INTELLIGENCE REPORTING FUNCTION-STATE DEPARTMENT A review of a million-and-a-half words or more testimony taken in these hearings reflects hardly a scintilla of information derogatory to Otto Otepka's competence and experience.1 Transfer of the intelligence-reporting function from Mr. Otepka's authority could hardly have been predicated, therefore, upon any attribution of incompetence to him. That such functions are an integral part of the security structure must be apparent even on the surface. When the function transferred away from Otepka's supervision is defined, it becomes apparent that tinkering with the performance of it, let alone transferring it from skilled hands, makes for an alarming situation. Before the transfer, it was Otepka's responsibility to receive from the intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government, and more specically, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (which supplied the bulk of the data received) and the Central Intelligence Agency, intelligence reports of a security type.2 The testimony further reflects that the security intelligence reports had an impact on the administration of the personnel security program.3 What happened? The intelligence-reporting function in its entirety was transferred (Feb. 18, 1963) out of the Office of Security. The reports that previously had been reviewed by qualified personnel in the Office of Security went out to a separate bureau in the Department. The tasks of determining contents of the reports, and what area in the Department had an interest in the subject-matter, the followup with respect to appropriate action, were all lifted, with experienced and qualified officers, for a reason that even at this late date in the subcommittee's appraisals must be murky if the element of reprisal is rejected. With regard to the consequences: "*** the Office of Security would be deprived of immediate and firsthand knowledge of data appearing in intelligence reports which are useful in the administration of our personnel security cases." 5 In that connection, data which was of primary interest to other bureaus had been sent to them without delay under the system as it prevailed prior to transfer. The Department itself must have entertained the conviction that the personnel under direction of Mr. Otepka were qualified and experienced (as supervised) because, oddly enough, the personnel were transferred with the function! The personnel fed back to Mr. Otepka, Chief of the Division of Evaluations of the Office of Security, The subcommittee, over the signature of its chairman, Oct. 31, 1963, declared, "Without attempting to pass upon these charges, we want to express our confidence in Mr. Otepka's integrity, capability, and professional skill." 2 Testimony of Otto Otepka, Mar. 6, 1963, State Department Security hearings, pt. 4, 1965, p. 193. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 'Id., p. 194. the very work that formerly had been directly under his supervision." At least Mr. Otepka presumed that it was fed back "but not seeing the totality of intelligence," the witness couldn't say. There could be no dispute, under that circumstance, with the witness' opinion that the Office of Security would be deprived of immediate and firsthand knowledge of data appearing in intelligence reports which are useful in the administration of personnel security cases. "Now I do not mean to say that this information will not be available to us, but it will mean now that we have to depend on other bureaus to offer that information to us if they see fit to do so after reviewing the contents." 7 The transfer was announced in a foreign affairs manual, January 15, 1963, but it "did not affect the Office of Security in any way because of the fact that it was canceled and superseded by another circular." The second foreign affairs manual in this connection was dated February 4, 1963, and was entitled, "Reassignment of Certain Liaison Functions Affecting Investigations and Security." The functions described in the circulars, by virtue of the superseding paper, were split up between the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. When asked by the chief counsel of the subcommittee whether the State Department now has "two different agencies within the Department, both outside the Office of Security and both outside SCA which are performing some or all of these liaison functions with the Federal Bureau of Investigation", Mr. Otepka replied that no part of that function is under the Office of Security.10 The consequence here is marked: "The Office of Security, in its long experience in evaluating, has had the know-how and long years of experience in dealing with our counterpart in the Federal Bureau of Investigation who, as I said, were the primary disseminators of most of this information to us, and I think we have had a successful period of coordination and cooperation. I, in my own mind, feel that, by transferring these functions into another bureau where the Office of Security is actually cut off from dealing with representatives of these agencies in areas of interest, that this will have some deleterious effect-in the long run-on our personnel security program. That is my opinion." 11 An editorial pause is suggested at this point in the recital of facts. The information and evidence adduced, above, supply incontrovertible support of the subcommittee's basic contention that the issue is its right to secure testimony disclosing protection (or lack of it) anent our internal security, and the means established for the purpose." As stated in a letter of the chairman under date of October 31, 1963, to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State: A committee of the Senate has a right to the testimony of any official or employee of our Government respecting any question of security or possible wrongdoing in any department or agency, if the subject-matter of the committee's inquiry falls within its jurisdiction. Had the State Department itself recognized a problem in internal security, with particular reference to the matter of intelligence func • Id., p. 195. 7 Testimony of Otto Otepka, Mar. 6, 1963, State Department Security hearings, pt. 4, p. 194. • Id., p. 196. Id., p. 197. 10 Id., pp. 198, 199. 11 Id., pp. 200, 201. 12 As reported by the press, "While the lengthy record is being built around the case of Otepka, the proceedings also reflect a general dissatisfaction of some subcommittee members with the whole security system of the Department." Washington Post, Nov. 21, 1965. tions of the Office of Security, later transferred elsewhere? The answer from Mr. Otepka, Chief of the Division of Evaluations, Office of Security: "*** there certainly was a problem back in October 1960 when I was asked to undertake a study by the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs to effect a correlation of intelligence and security, and this was undertaken formally in about May 1961 and it continued only for a short period of time, when the reorganization caused a change in the various functions to be performed in the Office of Security." 13 THE ROUTING IS CHANGED The intelligence reporting function had been under the jurisdiction of the Office of Security since sometime in 1948, until February 18, 1963, when the files, records, and personnel were transferred to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. But if the records were to be moved over to the Office of Investigation, the subcommittee was informed, nobody there "[could] cull this information and relate it to the Office of Security." 14 Thus the problem and situation came in and out of official gaze and attention with resulting confusion (the testimony indicated) on the part of personnel, certainly on the part of the Chief of the Division of Evaluations, Office of Security, and most assuredly to one studying the vacillation. An important ingredient, manifestly, of intelligence reporting functions is that embracing the FBI. "Generally, the FBI, as you know, handles all its information to us by a liaison officer," testified William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. Mr. Crockett continued: It (the information) is personally delivered.*** after I assumed my present position, it was personally delivered to 'me by the liaison officer. Much of the information had to do with FBI interests or FBI surveillance of individuals.15 The witness added that the information was always passed to the Office of Security for its handling. But the official's attention was directed to the testimony of John Reilly, at one time Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Affairs, who, in turn, had examined the testimony of Mr. Otepka, March 6, 1963, supra. Asked as to Mr. Otepka's version of the FBÍ liaison, Mr. Reilly had stated: Well to sum it up, that is Mr. Otepka's opinion. I don't agree with it. In essence, in response to the chief counsel's question, Mr. Reilly testified that the Bureau (FBI) decides where it is going to take its information, "based on guidelines furnished by us." Mr. Reilly, further questioned, stated that the FBI did such "within the agreed ground rules." Mr. Reilly was further asked, "And you allow them to do this?" His answer was, "Yes." 16 Mr. Crockett's attention was further directed to a letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which set forth the detail of the liaison and concluded with: 13 Testimony of Otto F. Otepka, Mar. 11, 1963, State Department Security hearings, pt. 4, p. 207. 14 Ibid. 15 Testimony of William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, Jan. 28, 1964, State Department Security hearings, pt. 11, p. 769. 16 Ibid., pp. 771, 772. Mr. Reilly had iterated the thought as the questioning continued, finally concluding (as to whether the information is "routine,") "The Bureau makes that determination.' After this initial dissemination is made, the internal responsibility of bringing our memorandums and reports to the attention of appropriate State Department officials is, of course, a matter for that Department's personnel. [Emphasis added.] The witness stated, "I personally don't see the conflict, but if you say there is one, there perhaps is one." He added, "I do know that the information from the Bureau on personnel security matters comes to my office and therefore in the Office of Security. The larger issue, what you might call intelligence, does go to the other area." 17 A JOB IS LEFT UNFINISHED Mr. Otepka testified August 12, 1963, with respect to the FBI and intelligence reporting function: I have been aware, of course, for a long time that so-called intelligence data, that is, that information which came to us from intelligence agencies such as the FBI and the CIA, domestic subversion, sabotage, espionage, and the like, had not been fully correlated with our security files, and I was given a specific assignment to undertake this correlation in November 1960 and unfortunately that undertaking was abandoned or suspended with the reduction in force that took place beginning in November 1961. That job is undone. I have-I did uncover many examples of lack of correlation of intelligence data-with respect to employees of the Department of State-with the security files on those employees. With regard to the time that would have been required for the purpose, the witness declared, We had estimated, sir, that, assuming we had good files, assuming that we first put our files in good order and had good personnel working in the file room, that this job of proper correlation which, of course, would have also consisted of a review from the top on down of the file of every officer of the Department, that we could have accomplished this thing within 2 years, using five or six officers.18 With such duties and programs, including correlation, associated with the State Department's security officers, the subcommittee became deeply interested in why the function was transferred. The work of the Office of Security comprehended 26,205 intelligence reports received in fiscal 1961. The job was monumental and, of course, remains such both in sensitivity and volume. The question of why the function was transferred was answered by John F. Reilly, May 21, 1963: First, the greater bulk, not all but the greater bulk of these reports had no direct bearing on matters within the purview of the Office of Security. They were substantive intelligence reports of a political nature which this unit, which is still an intact unit-the same personnel, are handling these matters-undertook to get to the various geographic bureaus and officials of the Department who had a direct interest in the contents of these reports. Mr. Reilly contended that the transfer away of the unit to the Intelligence and Research Office had not affected Security's getting the reports in which his office had an interest.19 It is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that now supervises the intelligencereporting function. But since personnel formerly supervised by Mr. Otepka was transferred with the function, Mr. Reilly was able to testify that "These are the same personnel who have been handling it in Security for many years." 17 Ibid., pp. 771. 772. 18 Testimony of Otto F. Otepka, Chief, Division of Evaluations, Department of State, Aug. 12, 1963, State Department Security hearings, pt. 13, p. 1006. (Senator Scott asked at this point whether the program could have been accomplished within 1 year and was answered affirmatively "I think with seven good evaluators, we could have accomplished that entire review in 1 year.") 19 State Department Security hearings 1963-65, pt. 16, p. 1275. The testimony of the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Affairs continued: Mr. SOURWINE. You transferred the personnel with the function? Mr. REILLY. Yes; the files still remain as of now with our files and maintained by our file people. Mr. SOURWINE. What division of Security was this under before it was transferred out? Mr. REILLY. It was in the Executive Office immediately before its transfer. Later, Senator Dodd, reflecting the curiosity of the subcommittee as to the animus or motivation for the transfer asked: What was the significance of this transfer? I don't quite follow that.20 Mr. SOURWINE. Well, perhaps it would be helpful if Mr. Reilly would tell us just what this function covers. Mr. REILLY. Well, as I stated earlier, it covers the reception and dissemination to interested parties within the Department of State of intelligence information received from the FBI, from CIA. These individuals in the unit have long experience in reading a report and recognizing which geographic or whether it is the Office of Security or whether it is visa or passport, would be interested, and they immediately disseminate a copy of it to that party for whatever action that area deems appropriate. Senator DODD. This unit gleans from the reports the information that it thinks would be of interest to the Mr. REILLY. No. It sends the actual reports, Mr. Chairman. Senator DODD. Sends the actual Mr. REILLY. Yes. So there is no digressing on their part. No chance for them to miss the significance of something. Senator DODD. I see. Mr. SOURWINE. Our information is that this function was transferred on February 18, 1963. Do you know if that is correct? Mr. REILLY. If the date is important, I can verify the actual date of transfer. I think it was postponed for operational reasons. Mr. SOURWINE. I am only interested peripherally. The item has been moved out of Security but it was still in the Office of Security budget when the appearance was made before the House committee in February and March of this year. Mr. REILLY. Yes. Of course Mr. SOURWINE. They weren't told about it having been transferred. Mr. REILLY. No. Mr. Rooney has been told about it. Senator DODD. Why was it transferred again? What was the reason? Mr. REILLY. Well, it was felt on high levels in the Department, as a result of the Cuban crisis, that since Intelligence and Research has the overall intelligence responsibilities for the Department, even greater speed could be achieved in disseminating these reports to the end user and to make certain that it didn't go to a desk officer when the Secretary or the Under Secretary should have seen the particular thing. Mr. SOURWINE. You have the same people handling it who were handling it before. You just moved them and the function into the new office. What differ ence Mr. REILLY. But they have a new supervisor from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research who is working with them, making them on a daily basis, aware of the interest and needs. Mr. SOURWINE. I see. You think that is more effective than having it under your Executive Office? Mr. REILLY. Only time can tell on that. In that connection, there was a recommendation in this committee's report that indicated there should be greater response to this. There should be some system to make sure that these reports get promptly to the attention of action officers. And this is an attempt to carry that out. [Emphasis added.] 21 |