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Summary of Oral Reply Phillip J. Chojnacki

himself, ASAC Cavanaugh and ASAC Sarabyn, and SAC Royster. He stated that most of the other 100 people there were not witnesses. They only knew about information third or fourth hand. He had answers to the questions that people had, but he was not given an opportunity to answer those questions. The successful prosecution of some of the Branch Davidians is all they have left to offer.

Ms. Dickenson urged Mr. Black (ATF) to conclude Waco--to end it. She asked that he not put people through it again. She stated that ATF has been through a lot, SAC Chojnacki and ASAC Sarabyn more than most. She stated that it would not do Treasury, ATF, or ATF agents any good for the agency to remove ŠAC Chojnacki and have an MSPB hearing.

Ms. Dickenson stated that SAC Chojnacki had years of experience and training with ATF. She stated that to lose him will be a real loss. She stated that firing SAC

Chojnacki would be even more of a loss because of the message it would send to agents in the field when they are called upon to make decisions. She stated that it would be a disruptive message to supervisors who will be called upon to made decisions.

Ms. Dickenson stated that SAC Chojnacki will stand by decisions he makes; he did it before, he did it at Waco and he will continue to do it.

Ms. Dickenson urged Mr. Black to cancel the removal action and reminded him that he now has information that the proposing official did not have.

Finally, Ms. Dickenson told Mr. Black that there are many reasons the agency would not want to go before MSPB,

including the emotional effect a hearing would have on agents who would be called as witnesses.

After closing remarks by Mr. Black, the oral reply hearing ended at 4:20 p.m.

Summary prepared by:

M.J. Wilkins

00013754

Mr. CHABOT. While they're being handed out I will read to Mr. Chojnacki from document 23, which is the Treasury Department summary of Mr. Chojnacki's oral reply to Mr. Black about the incident.

"Chojnacki said that he had been contacted by the press and told that they knew he had another side of the story. However, he believed it was in the best interest of the Bureau not to go forward with his story. He stated that the most critical parts of the incident were witnessed by himself, Cavanaugh, and Sarabyn, and Royster. He stated that most of the other 100 people there were not witnesses, they only knew about information third or fourth hand. He had answers to the questions that people had, but he was not given an opportunity to answer those questions. The successful prosecution of some of the Branch Davidians is all that they were left to offer."

Now, Mr. Chojnacki, you said that by keeping quiet about the incident you could offer the successful prosecution of the Branch Davidians. What specific incident was it that you were talking about?

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP CHOJNACKI, FORMER SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, HOUSTON, TX

Mr. CHOJNACKI. My concern at that time related to the contact that I had with Mr. Sarabyn on the tarmac at the airport with Ted Royster, the SAC of Dallas present, where we discussed the information that had come from Robert Rodriguez, the agent in the undercover house.

My feeling at that time was that I-while I understood—while I thought I understood the information that Robert was passing to us, I did not understand at that particular point in time that he meant that Koresh was aware that we were coming then. I understood that Koresh talked that way to him all the time. I didn't see new information, and I in good faith was going forward with the warrant.

Mr. CHABOT. Let me stop you there. The Treasury report downplays this point a little bit, but there is something I wanted to ask you. It notes that after you learned that Koresh knew the ATF and the Guard were coming, you called ATF headquarters in Washington; correct?

Mr. CHOJNACKI. That's correct, sir.

Mr. CHABOT. That's where the higher-ups were, in Washington, of course. What was their reaction to you talking to them?

Mr. CHOJNACKI. There was no reaction, sir. I was reporting to the emergency command center at headquarters. The agent that I spoke to, I believe, was John Jensen, who was one of the agents staffing the command center, and I was merely advising him of the status of the investigation at that time.

Mr. CHABOT. What time was it then, 9:10?

Mr. CHOJNACKI. It would have been somewhere approximating 9:10, 9:15, somewhere in that time frame.

Mr. CHABOT. The raid was initially supposed to start at 10, because it was thought all the men would be out in the pit working at that time; correct?

Mr. CHOJNACKI. That was an approximate time of arrival, yes, sir.

Mr. CHABOT. That was one of the keys to this whole raid, that the men would be in the pit and separated from their guns, correct?

Mr. CHOJNACKI. Well, the key would be that they would not be in their rooms but separated from their guns, not necessarily outside. If it was raining, we wouldn't expect them to be outside or outdoors.

Mr. CHABOT. You had just learned or you had just discussed with Sarabyn the information about Rodriguez prior to making that phone call; is that right?

Mr. CHOJNACKI. That's correct, sir.

Mr. CHABOT. The raid was supposed to happen at 10.

Mr. CHOJNACKI. We presumed that Robert would come out at approximately 9:15 that morning, contact Chuck Sarabyn, Sarabyn would pass the information to me, then Sarabyn had to drive to Bellmead.

Mr. CHABOT. Excuse me. Not to interrupt but, I have only got a couple of minutes left. You had changed the time, or you speeded the time up after that conversation on the tarmac; correct?

Mr. CHOJNACKI. Rodriguez came out 10 minutes early, sir. So the final-if all the steps in progress took place as we had predicted, he came out 10 minutes early. We got there approximately 10 minutes early. We did not intentionally do anything to speed it up. We were anticipating how long it would take to go from point A to point B, the Bellmead Center, and then for the men and women to travel from that location to the raid scene.

It wasn't like a military thing where we had other resources doing things simultaneously. We were estimating that time, and we exceeded that by 10 minutes because we initiated our conversation on the tarmac by 10 minutes.

Mr. CHABOT. There is one document, Mr. Chojnacki, that basically suggests that when you talked to Washington, that you told them that Koresh knew they were coming, that Washington told you, you're on the site, you make the decision. Is that what really happened?

Mr. CHOJNACKI. I don't remember any such conversation, sir. My conversation, to the best of my recollection, was reporting to somebody who was not a superior but somebody who was staffing that office, that Robert Rodriguez had come out, we had had the conversation, I saw no reason for the raid to not go forward, they were not aware of us, so we could execute it safely.

Mr. CHABOT. I'm almost out of time here.

Mr. Sarabyn, let me ask you a quick question. I'm going to ask you about some telephone conversations you had with former ATF Agent Larry Sparks. I know that some of the members here have opined that Mr. Sparks may not be a reliable source of information, so I am only going to ask you about something about you were reported saying to him. Do you recall saying, and I quote, "obviously some people way up said some things after that that weren't true, and it goes right down to the decision to go, and they were part of it?" Do you remember making that statement?

STATEMENT OF CHUCK SARABYN, FORMER ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, HOUSTON, TX

Mr. SARABYN. Something like that, yes.

Mr. CHABOT. And finally, let me address this question.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chabot, your time has expired.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I would yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New York so he can complete the point that he was making.

Mr. SCHUMER. The point I wish to make is, I would say to everyone listening to this hearing, and particularly those writing and reporting on the hearing, that the most important point today is who fired first, and simply because there is no controversy about it, it shouldn't be forgotten.

In other words, we may debate other, more trivial points, but the number one salient feature here is who fired first, and even if the element of surprise was lost, it does not justify firing on agents serving a warrant.

Thank you.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. I would like to follow up on that with Agent Williams. Can you go through just very briefly, you were walking up to the door, and how close to the door were you when the shooting started?

STATEMENT OF JOHN HENRY WILLIAMS, SPECIAL AGENT, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

Mr. WILLIAMS. About 10 feet from the door.

Mr. SCOTT. Was it your intention prior to that to-had Koresh come out by then?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. How far from the door were you when he closed the door in your face?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Approximately about 15 feet from the door.
Mr. SCOTT. Did you continue walking forward?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. How close were you when the shooting started?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I-basically about 10 feet. After that, the shooting started immediately after he closed the door.

Mr. SCOTT. Is there any question in your mind as to where the shooting was coming from?

Mr. WILLIAMS. None.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you-excuse me, that was from the inside coming out.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, from the inside coming out.

Mr. SCOTT. OK.

Mr. Cadigan, you are a firearms expert?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. We have had reports that several agents were shot through their vests. My question is whether or not there was any illegal ammunition, because bullets that pierce bulletproof vests are supposed to be illegal. Well, was there any illegal ammunition on site you could tell?

Mr. CADIGAN. Not that was that we found. We found a lot of ammunition, hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, but none of which would be, to my understanding, that are illegal.

Mr. SCOTT. Do the laws against ammunition that go through bulletproof vests, do those include the high-powered rifle ammunition? Mr. CADIGAN. It is my understanding that some vests that are worn offer protection only up to a particular caliber, and that high velocity or high-powered rifles is not one of them.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. Rodriguez, is there was there any question in your mind, having been inside the compound, that Koresh knew that the agents were coming that day?

STATEMENT OF ROBERT RODRIGUEZ, SPECIAL AGENT,
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Sir, there's no question in my mind that Koresh knew that we were coming, yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. Can you describe briefly his emotion when he got the word?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. We were I was inside the compound, on that day, that morning. I had asked him some questions regarding a newspaper clipping. He sat down and started to explain to me the difference between his preachings and another subject's preachings.

As we were discussing the Bible, one of his subjects, Mr. Jones, came in and advised him that he had a telephone call. He ignored the call and continued to talk to me.

At that point, everything was normal. There were only three people in that living room at that point. Everything was calm. He was normal. He was talking to me as he always spoke to me during all our sessions. Nothing was wrong.

Mr. Jones again came to the living room and advised him that he had an emergency call from England. At that time, he quickly got up and left the room. At that time it was still just Mr. Schneider and Sherri Jewell in that room with me, at that time. He came back approximately 3 or 4 minutes later, and when he came back, I mean it was like day and night.

As he approached me, he was-he was shaking real bad. He was breathing real hard. At one time he put his hands in his pocket, in his jacket pocket, to probably keep his hands from shaking. He sat down next to me, probably about this far, and he continued to try to finish what he was talking to me about.

When he grabbed the Bible, he was shaking so bad that he could not actually read it. I grabbed the Bible and asked him what is wrong. At that time he stopped, and as I sit here I can remember, clearly, he took a deep breath, he turned and looked at me and said, "Robert, neither the ATF or the National Guard will ever get me. They got me once, and they'll never get me again."

Mr. SCOTT. Now, was there any question-were you surprised at what happened after the ATF came? Were you surprised that he had prepared the ambush?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I'm sorry, sir?

Mr. SCOTT. Were you surprised that he had prepared the ambush?