MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

FILE TITLE:

INTERVIEWING AGENTS: FREDERICK 2. KLARE

DATE: November 18, 1993
VACO ADMINISTRATIVE REVILY

PAGE: :

meeting these agents told ADLE Hartnett that the press were "beating us : death. They all urged ADLE Hartnett to open up to the press and tell wh happened. They explained that the agents wanted this to occur. AD: Hartnett responded that the U.S. Attorney did not want ATF to do this. Thes agents reportedly presented the view that it was necessary to prepare potential jury for ATP's account of the action as opposed to not having opportunity to explain what happened. ADLE Hartnett responded that it w ATF's goal to put the Davidians in jail.

ASAC vas asked what he was prepared to suggest specifically to AD: Hartnett in order to give the press. ASAC stated that he v unprepared to say what should be given. He stated that he just wanted opportunity to tell the press what SA Rodriguez said to him.

ASAC

was asked, knowing what he knew at the time, if he would do t raid again. ASAC responded, "Yes, I would."

He v during his r stated the followin

On Thursday, 07/01/93 ASAC
was briefly re-interviewed.
questioned regarding the information provided by RAC
interview on Friday, 06/25/93. At that time RAC

ASAC

sav

nervous than

went over

"The day before Steve Willis' funeral, (
sitting in a room and he appeared to be more
usual. His legs were moving rapidly and the legal pad he
had on his lap was in danger of falling.
to him and asked him if he was alright.
'Un uh, what what'. This was a common response from
Sarabyn, but
still felt like something was wrong.
to come take a drive with him because
was alright. When

Levis told

said,

Isaid that he had had a

he didn't think that
asked him what was wrong,
Beeting with Hartnett and Hartnett had accused him of
lying to him and had berated him and had generally
shouted at him.
said, 'I guess they found their
scapegoat.'
dropped him off at his
looked like a 'beaten man' walking

house, he said

Later when

up to his house.'

stated that this information was correct. He stated that ti incident with ADLE Hartnett was the one he described during the previ interview (reported above) where ADLE Hartnett questioned him on two iss about the raid.

ASAC

interviews.

offered по additional relevant

information during

00013292

Mr. CHABOT. Isn't it true that Mr. Sarabyn's lawyer told you that to that point Mr. Sarabyn had honored a, "gag order" imposed by Director Magaw, but that if he was removed from the Federal service he would talk, and that notes, including Mr. Noble's notes, would be made public, and that, "Treasury doesn't need this and ATF doesn't need this." Isn't that what the lawyer said?

Mr. BLACK. I recall the lawyer saying something to that effect, but I am not aware of any gag order.

Mr. CHABOT. Isn't it also true that the lawyer for Mr. Chojnacki said basically the same thing?

Mr. BLACK. That's correct.

Mr. CHABOT. In any event, Agent Chojnacki himself told you that he has another side to the story that has not come out but that he believed that it was in the best interest of the BATF not to go forward with his story. He mentioned a specific incident, and he stated that the most critical part of the incident was witnessed by himself, Cavanaugh, Sarabyn, and Royster, and he said, "the successful prosecution of the Branch Davidians is all they have left to offer." And I ask you, Mr. Black, what did they know that, in their view, could have undermined the prosecution and that they would keep quiet about if they were rehired? You don't know what that is? Mr. BLACK. I don't know what that is, no, sir.

Mr. CHABOT. My time has expired.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mrs. Thurman, I understand you want me to yield to Mr. Schumer. Is that correct? Mrs. THURMAN. Yes.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Schumer.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you very much.

And I guess there are two key issues here today. One is the element of surprise and what happened. The second is who fired first. And, to me, the second issue is probably-is certainly the number one issue that faces the entire day today, and I would like to get some statements about that on the record even though we went over it a little bit last week.

First I would like to address questions to Agent Buford.

You testified last-first of all, is it true, sir, that you were the team leader and you were right on the front lines the morning of the raid?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BUFORD, RESIDENT AGENT IN CHARGE, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, LITTLE ROCK, AR

Mr. BUFORD. That's correct, sir.

Mr. SCHUMER. And that you ascended, the pictures we see going up the roof and trying to get into the room with the guns, you were one of the people on that ladder.

Mr. BUFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHUMER. And you were wounded that day as well; is that correct?

Mr. BUFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHUMER. OK, sir, who do you think fired the first shot? Mr. BUFORD. To the best of my knowledge, the first shots I heard fired were coming from the inside of the building to the outside fired by other than ATF agents.

Mr. SCHUMER. And how do you know it was other than ATF agents?

Mr. BUFORD. I could tell by the type of weapons that I heard shooting, the 50-caliber weapons, the AK-47's. We had no 50 calibers. We had no AK-47's.

Mr. SCHUMER. Do you have any doubts that you were fired on first?

Mr. BUFORD. To the best of my knowledge, no, I have no doubt. Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you. And would you describe what happened? Could you describe it as sort of an ambush?

Mr. BUFORD. It was definitely an ambush, a very well planned ambush, I believe. The firing was from, it appeared to me as though nearly every window along the front of the building.

Mr. SCHUMER. I see. So it wasn't just one or two people firing but a large number.

Mr. BUFORD. A large number, yes, sir.

Mr. SCHUMER. OK. Thank you, Mr. Buford.

And I'd like to now ask Mr. Williams some questions.

Mr. Williams, you were one of Mr. Buford's team. Is that correct?

STATEMENT OF JOHN HENRY WILLIAMS, SPECIAL AGENT, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

Mr. WILLIAMS. No. I was on the Houston team.

Mr. SCHUMER. The eastern team?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Houston. The Houston, TX, team.

Mr. SCHUMER. Oh, the Houston team.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes.

Mr. SCHUMER. But you were also on the front lines that morning; is that correct?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, I was.

Mr. SCHUMER. Who do you believe fired the first shot?

Mr. WILLIAMS. From all indications, it came from the inside as we approached the front door.

Mr. SCHUMER. And would you describe what happened to you and the other agents as an ambush?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, I do.

Mr. SCHUMER. Were you kind of shocked that people, when you were serving a warrant, would fire back in such-with such firepower?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I was stunned from all the firepower that came from outside from the compound.

Mr. SCHUMER. OK. How do you-why do you believe with such certainty that you fired-that the other side, that the people inside the compound, Koresh's people, fired first?

Mr. WILLIAMS. My assignment that day was to enter the front door. As we approached the front door, David Koresh came to the front door dressed in black cammo fatigues.

As he closed the door, before we reached the door, one agent reached the door, and at that point that is when the doors erupted with gunfire coming from inside. It was 10 seconds or more before we even fired back.

Mr. SCHUMER. Did there appear to be any coordination, the shooting from inside, or was it just random?

Mr. WILLIAMS. There was coordination, and they were shooting through the windows, through the walls, everywhere.

Mr. SCHUMER. Did you see any agents shot?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, I did.

Mr. SCHUMER. OK. And did you hear any voices from one of the walkie-talkies inside the compound sort of directing how and where the fire ought to be?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. Later on they had walkie-talkies which pinpointed any any time any agents outside moved, they would relay that we had one moving in the back, pinpointing every agent position on the compound.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Williams; and, again, I think all of us appreciate your bravery.

I want to ask any member of this panel, does any member of this panel-and I know you all have different views on the aspect of secrecy and surprise and who knew and when, but on the crucial issue of who shot first, does anyone-and raise your hand by indicating so the record could show does anyone believe that ATF fired first? Please raise your hands.

Do all of you believe that the first shots were fired from within the compound? If you believe that the case, please just raise your hand.

[Show of hands.]

Mr. SCHUMER. Let the record show that every-every member here on the panel, I believe, with the exception of Mr. Cadigan, has raised his or her hand in believing that the shots were fired first by Mr. Koresh.

And, Mr. Cadigan, could you explain why you didn't raise your hand?

STATEMENT OF JAMES CADIGAN, FIREARMS EXPERT,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes, sir. I wasn't there.

Mr. SCHUMER. You weren't there?

Mr. CADIGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHUMER. Don't have an opinion one way or the other?
Mr. CADIGAN. No, sir.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Cadigan. You got me worried there for a moment.

OK, let me then go back to Mr. Buford. Just a final question, because I think you touched all of us, Mr. Buford, when you mentioned last week how you felt after going on this raid and finding your agency so criticized for it when you were just doing your duty.

If you were on this side of the table and had the opportunity to ask questions or had the opportunity to bring out anything that hasn't been brought out, what would you-what kind of questions would you ask? What would you bring out?

Mr. BUFORD. I think it would be important for everyone to know one of the things that you just brought up, that they did in fact fire first, that we were in fact ambushed, and I think the thing that has bothered me a lot is that it seems as though many people think that we went into that situation without any concern for those children, and our main concern in conducting this raid the way we did was concern for those children.

Had we have gone to a siege-type operation, I was convinced in my mind that all of those children would be murdered, as they were, and if we were successful with the type of entry we were trying to do and were able to neutralize the people on the inside, that no one on either side would be hurt, and that's what we were striving for.

We even took extraordinary measures to make sure that we had people there to take care of the children after the situation was neutralized and were even going to bring Happy Meals out for all of the children from McDonald's once we got them outside of the compound.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you. The final point

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Schumer. Your time has expired.

Mr. Schumer, would you please reserve that point?
Mr. SCHUMER. I guess I don't have much choice.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Buyer.

Mr. BUYER. One quick comment before I yield on, I think, what Mr. Schumer was doing, laying down the predicate of sort of an ambush gives a fairly accurate scene, and that's why the importance of the element of surprise, that once that was removed, that's why you shouldn't have been surprised that there was an ambush. That's why we're going through this process.

And, you know, this isn't just serving a warrant. This isn't a Federal marshal going up, knocking on the door, and saying, are you so and so, I have a warrant, when we have 75 agents in a dynamic entry, going to lay down discriminating fields of fire, children present. We've got Federal agents with the 9 millimeters, AR-15's, MP-5's, and 2-shot repeaters. But look also at the firepower you are going up against. So this isn't just going to the door and saying, I am going to serve a warrant.

Let me yield to Mr. Chabot the remaining balance of my time. Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

I will ask that documents 22 and 23 be distributed to Mr. Chojnacki and to the minority.

[The documents follow:]