whole Mafs of Matter would prove entirely useless, and that there would be no room for fo many Animals as now we find receive their Origin and Subfistence from it; which is juftly esteem'd a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all the natural Evils arifing from Matter and Motion and we fhould find the fame thing in the prevention of the ufe of Free-Will, if we understood the Syftem of the Intellectual as well as that of the Material World. But if we can fhew that more Evils neceffarily arise from withdrawing or restraining the use of Free-Will, than from permitting the abufe of it, it must be evident that God is oblig'd to fuffer either thefe or greater Evils. And fince the least of these necessary Evils is chofen, even infinite Goodnefs could not poffibly do better.

of Free

have been

V. Let us try then whether the abuse of Free- The abufe Will could be prohibited with lefs detriment to the will may whole Syftem, than what arifes from the permiffi- be conon of it. There are three Ways whereby God may ceiv'd to be conceiv'd able to have prevented bad Elections; prevented firft, If he had created no Free Being at all. Se- three ways condly, If his Omnipotence interpofe, and occa- which are fionally restrain the Will, which is naturally free, confider'd from any wrong Election. Thirdly, If he fhould lowing change the present state of things, and tranflate Subsecti Man into another, where the occafions of Error ons and incitements to Evil being cut off, he should meet with nothing that could tempt him to choose amifs.

in the fol

SUBSECT.

Godmight I. have preventedmo

SUBSE C T. II.

Why God has created Free Agents.

A s

S to the first, 'Tis certain that God was not compell'd by any neceffity to create ral Evils, any thing at all, he might therefore have prevented if he had all Moral Evils, if he had not endow'd any Being refufed to with Free Choice; for fo there would have been create any nothing that could fin. But fuch a monftrous Defree Being. fect and Hiatus would have been left in Nature by this means, viz. by taking away all Free Agents, as would put the World into a worse Condition than that which it is in at prefent, with all the Moral Evils that diftrefs it, tho' they were multiply'd to a much greater Number.

But with

the World would

have been

every

thing paffive.

II. For in the first place, if we fet afide Free Aout thefe gents, i. e. thofe which have the Principle of Action within themselves, there is properly nothing at all Self-active, for all other Beings are merely pafa mereMa- five: there is indeed fome kind of Action in Matchine, and ter, viz. Motion; but we know that it is passive even with regard to that; 'tis therefore the Action of God upon Matter, rather than of Matter itself; for it does not move itself, but is moved. Without Free Agents then the whole World would be a mere Machine, capable of being turn'd any Way by the Finger or Will of God, but able to effect nothing of itself. Nay the whole Work of God could not of itself exert one fingle Act or Thought, but would be totally brute and ftupid, as much as a Wheel or a Stone: it would continue fluggish and incapable of Action, unless actuated by exter

nal

nal force. Second Caufes could therefore effect nothing which might be imputed to them, but all would be done entirely by the first. We need not fay, how much a World thus conftituted would be inferior to the prefent, nor how incommodious and unworthy of its Divine Author.

who de

is active,

tho' it is

III. Man, you'll fay, neceffarily affents to this Objection Propofition, twice two make four; but tho' his from thofe Mind is neceffarily driven to this Affent, and con- clare that fequently is not free, yet he is active: for it can the Underfcarce be faid that a Man is paffive in giving his ftanding Affent. The fame may be affirm'd of God, who tho' we fuppofe him to be abfolutely free in his pri- neceffary, mary Elections, yet when thefe are once fix'd, he as alfo muft neceffarily execute what he had decreed: ne- God himvertheless he is properly Self-active in all Cafes, confequently there may be fomething active in Nature, tho' there were nothing free.

felf.

IV. As to the former Part of the Objection, 'tis Answer to not very clear what may be the efficient Caufe of the former intellectual Affent; if the Object, then the Mind part of the is merely paffive in the Act of Understanding: nor Objection is Affent imputable to it any more than Descent to a Stone; but if the Object be efteem'd only a Condition upon which the Understanding acts, we shall want a Caufe to determine the Understanding; for that cannot be fuppofed to determine itself, any more than the Fire determines itfelf to burn combuftible Matter. For no body judges the combu ftible Matter to be active when it is fet on Fire, or that the Fire burns of itself without being kindled by fomething else. The World then without Liberty will be a piece of Mechanifmm, where nothing moves itself, but every thing is mov'd by an external Caufe, and that by another, and fo on till Vol. II.

↑ See Note 42.

we

Anfwer to

we come at the firft, namely God; who will be the only Self-active Being, and must be esteem'd the real Caufe of all things: neither can any thing, whether well or ill done, be afcribed to others.

V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That the latter. Being muft be denominated Free, who is held by no other tie than his own Election: But God is no otherwife oblig'd to execute his Decrees, therefore he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely; and is purely active in every Operation wherein he executes them. For he fuffers nothing by neceffity, nor from any other befide himself, and is determin'd to act by his own Liberty.

cency in

free, that

in them which is

molt agreeable to the Deity.

God has a VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the complaWorld in order to exercise the Powers he is pofhis Works, fefs'd of for the Good of the Universe; the Divine and if no Goodnefs therefore delights and applauds itself in thingwere its Works, and the more any thing refembles God, would be and the more 'tis Self-fufficient, it is to be esteem'd wanting fo much the more agreeable to its Author. But any one may understand how much a Work which moves itself, pleases itself, and is capable of receiving and returning a Favour, is preferable to one that does nothing, feels nothing, makes no return, unlefs by the force of fome external Impulse: any Perfon, I fay, may apprehend this, who remembers what a Difference there is between a Child careffing his Father, and a Machine turn'd about by the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of Commerce between God, and fuch of his Works as are endow'd with Freedom; there's room for Covenant and mutual Love. For there is fome fort of Action on both Sides, whereby the Creature may in fome measure return the benefits of the Creator, at least make an acknowledgment for them; and if any thing in the Divine Works can be conceiv'd to be agreeable to God, this must certainly

certainly be so *. One fuch Action as this is preferable to all the Sportings of Matter, or the Labyrinths of Motion; if there had been no free Creatures, God must have been deprived of this Complacency, which is almost the only one worthy of him that he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis therefore as much agreeable to God that he fhould have made fuch Beings, as it is to the World that they should be made: for if nothing of this kind had been created, the very best thing among the Creatures, and that which is most agreeable to the Deity, would have been wanting. Tis better therefore to permit the abufe of Liberty in fome than to have omitted fo much Good. For the Defect and Absence of fuch Agents is to be esteemed a greater Evil than all the Crimes which are confequent upon the abuse of Liberty.

Evils do

not always

thofe

VII. Thirdly, From what has been faid, we Neceffry learn that fome Evils which neceffarily adhere to things, viz. Natural ones, and thofe of Imperfecti- hinder the on, did not hinder the Divine Goodness from crea- Creation ting the Good with which they were connected, of things, fince the excess of Good compenfated for the fewer much lefs and lefs Evils which were unavoidable: Thus God which are chofe fuch Animals as were Mortal, afflicted with only pofHunger, Thirft, and other Paffions, rather than fible. none at all. If then thofe Evils which were neceffary and forefeen did not hinder God from creating the Good that was annext to them, how much less fhould the poffible Evils arifing from the abuse of Free-Will hinder his Goodness from creating FreeAgents? To enjoy free Choice is a greater Good than fimple Life, but we willingly accept this latter with all the train of Natural Evils, how much more gratefully fhould we embrace the Gift of LiCc 2 berty,

*Paradife loft, B. 3. C. 100, &c.