Department of Defense Appropriations for ..., Part 8U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983 |
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Common terms and phrases
acquisition ADDABBO additional advance procurement Air Force aircraft Answer arms control Army ASAT AUCOIN budget capability Chairman CHAPPELL Committee communications competition components Congress contract contractor cost Cruise Missile deployed deployment deterrence DICKS dollars DSARC DSCS DSCS III effort engine equipment estimate fiscal year 1984 funds going hardening ICBM ICBM force implementation improved increase initiatives JTIDS laser LATHAM launch major ment military million MILSTAR Minuteman III Minuteman silos mission mobile MX missiles Navy nuclear operational orbit Peacekeeper Peacekeeper missile percent problem proposal Question RDT&E recommendations reduce request requirements satellite savings schedule ScowCROFT Secretary of Defense Secretary WEINBERGER Services Shuttle SKANTZE small ICBM small missile Soviet Soviet Union space systems spares specific strategic submarines survivability TACAMO target TDMA terminals tion Triad vehicle VESSEY warheads weapon system WWMCCS
Popular passages
Page 93 - ... accomplished. The program activities are moving at a rapid pace leading to contract awards in early 1984. CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF) Question. Briefly describe the CRAF program, its contribution to our total airlift capability, and its expected costs. Answer. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a prpgam designed to take advantage of the defense airlift augmentation available in the US civil air fleet. Through a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Transportation and the...
Page 440 - The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security.
Page 706 - This directive applies to the Of-fice of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Organi-zation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to as "DoD Components"), and to all personnel of such DoD Components.
Page 218 - At this time, however, the Commission believes that no ABM technologies appear to combine practicality, survivability, low cost, and technical effectiveness sufficiently to justify proceeding beyond the stage of technology development.
Page 170 - Over the long run, stability would be fostered by a dual approach toward arms control and ICBM deployments which moves toward encouraging small, single-warhead ICBMs. This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield.
Page 178 - ... Commission thus recommends beginning engineering design of such an ICBM, leading to the initiation of full-scale development in 1987 and an initial operating capability in the early 1990s. The design of such a missile, hardened against nuclear effects, can be achieved with current technology. It should have sufficient accuracy and yield to put Soviet hardened military targets at risk.
Page 219 - An easier task is to provide ABM defense for fixed hardened targets, such as ICBM silos. However even this will be a difficult feat if an attacker can use a large number of warheads against each defended target. The effectiveness of such a defense could be enhanced by some types of bunching and close spacing of the defended targets, in order to reduce the number of ABM systems required. It could also be enhanced by having multiple shelters for each missile and preferentially defending only the shelter...
Page 196 - This illustrates that the different components of our strategic forces should be assessed collectively and not in isolation. It also suggests that whereas it is highly desirable that a component of the strategic forces be survivable when it is viewed separately, it makes a major contribution to deterrence even if its survivability depends in substantial measure on the existence of one of the other components of the force.
Page 188 - To deter successfully, we must be able — and must be seen to be able — to retaliate against any potential aggressor in such a manner that the costs we will exact will substantially exceed any gains he might hope to achieve through aggression. We, for our part, are under no illusions about the consequences of a nuclear war: we believe there would be no winners in such a war.
Page 155 - ... several times the cost of the fixed-base version. And it would be much more expensive to operate. Furthermore, the mobile MINUTEMAN would be less reliable and less accurate than the fixed-base version. It would be much more susceptible to sabotage and would involve many difficult operational problems such as protection from fallout, safety, etc.