·4 protection under the Price-Anderson system. The Commission did not recommend further changes to the causation and proof of damages provisions of the Price-Anderson Act at this time. However, the Commission believes that it would be useful to study the experience gained in the future from other administrative systems for compensating latent injury claims. A fifth element in the Commission's report was the recommendation that the Congress investigate with nuclear liability insurers the potential for increasing the private insurance capacity made available through the insurance pools for the basic layer of insurance. The Commission believes that this capacity has not kept pace in recent years with inflation and should be increased if possible. We recognize that the insurance pools have emphasized the expansion of property insurance coverage in recent years, and we believe additional liability coverage would be useful as well. Sixth, the Commission recommended that the Congress should clarify its intent on two issues that have been or can be sources of uncertainty in implementing Price-Anderson these are: (a) The application of the waiver of defenses provision of the Price-Anderson Act to all situations in which financial protection is required such as, for example, for indemnified nuclear materials licensees, and not - 5 just, as presently, to production and utilization facilities (reactors); and (b) The exclusion of the costs of investigation, settlement and defense of claims from the two levels of financial protection as well as the presently excluded government indemnity level. As I mentioned at the outset, there was one recommendation on which the Commission was divided. That recommendation addressed the need to retain or modify the extraordinary nuclear occurrence concept that triggers the waiver of certain legal defenses that would otherwise be available to the utility to avoid public liability claims. The Commission considered three options for dealing with the extraordinary nuclear occurrence concept. The first option considered was to retain the present statutory language for the finding of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. The second option considered was to eliminate the term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" from the Price-Anderson Act and amend the Act to require the waiver of defenses for all nuclear incidents. This change would establish. "no-fault" coverage for all nuclear incidents, would assure more uniform determinations on recovery for public liability claims from nuclear incidents and would eliminate difficulties in establishing practical and workable criteria for making ENO determinations. I might add that this has been a major difficulty for the Commission that was brought to light by the TMI accident. - 6 The third option considered was to eliminate the term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" from the Price-Anderson Act and amend the Act to require the waiver of defenses for nuclear incidents in two situations: where (a) the licensee at a production or utilization facility declares a General Emergency, or should have declared a General Emergency in accordance with Commission regulations or (b) where doses offsite equal or exceed the Protective Action Guides of the Environmental Protection Agency or those of the Food and Drug Administration. Of these options, a majority of the Commission favored the first option of retaining the existing extraordinary nuclear occurrence concept to establish a definitive basis for valid claims and conserve resources to pay for public liability claims. Two of us took the view that the Congress should eliminate the extraordinary nuclear occurrence concept and require the waiver of defenses for all nuclear incidents. However, I am also of the view that the third option would be an improvement over the present formulation in terms of providing a predictable and easily implementable compensation scheme for public liability claims. That completes a brief summary of the principal findings and conclusions in the Commission's report. Thank you. The recent negotiation between the State of Washington and the U.S. Department of Energy for a consultation and concurrence agreement regarding the potential siting of a high-level nuclear waste repository in that state has produced a conflict between that state and the Department of Energy. The conflict revolves around the application of the Price-Anderson Act to the federal government's activity under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. That act, as you know, provides insurance coverage for NRC licensees, and also limits the total liability arising from nuclear incidents. The Department of Energy has taken the position that the Price-Anderson Act does or should apply to a waste repository. Washington State has taken the position that if the Act applies, its citizens would be unjustifiably limited in their recovery for nuclear waste-caused injury where there was clear federal government liability. Likewise, I feel that the citizens of Nevada should be entitled to complete recovery for any injury arising from the federal government's activity in the siting, construction, or waste emplacement aspects of a nuclear waste repository if such a facility were to be located in Nevada. Also, the state or its citizens should be free to recover totally from the federal government in the event that such a repository caused environmental or public health injury through failure of such a repository to isolate waste over the long term. I understand that the Interior and Insular Affairs Representative Vucanovich Page 2 to this issue, the application of the Price-Anderson Act high-level nuclear waste repositories, as an issue worthy of the Committee's consideration. Hopefully, the Congress would be able to address and resolve this matter before the President recommends a repository site for development. |