followed herein. (Dodge v. Brady, 240 U. S. 122, 1916.)

There is no room for argument as to the general constitutionality of the tax upon returns made in 1914 and estimated or based upon the income of an individual for a certain definite preceding period, even though that period be partially prior to the date of the enactment of the law. If the person is liable for the tax in the future, the method of its computation as estimated upon the past does not invalidate the tax. (Citing Stockdale v. Insurance Companies, 87 U. S. 331; Edwards v. Keith, 224 Fed. 585, 587, 1915. Affirmed by 231 Fed. 110; see 243 U. S. 638, 1916.)

The claim that the act is unconstitutional if construed to cover dividends, whether in stock or in cash, derived from earnings prior to the sixteenth amendment, is denied in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U. S. 1; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103; Edwards v. Keith, 231 Fed. 110, 243 U. S. 638. See also Memphis & C. R. R. Co. v. U. S., 108 U. S. 228; (Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 1918.)

Sixteenth amendment.

Independently of the operations of the sixteenth amendment, a tax on the product of a mine is not a tax upon property as such because of its ownership, but is a true excise levied on the result of the business of carrying on mining operations. (Stratton's Independence . Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, followed in Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103, 1916.)

Under the sixteenth amendment of the Constitution, Congress has power to tax as income, without apportionment, everything that became income in the ordinary sense of the word after the adoption of the amendment. (Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, 1918.)

The sixteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects, but merely removes all occasion which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the States of tax laid on income, whether it be derived from one source or another. (Peck ». Lowe, 247 U. S. 165, 1918.)

Construction.

In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule not to extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out, and in case of doubt they are to be construed most strongly against the Government, (Haiku Sugar Co. et. al. v. Johnstone, 249 Fed. 103, 1918.) And (Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 1917.)

While taxing statutes are to be strictly construed, this merely means that neither the courts nor the executive may, through judicial or administrative construction, impose a tax not imposed by Congress, and, when Congress had indicated its purpose and intent to tax, the law is not to be strictly construed, but is to be given that construction given to remedial statutes.

In construing a law, the judicial inquiry is not into what enactment Congress should have made, but into what enactment Congress did in fact make.

While an act of Congress must be accepted for the purpose of interpretation in the form in which it was finally passed, and can not be altered or amended to conform to the meaning given it by individual members who advocated its passage, or by a committee which may have discussed it in a report, such expressions of opinion are entitled to weight in construing the law. (Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 247 Fed. 559, 1918. This case was reversed on another point by 258 Fed. 81.)

In case of ambiguity in the income-tax act of 1913, the language is to be construed most strongly in favor of the taxpayer. (United States v. Coulby, 258 Fed. 27, 1919.)

The law is so framed as to deal with the gains and profits of a partnership as if they were the gains and profits of the individual partner. (U. S. v. Coulby, 251 Fed. 982, Aff. in 258 Fed. 27, 1919.) Departmental rulings.

Regulations of the Treasury Department that unpaid charges for services or contingent income due for the year shall, if good and collectible, be included in return for such year can not interfere with the statutory determination of what is income to be taxed. (Edwards v. Keith, 231 Fed. 110, 243 U. S. 638, 1916.)

Retroactivity.

The retroactivity of the act to March 1, 1913—a date not prior to the adoption of the sixteenth amendment-is permissible. (Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, 1918; Brushaber case, 240 U. S. 1, followed

and approved.

Same point similarly decided in Woods v. Lewellyn, 252 Fed. 106, 1918.) (See Brady v. Anderson, 240 Fed. 665.)

Applicability of general provisions of law to income tax law. (Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 1916.)

Implications.

Exemptions in a tax law must be clearly expressed and will not be implied or spelled out of equivocal language. (U. S. v. Coulby, 251 Fed. 982, affirmed 258 Fed. 27, 1919.)

In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule not to extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out, and in case of doubt they are to be construed most strongly against the Government. (Haiku Sugar Co. et al. v. Johnstone, 249 Fed. 103, 1918; Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 1917.)

Enjoining collection of tax.

(See cases under Par. L, "Restraining injunctions.")

Revised Statutes.

Sections 3220, 3224, 3226, 3227, are applicable. (Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 1916.)

Act of 1894 distinguished. (Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 1916.)

Intention of the act.

It is the evident purpose of the act to refrain from taxing income that accrued prior to March 1, 1913, and to exclude from consideration, in making computation of taxable income for a given year, any income that accrued in the preceding taxable year.

The act is quite different in this respect (that of imposing liability on stockholders in the case of dividends not yet declared) from the income tax act of June 30, 1864, which provides that "the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in this section, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise." (Southern Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 1918. Following Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339. Reversing 238 Fed. 847.)

PARAGRAPH A (1).

A. Subdivision 1. That there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding calendar year to every citizen of the United States, whether residing at home or abroad,