Isbell et al. vs. Epps et al. placed in the registration books for his voting precinct in Union county by the president of the board of registration; that afterwards without his knowledge, until after the adjournment of the board of review, his name was erased from said books by the defendants while sitting as such board, etc.; and he prays that a writ of mandamus issue against said defendants as registrars, etc., requiring and commanding them to place his name upon said registration books as a qualified voter, etc. It has been well settled that a mandamus will not be granted where it would be fruitless and ineffectual to relieve the petitioner. Here we are asked to grant a mandamus against registering officers whose terms of office have expired (they were commissioned in 1870, and held two years under the provisions of the law); whose books are now forever closed, and whose lists of voters, made by them in 1870), cannot now be used by officers of elections in ascertaining the persons legally qualified to vote. It is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the grounds as set forth in the petition upon which the mandamus is asked; for the granting of it now would be clearly unavailing in affording the petitioner the relief sought, even if it were a proper case in other respects for the issuance of the writ. For this reason mandamus is refused and the petition dismissed. ISBELL et al. vs. EPPS et al. EXECUTIONS FROM JUSTICES: On what a lien, and when commences. An execution on a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace is a lien on all goods and chattels of the defendant in the execution within the limits of the township to which the execution was direct ed, from the time of its delivery to the constable. Isbell et al. vs. Epps et al. APPEAL from White Circuit Court. Hon. S. F. CLARK, Special Judge. S. W. Williams, for appellants. BENNETT, J. This action was instituted to recover the possession of a bale of cotton, said to have been wrongfully detained from the appellee by the appellants. Appellants pleaded non detinet, and the cause was submitted to the court sitting as a jury. Judgment was rendered in favor of appellee, and damages assessed at $187.60. The motion for a new trial was overruled, and appeal granted. The agreed statement of facts, as far as is necessary to decide the points before us, are as follows: Humphries, one of the appellants, was a constable in White county, and had an execution in his hands, issued by a justice of the peace, against one Montgomery. On the 27th of July, 1866, Montgomery executed to appellees a mortgage on a crop of cotton, which mortgage was recorded on the 3d day of July. The execution was in the hands of the constable before the mortgage was made. Afterwards, the constable levied on a bale of cotton, a part of the cotton crop previously mortgaged to appellees, and sold, and bought by Isbell, one of the appellants, and claimed by appellee by virtue of their mortgage. The sale under the execution took place on the 1st day of December, 1866. The court declared the law to be, "that an execution from a judgment of a justice of the peace, in the hands of an officer of the proper county, is not a lien upon personal property until it is levied thereon." In determining the rights of the parties to the suit, the only question was, which had priority of lien; the execution in the hands of the officer, though not levied, or the mortgage, which was executed afterward. Isbell et al. vs. Epps et al. At common law, the writ of fi. fa. bound the chattels of the defendant from its teste. 3 Bouv. Inst., 573, 574; Archb. Civ. Pl., tit., Execution; 1 Hay (N. C.), 396; 2 id., 57; 2 Hawkes, 232; 3 id., 296. As this had the unjust effect to overreach and defeat sales made even before the writ was delivered to the sheriff, it was remedied by the statute of the 29 Charles I, which made the writ binding from the time of its delivery to the sheriff to be executed. Under our statute (Gould's Dig., secs. 35, 36, p. 505), which is nearly a copy of the English statute, an execution becomes a lien upon the personal property of defendant, and the real estate to which the judgment lien does not extend, from the time the writ is delivered to the officer in the proper county to be executed. And whenever the execution is placed in the officer's hands, the lien commences by presumption of law, the execution thereof is commenced, and it being an entirety, must be consummated. Pettit et al. v. Johnson et al., 15 Ark., 55; Davis v. Oswalt, Ex'r, 18 id., 414; James v. Marcus et al., id., 421. It may be contended that the general law on the subject of execution, as cited in the above sections of Gould's Dig., giving or rather restricting the lien to the time of the delivery to the officer, is only applicable to executions issuing from the courts of record, and that statutes relative to proceedings of courts of record are not to be construed so as to extend to courts of limited or inferior jurisdiction. A writ of execution is a final process in a suit at law; its purpose being to obtain the fruits of the remedy, and to put an end to the proceeding. In general, an execution in a civil case before a justice of the peace is to be issued; its form and requisitions are to be drawn; it is to be directed to the prescribed officer; served and carried into effect, and a return made thereof, strictly in conformity with the provisions of the Isbell et al. vs. Epps et al. acts of the general assembly. An execution cannot be issued by a justice of the peace unless it be expressly or impliedly authorized by statute. It is to be considered, however, that there are certain general principles and rules of law relative to writs of execution issued by the courts of record, and the proceedings thereon, which are applicable to similar process, under the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. In the examination of the acts creating justices' courts and defining jurisdiction, there will be found an analogy running between them. There is an analogy which governs in respect to the nature of personal property, as distinguished from real estate; property in possession as distinguished from choses in action, bailments, exemptions, the mode of making a levy, the control of the officer over goods and chattels levied on; the title of the purchaser to property sold on execution; the arrest and commitment of a party, and other incidental matters and particulars. Chief Justice SAVAGE in the case of Pixley v. Butts, 2 Cow., 421, says: "The same rules of law which govern sheriffs in the execution of process from the higher courts, govern constables in the execution of a justice's process, in analogy to the former, except where some statute intervenes." Under our statute a party in whose favor any judgment, order or decree is or shall be rendered, made by a court of record, may have an execution in conformity with such judgment, order or decree. Such execution shall be a fieri facias against the goods, chattels and real estate of the party against whom the judgment, order or decree shall have been rendered. Gould's Dig., secs. 1, 2, p. 499, 500. The form is provided and set out in full in section 6, p. 500. execution provided for in a court of record. This is the Section 141, ch. 99, Gould's Dig., says: "Upon any judg ment rendered by a justice of the peace, execution shall be is Isbell et al. vs. Epps et al. * * sued by such justice in manner hereinafter prescribed at any time on demand." Secs. 146, 147, say: "The execution shall be directed to the constable of the township where the justice resides. *Such execution shall be against the goods and chattels of the persons against whom the same is issued." Sec. 149 prescribes the form. The form of an execution, as provided by statute, is in substance, the same in justices' courts as in courts of record, except the execution from a justice only reaches the goods and chattels, while executions from courts of record reach "goods, chattels and real estate." An execution from a court of record is directed to the sheriff of the county; an execution from a justice's court is directed to the constable of the township where the justice resides. It may also be remarked that some of the provisions of the execution law have always been held appli cable to executions from justices' courts. There is nothing in the law relative to those courts, which exempts any property of the defendant from execution, yet it has never been questioned that property exempt by the general law relative to executions is also exempt from levy and sale under executions issuing from justices' courts. By these comparisons we are led to believe that executions issued from a justice's court are executions with the same power as though issued from a court of reorrd, limited only by the statute as to the extent of territory and the kinds of property over which their lien may extend. As to the territory over which the lien may extend, justices of the peace and constables are township officers. While it may be true. that justices of the peace have jurisdiction co-extensive with the county, yet, they are not authorized to act judicially in the hearing and determining of causes beyond their respective townships. Humphries v. McGraw, 5 Ark., 64. A constable is purely a township officer, yet, in certain cases, may execute |