Act," in violation of the Constitution of the State? The Act is entitled "An Act to add a new section to the Political Code, to be known as Section 1618, relating to salaries of school teachers in cities having 100,000 inhabitants or more," and establishes the salaries to be paid to the teachers in the public schools "in all consolidated cities and counties containing more than 100,000 inhabitants."

Section 5 of Article IX of the Constitution. declares: "The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools, by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a school has been established.

By Section 25 of Article IV it is provided that "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases-that is to say:

"First. *

"Twenty-seventh. Providing for the management of common schools.

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"Thirty-third. In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable."

We entertain no doubt that the fixing of the salaries of the teachers is as much a part of the "management" of the schools as is the employment of teachers or the grading of classes. Ordinarily, an important part of the contract of employment of any one to serve in any capacity is the fixing of the compensation for the services to be rendered, and there is nothing in the Constitution to indicate that the word "management' was used in the connection in which it is found in any other than its ordinary sense.

If therefore the Act in question is special or local in its character, it is expressly prohibited by the twenty-seventh subdivision of Section 25. That it is local in its nature and in its operation seems to us plain. It may not be an easy matter to define with precision the distinction between a general law and one that is special or local. In a note to Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law (second edition, p. 529), it is said: "An Act is local when the subject relates to a portion only of the people or their property, and may not, either in its subject, operation, or immediate necessary results, affect the people of the State or their property in general."

Burrill, in his Law Dictionary (Vol. 2, pages 153-4), defines the word "local" as follows: "Relating to place; expressive of place; belonging to or confined to a particular place; distinguished from general, personal, or transitory." Looking at the Traylor Act, we see that it only purports to

deal with salaries of teachers in consolidated cities and counties containing more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Whether we take judicial notice of the fact that there is in the State one such city and county or not, we do know that this Act does not make provision for the salaries of the teachers in any city, county, or district in the State outside of consolidated cities and counties of the population mentioned, and that it is entirely confined as to its subject and in its operation, if not to a specified locality, at least to specified localities. It would seem to follow, necessarily, that it is local as contradistinguished from general, and therefore within the constitutional inhibition already quoted. This view renders it unnecessary to consider whether the Act is also violative of the thirty-third subdivision of Section 25 of Article IV of the Constitution.

It is said that the question whether a general law can be made applicable is one for the discretion of the Legislature, and not for the Courts. It is true that it has been so decided, but under constitutions not containing a declaration that its provisions "are mandatory and prohibitory unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise," as does the present Constitutian of this State. It may be-although we do not so decide that it would be the duty of the Court, under these provisions, to say whether a general law could be made applicable, in order to determine in a given case whether the Act in question contravened that provision of the Constitution prohibiting the Legislature from passing any special or local law where a general one can be made applicable. But, as observed already, it is unnecessary in this case to determine that question.

It is contended that the Traylor Act is but an amendment to the Political Code; that the Political Code contains a general law upon the subject, to which the Traylor Act relates; and that by this sort of tacking the latter Act is converted into a general law. We cannot appreciate the logic or force of the argument. The question is, Has the Legislature the constitutional power to pass the Act under consideration? If it is a general law, it had; and no resort to the Political Code is needed to uphold it. It is good of and by itself. If it is a special or local law, then it comes directly within the inhibition of the Constitution, and never had any validity; for the Legislature had no power to enact it. We do not understand how any law can be amended by a void Act.

But the Traylor Act is in no sense an amendment to the Political Code. It is entitled "An Act to add a new section to the Political Code, to be known as Section 1618," etc.,

and its first section is: "A new section is hereby added to said Political Code, to be known as and numbered 1618, and to read as follows," etc.

The new section is to follow immediately Section 1617 of the Political Code, which, so far as necessary to be quoted, reads thus: "The powers of Boards of Trustees of school districts, and of Boards of Education in cities, are as follows: * * 7. To employ the teachers, janitors, and employees of schools; to fix and order paid their compensa

tion."

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The new section, which is a subsequent Act, declares that in consolidated cities and counties of a certain population the salaries of teachers shall be certain sums respectively. This subsequent Act, if anything, is, to the extent it goes, a repeal by implication of the seventh subdivision of Section 1617; but in no sense is it an amendment. If an amendment, what does it amend? The Political Code or some particular section of it? If treated as an amendment at all, it is in direct conflict with Section 24 of Article IX of the Constitution, which declares that * * "no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the Act revised, or section amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length as revised or amended." There is no pretense here that the law, whatever it is, supposed to have been amended by the Traylor Act, was reenacted and published at length as amended, as is expressly required by the Constitution. If this law is to be upheld as an amendment, it seems to us it would be opening the door to the accomplishment by indirection of many of the evils it was manifestly intended by the framers of the Constitution directly to prevent, and thus wipe out some of its most salutary provisions. To maintain the Constitution as it is, is our first duty; and whenever it is encroached upon, we are bound to assert its supremacy.

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Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions to sustain the demurrer to the petition. I concur: Morrison, C. J.

CONCURRING OPINIONS.

I concur in the judgment and in the opinion of Mr. Justice Ross.

1. It may be admitted that a portion of a statute is repealed, by implication, when a subsequent statute is passed containing provisions so far in conflict with such portions of the first that the provisions of the new and the part of the

older statute cannot co-exist. In such case, however, the provisions of the later which operate a repeal of a portion of the older statute are not, properly speaking, amendments of the older law. The last expression of the legislative will is an original law, to which are applicable the provisions of the Constitution requiring that every law of certain classes shall be "general," and that it shall embrace but one subject to be "expressed in its title.". (Constitution, Article IV, Sections 24, 25.) The Traylor Act is therefore not an amendment of the Political Code.

2. But if, on the other hand, the Traylor Act can for any purpose be treated as an intended amendment of any portion of the Political Code, it is an amendment of the section thereof with which it conflicts-to-wit, Section 1617. Subdivision 7 of that section authorizes "the Boards of Trustees in school districts, and the Boards of Education in cities," to employ all teachers, and fix and order paid their compensation; the Traylor Act takes from the local Boards the power of fixing the salaries of teachers in a certain class of cities and counties. Section 24 of Article IV of the Constitution declares that no law shall be amended by reference to its title, but in such case the section amended shall be "re-enacted and published at length." The Traylor Act is not a re-enactment of Section 1617 of the Political Code as amended.

3. I desire to add, even if the Traylor Act could be considered as an amendment of the Political Code, and the two read together could be treated as one law, such law would not be a "general law" within the meaning of those terms as employed in the Constitution. The political Code purports to be, and in fact is, one statute, since it was passed through both Houses of the Legislature and signed by the Governor as a single statute, and is entitled An Act to establish a Political Code. It treats of a variety of subjects, not only furnishing a different rule for different localities with respect to many of them, but as to many of its provisions not applying to certain localities at all. MCKINSTRY, J.

I concur. The Act in question does not purport to, and does not in fact, deal with a rate of salaries applicable to the State at large. The Constitution, Section 5, Article IX, says that the Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools, by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district, etc. The term " The term "district" is defined. (Political Code, Section 1576.) The Act in question, which was approved April 2, 1880, upon its face deals with a portion only-in fact, with only one locality. It is there

fore special, if not local, in terms, and is within the prohibition of Article IV, Section 25, subdivision 27 of the Constitution, which is that the Legislature shall not pass a special law providing for the management of common schools.

A special law is one referring to a selected class, as well as to a particular object. This Act refers to a selected classviz., teachers in cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more. I have no doubt that the Legislature may fix rates of salaries throughout the State, and in so doing may grade; or it may confer the power upon the local boards; but to fix the salaries in a class of towns, and leave the balance to be regulated by the local authorities, is, in my opinion, special legislation. (See Worcester's Dic., "special;" Bouv. Law Dic., same; 12 N. Y. 595.)

Subdivision 20, Section 25, Article IV, prohibits the passage of special or local laws changing county seats. Could it be said not to be special legislation to pass a law changing county seats of all counties having more than 100,000 inhabitants, and prescribing another mode for counties having a less population?

By subdivision 33, the Legislature is prohibited from passing a special or local law "in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable." Cannot a general law fixing salaries, or prescribing a mode for fixing salaries, be made applicable to the entire State?

On the 7th of April, 1880, an Act was passed relating to the public schools generally, and by that Act the Board of Education has power to fix the compensation of teachers. (Section 1617, subd. 7, amdts. Political Code, 1880, p. 36.) It is proper to suggest that by the Constitution the educational department is made a State care, as distinguished from municipal, and that the regulation of schools in the City and County of San Francisco does not remain unchangeable under the Consolidation Act. This view is in keeping with my concurring opinion in Desmond vs. Dunn, filed June 21, 1880. It is not in conflict with The People ex rel. Beckwith vs. The Board of Education, etc., opinion filed June 22, 1880. The Consolidation Act may remain for municipal purposes-that is, city and county government-yet the educational department, as a State matter, be subject under the Constitution to general laws passed for that purpose. MYRICK, J.

DISSENTING OPINIONS.

I dissent. The principal, if not the only ground relied upon by those who deny the constitutionality of the Tray