ing in large numbers. And logs kept there indicated that only about 14 of them were working there, leaving a large number of other men in the building. And this was key in the planning of the raid, wasn't it?

Mr. SARABYN. We estimated that there was 10 or 15 people. But the pit significance kind of changed as we went along. When we first started the investigation, the pit was actually a large hole. By the time we actually executed the warrant, it was a basement. The key significance was that after they had Bible study, in our opinion, like at 10, they would go work on something.

Mr. BLUTE. That's why you delayed the raid until 10, rather than early in the morning?

Mr. SARABYN. Because they would be working somewhere. At one time we could see them actually working in the pit, then underground, but they always went and did something.

Mr. BLUTE. But you didn't expect that they'd all be there or a large number of them would be there?

Mr. SARABYN. I felt that a number of them would be somewhere at that time.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Blute, your time is expired.

Mr. BLUTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Schiff, with Mrs. Thurman still reserving, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Altman, I'd just like to go back over, please, the memorandum that you sent to Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen. You were at the time the No. 2 person at the Treasury Department; is that right?

Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHIFF. Your memo, which has already been discussed here, contains the words as you're describing on April 15, the planned FBI plan to terminate the siege, which came about on April 19, you said the risks of a tragedy are there, among other things. Am I reading correctly?

Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHIFF. Did you receive any response from Secretary Bentsen about your memorandum from the point you sent this on April 15 to when the FBI actually acted on this plan?

Mr. ALTMAN. I don't recall whether we discussed it. I spent a great deal of time each day with Secretary Bentsen and I really don't remember whether we discussed this after April 15 or we didn't.

Mr. SCHIFF. Excuse me for pressing a little bit here, but this is rather strong language. The risks of a tragedy are there. You're saying you do not remember if you and Secretary Bentsen discussed it further?

Mr. ALTMAN. No. I was reflecting an instinct. I know nothing of the technical issues, of the assault-related issues, the gas. My reaction was just an instinctive one.

Mr. SCHIFF. But you felt it strongly enough to send a memorandum to your boss, the Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, but I sent such memorandums very regularly on all sorts of matters.

Mr. SCHIFF. Did it occur to you-well, Secretary Bentsen has already testified earlier, as I think you know, that he considered this matter no longer the Department of the Treasury's responsibility, because it had been turned over to the Justice Department. And, of course, it had been turned over to the Justice Department. But for that reason, did you ever send this memorandum with your concerns to the Justice Department?

Mr. ALTMAN. No, sir, of course not.
Mr. SCHIFF. Why of course not?

Mr. ALTMAN. Because this was a-as the memorandum itself says, this is the Attorney General's decision, and I can't remember any circumstances where I would send a memorandum to the Justice Department.

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, I understand this was the Attorney General's decision, because the Justice Department had taken over this situation. But it began with the Treasury Department through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Wouldn't in your opinion, then, the opinion and views of people in the Treasury Department be of value to the Attorney General before she made the decision go ahead with this move, this attack?

Mr. ALTMAN. Not mine.

Mr. SCHIFF. Not yours?

Mr. ALTMAN. No, I had no background whatsoever in these is

sues.

Mr. SCHIFF. So you're saying your memorandum wasn't worth anything?

Mr. ALTMAN. I said I wouldn't have proffered those views to the Justice Department, because I don't think I was qualified to make any judgments.

Mr. SCHIFF. But you were qualified enough to send them to your boss, the Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. ALTMAN. Yes, but that's the type of relationship we had.

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, I'm just going to let it go at that, Mr. Altman. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to take a moment here and just address something I saw this morning. I want to say that I'm very grateful that these hearings are being carried in their entirety by several networks, because I have to say with regret, I think a number of people getting their information from news stories, not in all cases, but in many cases, are not getting all of the information.

In today's-in a national newspaper, I won't mention its name, but its first three initials are U.S.A., they do a summary of the 3 days of testimony. They start off with a-with the rendition of the sexual abuse, the despicable practices of David Koresh on Kiri Jewell. And it's complete with Ms. Jewell's picture. And in case you miss it, they put Ms. Jewell's picture in again in letters to the editor section.

Then after doing that, they say: Other witnesses testified about the now controversial use of the military in training agents for the raid. Well, with respect to that section, that's a little like saying, other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play?

What was going on was that the military was being misrepresented to, to get them to provide training they would not have provided under military policy. Because there was this mindset, there

was this mindset that ATF was going to conduct a military raid. And nothing was going to dissuade them.

And speaking of concern for children, I think it's terrible, a terrible tragedy what happened to Kiri Jewell in that compound that she testified to. But speaking of children, the child caseworker from the State of Texas, Joyce Sparks, testified before us that in her opinion the plan for a raid was a fatal mistake. Her words were: When I saw those ladders going up on television, I knew children were going to die.

And my concern, Mr. Chairman, is that unless people have had the opportunity to see all of these hearings, they're not getting a lot of that information; that the tragic abuse which occurred to Kiri Jewell was inserted in this hearing to do to the headlines and to the media-reporting exactly what it's done. I say that not because child sexual abuse isn't important. Of course it is. I used to prosecute such perpetrators, many years.

But the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, it should again be emphasized, was making a raid to search for weapons violations and to conduct an arrest for weapons violations. If they were concerned for children, they would have listened to the caseworker who was working with those children, who warned them that this

was an error.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you, Mr. McCollum, any time that I may have remaining.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

We're approaching the point in time where we want to take a lunch break, we're getting quite late into that.

Mrs. Thurman and I are the only remaining panelists presently up here who have not questioned this panel. We do not want to have a second round of questions completely through this because of the time involved, if we can avoid it. There are quite a substantial number of very significant questions that only the ATF and some of who are here today can answer that really should be brought out.

I think the public needs to have us ask these questions so you can respond to them, and they've not yet been asked today. With that in mind and having consulted with Mrs. Thurman, Mr. Zeliff, and Mr. Schumer, I'm going to ask unanimous consent that after lunch the first round of questions, say, be closed except as to the 5 minutes remaining of Mrs. Thurman's and my time, and that each side, Democrat and Republican, can get an additional 15 minutes allocated to question this particular panel after we return from lunch, to be controlled by the chairman and by Mrs. Thurman.

Is there any objection?

Mr. CONYERS. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Yes, Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. I had understood that it was going to be 10 minutes.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. It was, but we just altered it to accommodate a particular problem in getting the questions in we need to get in, and you're getting the advantage of that.

Mr. CONYERS. Well, that's so kind of you. I really wanted a lot more time than that, and you cut it down to 15 minutes.

The problem is, that each time we decide to go additional time, guess what that's doing to the length of these hearings? Each day and each week.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, the gentleman will yield back to me.

I would just comment that the other option is for us to take a complete second round of questions for this panel. This is such a large panel and so critical and there are so many questions of the raid itself and how it was planned

Mr. CONYERS. Well, thank you.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I'm tempted to actually shorten the amount of time involved, because we believe having discussed it among ourselves that we can accomplish that in the time

Mr. CONYERS. Well, that's what I was trying to do, I was trying to shorten it.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. I understand.

Mr. CONYERS. I'm in quite agreement with you. But I mean if we try to go another round

Mr. MCCOLLUM. We're not going to do that.

If my unanimous consent is granted right now, then we will only have, except for Mrs. Thurman and myself

Mr. CONYERS. I will withdraw my objection.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

We are now going to take a lunch recess until 5 minutes after 2. That will be 45 minutes.

I hope that the panel down here can get lunch as well with us during that time.

The subcommittees are in recess.

[Whereupon, at 1:19 p.m., the subcommittees recessed to reconvene at 2:05 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. MCCOLLUM. The joint subcommittees on the Waco matter will reconvene.

The hearing is reconvened, if we could get some order in the House, as they say, or order in the committee meeting room.

We're back aboard at this point. When we recessed a few minutes ago, we recessed for lunch under an understanding that Mrs. Thurman and I each had 5 minutes on the first round, the only real round of questions we had for this panel. We had quite a number of other important questions to ask that we hadn't gotten to, therefore, we had gotten by unanimous consent permission for each of us to control, in addition to those 5 minutes, 15 minutes each on our side to conclude the questions of this panel.

With that in mind, then I'm going to yield myself such time of my time as I may consume, and I'm going to ask the first questions I have to Mr. Altman who has a plane to catch. I'm going go to Mr. Zeliff for an Altman question as well, and anybody on your side, Mrs. Thurman, who wants to, so we can let him go. He has been very good to be down here on an extra day.

Mr. Altman, I understand from testimony last week that you did not know at any time anything about this raid on February 28 its planning or the fact that it was going to happen. We need for you to say for the record whether you did or not.

24-809 96-26

Mr. ALTMAN. Well, that's largely true, Mr. Chairman. But on the Friday evening before the Sunday raid, I was called-I think I had left the office already, but I was called by my then special assistant, who told me simply that there would be a major ATF activity over the weekend, that it might generate some press, and that if I saw the press not to be surprised. I wasn't asked for my approval, I wasn't told Waco or Branch Davidians or anything to that effect. I was told only what I just told you.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Did you not inquire and learn anymore at that point?

Mr. ALTMAN. I didn't.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. When did you first learn of this raid?

Mr. ALTMAN. Apart from what I just related?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Yes.

Mr. ALTMAN. I learned on Sunday morning, sometime around 11, I think it was, but I am not certain, when Ron Noble called me at home in New York, and informed me what had happened.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Altman, before the raid on February 25, Mr. Higgins, the Director of ATF testified that he had not met you, had not even personally shaken hands with you. Could you tell us if that comports with your recollection?

Did you at any time prior to February 28, 1993, have a meeting or meet with Mr. Higgins?

Mr. ALTMAN. Well, I had a practice of having biweekly meetings of all the Bureau heads, which includes ATF, and the first one of those meetings would have occurred before the raid, because we had been in office a few weeks. I don't recall whether Mr. Higgins attended it, perhaps he didn't. And I wouldn't, in any event, have had any one-on-one discussions with him. Those were meetings where one typically went around the room and asked for highlights of activities or planned activities.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. In any event, you don't recall specifically whether Mr. Higgins was in attendance at the meeting or not, if there was one, and you do not recall any specific discussions you had with Mr. Higgins before February 28, or actually meeting him personally?

Mr. ALTMAN. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Mr. Zeliff, I'm going to yield to you so we can have you ask Mr. Altman any questions you have.

Mr. ZELIFF. Mr. Altman, I've read your letter over and over and over again this past weekend, and I want to congratulate you for your gut, as you described it, your gut instinct that something really bad was going to happen after your briefing, and that you felt that your boss, Mr. Bentsen, should be notified. And it just seems to me that we're in Government here, you know, we know of things that are going to happen, somebody has to step up and be responsible, and you did do that.

I guess my concern would be, is once you did this on April 15, did you follow up in between the 15th and the 19th in talking with Secretary Bentsen? You probably talked to him about 10, 15, 20 other different things. Was this one of the things on the to-do list that you might have said, well, did you get my letter?