purposes; and as their legislative powers cannot be delegated, so they cannot be bargained or bartered away. They may make contracts, but they may not pass laws or make contracts which shall cede away or control or embarrass their legislative or governmental powers, or disable them from performing their legislative or governmental functions. A general clause in a city charter providing that it shall have power to contract and be contracted with, etc., does not confer upon such city power to enter into a contract with a gas company for lighting its streets which shall extend over a period of thirty years, so as to divest the city of power to exercise its discretion as to whether any or which of its streets should be lighted with gas.-East St. Louis vs. Gaslight Co., Sup. Ct. Ill.

MUNICIPIAL CORPORATIONS, BONDS OF.

Certain bonds issued by the town of Menasha were declared on their face to be valid only "when it is thereon duly certified that the conditions upon which they were voted, issued, and deposited by said town have been peformed." The bonds bore a certificate which merely detailed the thing required by the railroad proposition to be done, and certified that all these things had been done: Held, that the bonds were "duly" certified.

The railroad proposition authorized and required the trustee bank, which held the bonds in escrow during construction of the railroad, to thus certify on the bonds when a certificate, signed by the chairman of the town and president of the railroad company, that these things had been done, should be filed in the bank. The trustee spread on the bonds a copy of their certifificate, and only certified that the original was filed in the bank: Held, that the trustee certified the facts themselves, in legal effect, and that his statement of what they proved was unnecessary. The certificate filed in bank was signed in the names of the company by its president: Held, this was a certificate of the president. After the bonds were voted, the company's name was changed, but the organization remained the same: Held, that the change of name did not affect the validity of the bonds. After the bonds were voted and before their issue, the company, under legislative authority given prior to the vote, made two consolidations with other companies: Held, that the bonds issued to the consolidated corporation were valid: County of Scotland vs. Thomas, 94 U. S. 682, and Wilson vs. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 504 affirmed. The bonds in suit are valid and completely executed as commercial paper; and the buyer need not inquire into the truth of the facts certified: Anthony vs. Jasper County (1880) affirmed.-Town of Menasha vs. Hazard, U. S. Sup. Ct.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE.–

Where prosecutions were commenced against a person for violation of a city ordinance, and while such prosecution was pending on appeal from the magistrate, the ordinance itself was

repealed, without any clause reserving the right to prosecute for past violations; such repeal rendered the Courts powerless to proceed further against the offender in such prosecutions; it blotted out, as it were, his guilt. The repeal of the repealing ordinance at a subsequent meeting of the City Council, and enacting an ordinance that the first repeal shall not affect prosecutions for prior violations of the ordinance, will not destroy the effect of the first repealing ordinance as to such acts, or aid the further prosecution of suits already begun.-Day vs. City of Clinton, Ill. Appellate Court, Third Dist.

PAROL EVIDENCE.—

The testatrix executed two testamentary documents, in the first of which she appointed executors and disposed of the residue of her estate. În the second she appointed no executors, neither did the document contain any words of revocation; the principal legatees were the same in both documents, and in the second the residue was not specifically disposed of: Held, that there was sufficient ambiguity on the face of the instruments to warrant the admission of parol evidence in order to ascertain what were the intentions of the testatrix, whether the last instrument was to be in substitution of the first, or whether both were to be taken as together constituting the last will of the deceased. Jenner vs. Furch et al., English Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.

PATENT LAW.

A device which is merely the result of mechanical skill is not patentable. A device for cleaning windows, consisting of a handle or holder with an elastic or rubber strip attached to one edge, with a tubular rubber bearing or support therefor, embodies nothing but mechanical skill, and is not patentable.Window Cleaner Co. vs. Bosley, U. S. Cir. Ct., N. D. Illinois; Federal Rep. 574.

INFRINGEMENT-MEASURE OF DAMAGES. The rule is that the measure of profits as distinguished from damages for which an infringer is responsible is the aggregate of gains or savings which he has made from the use of any other device or process existing at the time capable of accomplishing the same purpose or attaining the same result, and free and open to public use. — Locomotive Safety Truck Co. vs. Penn. R. R. Co. Opinion by Strong, J. Cir. Čt. E. D. Penn. Legal Intelligencer, June 18, 1880.

PENSION-FRAUD.

The third section of the Act of 1863, prohibiting any person from doing any of the acts prohibited by Section 1 of the same Act, when taken in connection with said Section 1, which prohibits any person in the military or naval service of the United States from knowingly presenting any fraudulent claim against

the Government, is broad enough to include the offense of procuring a fraudulent claim for pension. Although the fraud in obtaining the entry of the name of the defendant upon the pension roll and the issuance of a certificate thereon is barred by the Statute of Limitations, yet every time the defendant made a claim upon that genuine certificate, his name being entered upon the pension roll, he presented a claim against the Government which he knew was false and fraudulent, and hence committed one of the offenses described in the statute.--United States vs. Coggin, U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Wisconsin.

PRACTICE.—

A decree entered by consent may be appealed from. If, when the case reaches this Court, it appears that the decree appealed from was assented to by the appellant, this Court cannot consider any errors assigned which were in law waived by the consent, but it must still receive and decide the case. If all the errors complained of come within the waiver, the decree below will be affirmed, but only after hearing. Parties to a suit have a right to agree to anything they please in reference to the subject-matter of their litigation; and the Court, when applied to, will ordinarily give effect to their agreement, if it comes within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings. So it was competent for the parties in this case to consent to a decree of sale without any specific finding as to the amount due on the mortgage debt, or without giving a day of payment. Where persons are made nominal defendants according to the pleadings, but in the course of the proceedings they voluntarily range themselves on the same side of the subject-matter with the plaintiff, thereby leaving the real issue a contest between citizens of different States, the Federal Courts have jurisdiction.Pacific R. R. Co. of Missouri vs. Ketchum et al., U. S. Supreme Court.

A complainant who has two suits pending for the same cause at the same time will be put to his election as to which he will prosecute; and the right to put complainant to an election is not confined to suits brought in our own Courts, but he may be compelled to elect whether he will proceed in this or in a foreign Court. The complainants may be put to their election after answer by order, upon motion.-Cent. R. R. Co. vs. N. J. W. L. R. R. Co., Court of Chancery, New Jersey.

A trial Court may, in the exercise of its discretion, grant a new trial when convinced of errors in its charge, even if the attention of the Court was not called to the error complained of; but this Court can only act upon bills of exception showing the errors complained of.-P., C. and St. L. R. R. Co. vs. Heck, U. S. Sup. Ct.

RAILROADS.-

Although the charter of the railroad corporation is a contract,

yet it is, by necessary implication, subject to the legislative power of the State to define, prohibit, and punish extortion.Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. vs. The People. Sup. Ct. Ill.

A railroad company not only cannot discriminate between express companies by excluding one and allowing another to do business on its road, but it cannot, though desiring to do business itself, exclude from its trains the competition of an express company desiring to transmit goods over its road, though the exclusion is intended to be of all express companies, without discrimination.-Southern Ex. Co. vs. Nashville and Chattanooga etc. R'y, U. S. Cir. Ct., Dist. of Kentucky. Weekly Cin. Law Bulletin, June 7, 1880.

RECORDS.-—

Where a statute required the register of deeds to keep an entry book, in which it was his duty to enter the dates of deeds and mortgages left for registration, the names of the parties, situation of the lands, etc., and the instruments were afterwards recorded at length in proper books, the fact that in copying a mortgage left for record, the name of the mortgagee was omitted by mistake, it having been properly entered in the entry book, will not defeat it as to subsequent purchasers of the land. The two books together supplied the necessary information.-Sinclair vs. Slawson, Sup. Ct. Michigan.

REGISTRY LAW.

Chapter 235, Laws of 1879, requiring the previous registration of an elector, to entitle him to vote at an election whether possible or impossible, is in conflict with Section 1, Article 3, of the State Constitution, because it disenfranchises a constitutionally qualified elector, against his will and without his fault, and in certain cases imposes an impossible condition upon the exercise of a constitutional right, and because it provides no method, chance, or opportunity for an elector whose registration was impossible to prove his qualifications to vote on the day of election.-Dells vs. Kennedy, Sup. Ct. Wisconsin. Opinion filed June 23, 1880. SURETY.

A surety cannot be held if the creditor varies the contract so as to impose increased risk. So where A became surety for B to the extent of $5,000 in value of watches, to be consigned by C, and it appeared that during the continuance of the contract B had on hand more than $5,000 worth of watches, though at the time of his failure the indebtedness was less than that sum, it was held that A was discharged from liability.-Brez vs. Warner, Sup. Ct. Penn.

WASTE.

Where a senior mortgagee purchases the equity of redemption in the mortgaged premises, and elects to keep his mortgage alive

and subsisting, notwithstanding his purchase of the equity of redemption, he will not be allowed to commit waste upon the mortgaged premises, to the detriment of a junior mortgagee; and if he does so, he will be accountable therefor to the junior mortgagee. Scott vs. Webster, Sup. Ct. Wisconsin.

Queries.

EDITOR PACIFIC COAST LAW JOURNAL: A careful perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Earle vs. Board of Education raises many doubts in my mind about the constitutionality of many Acts of the last Legislature. What seems to me particularly important is the question as to whether any portion of the Codes could be amended, and pass current as law when necessary to read the amendment with the Code, or any chapter thereof. Will you please inform me through your journal whether you have bestowed any thought upon this point?

X. Y. Z.

There is no doubt in our mind upon this point-to-wit, that there can be no such thing as an amendment or revision of any law depending upon the old Constitution for its validity.

We have, in a former article (see "Current Topics "), said as much upon the subject as our space would allow; and we can only reiterate here that all these so-called amendments must fall to the ground. It is held, we believe, in all the States, that "an Act should state on its face the law it creates or constitutes, and a new statute must be complete in itself. No attempt at revision or amendment can stand as such, but, as provided by Article IV, Section 24, must be set out at length as revised. Upon the first point we refer to the following authorities, which we think will bear us out: 33 Ind. 507; 28 Ind. 383; 50 Ind. 203, 70 Ill. 397; 40 Ala. 100; 30 Mich. 529; 13 Mich. 497.

If the Supreme Court should not regard as obiter dictum the allusion to the Political Code as one Act, then it would seem to follow that any section or chapter of that Code could not be amended without re-enacting the whole Code. It would be sufficient, however, to hold that the Political Code, read together with a new law, as the "Traylor Act," could not constitute a "general law," for the particular reason that the Political Code involves so many special features that it comes within the inhibition of the new Constitution, and cannot be bettered by any void enactment, or, in our opinion, by any valid enactment. Unless as an entirely new Act, complete in itself, it ceases to embrace any special features, and assumes the grade of a "general law."-[EDITOR PACIFIC COAST LAW JOURNAL.]