any judgment that plaintiff might recover. He has recovered a judgment. The proceedings in bankruptcy did not ipso facto affect the jurisdiction of the Fourteenth District Court; therefore its judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. The cases cited by respondent, 100 Mass. 452, and 59 N. Y. 233, are not in point. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. DEPARTMENT No. 2. [Filed August 11, 1880.] THE PEOPLE, RESPONDENT, VS. JOHN H. GILBERT, APPELLANT. CRIMINAL LAW. Under Section 1164 of the Penal Code, a verdict does not become final until recorded in the minutes, read therefrom to the jury, and assented to by them. And where the jury was discharged before their verdict had been so recorded and the prisoner sentenced, it was held that the Court had no right to pronounce judgment until there was a complete verdict; and the prisoner should be discharged. Appeal from the Superior Court of Yolo County. SHARPSTEIN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: The defendant is charged in the indictment with the embezzlement of a horse of the value of ninety dollars. He pleaded not guilty, and the case was tried and submitted to the jury. After consultation the jury came into Court, and the foreman handed to the clerk a scrap of paper on which was written these words: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as indicted, to the sum of $90. (Signed.) L. B. Adams, Foreman." The clerk read that to the jury, and they assented that it was their verdict, and were discharged by the Court. The verdict was not recorded by the clerk in the minutes until after the jury had been discharged and had left the court-room; nor was it ever read to the jury after it was recorded, nor did they ever assent that it was their verdict, as recorded by the clerk." 46 When the defendant was called for sentence, his counsel moved the Court for a judgment of acquittal and discharge, which the Court overruled, and sentenced the defendant to imprisonment in the State Prison. The defendant duly excepted, and we think the exception should be sustained. Section 1164 of the Penal Code provides that "when the verdict given is such that the Court may receive, the clerk must immediately record it in full upon the minutes, read it to the jury, and inquire of them whether it is their verdict. If any juror disagree, the fact must be entered upon the minutes, and the jury again sent out; but if no disagreement is expressed, the verdict is complete, and the jury must be discharged from the case." Unless we mistake the import of this provision, a verdict in such a case as this does not become final until recorded in the minutes, read therefrom to the jury, and assented to by them. Until that is done any juror may dissent; and it is only after the verdict has been so recorded, read, and assented to, that the Court is authorized to discharge the jury. Before that the verdict is incomplete. If, after it has been recorded and read to the jury as recorded, "no disagreement is expressed, the verdict is complete, and the jury must be discharged from the On behalf of the people we are urged to disregard the departure of the Court in this case from the course prescribed by the Code, on the ground that the failure to comply with the law "has not actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice in respect to a substantial right." We incline, however, to the belief that a person who is tried upon a charge of felony has a right to have a complete verdict rendered against him before being sentenced. And it srikes us, too, that this must be a substantial right; and that when, as in this case, the Court proceeds to sentence a person before the verdict is complete, that such sentence is premature and cannot be sustained. Perhaps in the sense that the defendant got nothing more than he deserved, it might be said that he was deprived of no substantial right. If he was actually guilty, that might be said with equal propriety if the Court had sentenced him as soon as he pleaded not guilty." 66 Assuming, however, that he had a right of trial by jury, the Court had no right to pronounce judgment until there was a complete verdict. Judgment reversed, with directions to the Court below to order the discharge of the defendant. We concur: Myrick, J., Thornton, J. DEPARTMENT No. 2. [Filed July 26, 1880.] No. 6966. W. P. KOUTZ, RESPONDENT, VS. P. VAN CLIEF, APPELLANT. PROMISSORY NOTE. When a note due six months after date was renewed by an endorsement to pay the same within two years, an action brought before the expiration of the latter time is premature. Appeal from the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Colusa County. J. T Harrington and W. G. Dyas, for respondent. SHARPSTEIN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: The first allegation of the complaint is that on the 3d day of November, 1872, the defendant made his promissory note in writing to John Koutz, and promised to pay him or order six months after that date $500, with interest at the rate of one per cent. per month. The second is that on the 18th day of October, 1876, defendant in writing admitted said indebt-· edness, and agreed to pay the same. The third is that on the first day of February, 1873, the said John Koutz, at the request of defendant, laid out for his use the sum of $43.02, which he, on the 18th day of October, 1876, promised in writing to pay said John Koutz. These are followed by allegations of the death of John Koutz, intestate, on the 25th of November, 1876, the issuance of letters of administration to one John Ross, administration upon the estate of deceased, final settlement, and distribution thereof; and that the plaintiff was entitled to receive the property of said estate, and did receive from said administrator said note and demand sued upon in this action. It is also alleged that on the 4th day of May, 1877, the defendant, in a writing signed by him and addressed to the plaintiff, acknowledged said indebtedness, and that no part of said note or demand has been paid. The complaint is not verified, and the defendant denied all the allegations of it. On the trial the plaintiff introduced in evidence a note with endorsements on it, of which the following are copies: "$500. November 3, 1872. "Six months after date, without grace, I promise to pay to John Koutz, or order, the sum of five hundred dollars, paya ble in gold coin of the Government of the United States, for value received, with interest thereon at the rate of one per cent. per month from this date until paid. Endorsed as follows: "P. VAN CLIEF." "I hereby renew the within note, and promise to pay the same within two years from this date. The object being to prevent a bar of the Statute of Limitations within the next two years. "October 18, 1876. And also endorsed as follows: P. VAN CLIEF." "FOREST CITY, May 16, 1877. "P. VAN CLIEF-Pay the within to W. P. Koutz, without JOHN ROSS, recourse. "Administrator of the estate of John Koutz, deceased." The following account and promise in writing were then introduced in evidence by the plaintiff: "P. Van Clief to John Koutz, Dr. 1873 February 1st.-To Cash for amount of taxes on A. M. Hill, Q. M. Co.'s property paid at your request.. . $43.02 "The above is correct, and I promise to pay the same. "October 18, 1876. P. VAN CLIEF." All the foregoing evidence was admitted against the objections of the defendant, upon grounds which it is now unnecessary to notice in detail. Our conclusion, however, is that the effect of the renewal of the note was to extend the time of payment two years from the date of said renewal, and that therefore the action was prematurely brought. We are also of the opinion that the plaintiff failed to prove that he was the owner, or entitled to bring an action in his own name alone for the recovery of said alleged indebtedness due upon said note and account. If it should be thought necessary and advisable to bring another action. upon said note and account, a joint action in his name and that of the other heir and distributee of said estate, or an assignment by her to him, would obviate this objection. We think that the record of proceedings of the Probate Court were properly admitted in evidence, and that they established the due administration and distribution of said estate. Judgment and order denying a new trial reversed. IN BANK. [Filed August 12, 1880.] No. 7253. S. H. EARLE, PETITIONER, VS. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, RESPONDENT. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The Act of April 2, 1880, known as the "Traylor Act," is in violation of the Constitution, because it is confined as to its subject and in its operation to specified localities, and is special. The Legislature may fix rates of salaries throughout the State, and in so doing may grade; or it may confer the power upon the local boards; but it cannot fix the salaries in a class of towns, and leave the balance to be regulated by the local authorities. A general law cannot be amended by a special or void Act; nor can the addition of a new section to the Political Code be considered as an amendment thereof. POLITICAL CODE. This Code is one statute, since it was passed through both Houses of the Legislature and signed by the Governor, and is entitled "An Act to establish a Political Code." It treats of a variety of subjects, not only furnishing a different rule for different localities with respect to many of them, but as to many of its provisions not applying to certain localities at all. Even if the Traylor Act could be considered as an amendment to it, and the two read togther and treated as one law, such law would not be a "general law" within the meaning of those terms as employed in the Constitution. SPECIAL LAW. Is one referring to a selected class as well as to a particular object; e. g., a law changing county seats of all counties having more than 100,000 inhabitants, and prescribing another mode for counties having a less population, is special legislation. EDUCATIONAL DEPARTMENT. Is under State care as distinguished from municipal; and the regulation of schools in the City and County of San Francisco does not remain unchangeable under the Consolidation Act. CONSOLIDATION ACT. May remain for municipal purposes-that is, city and county government-yet education, as a State matter, be subject under the Constitution to general laws passed for that purpose. [Semble that the Political Code cannot be revised, amended, or re-enacted, because it is a single statute, and unconstitutional on acccount of its special features; and as the new Constitution operates prospectively only, all Acts passed under it must be original Acts, without reference to former ones passed under the old and now obsolete Constitution. -EDITOR P. C. L. J.] Appeal from the Superior Court of San Francisco County. Ross, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: This cause presents but one question: Is the Act approved April 2, 1880, and commonly known as the "Traylor |