Mr. SOURWINE. Were any such instructions conveyed to Otepka or called to his attention? Mr. CROCKETT. The files of the Office of Security indicate that Mr. Otepka had such information available to him. Mr. SOURWINE. It is true, is it not, that the Marine Guards at the Warsaw Embassy who were involved by Goleniewski's disclosures were interviewed systematically, over an extended period of time, at Frankfurt, Germany, in a cooperative effort by the State Department and at least two other agencies. Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true that while the results of these investigations were made known to the Office of Security for information purposes, the responsibility for disciplining the Marine Guards or taking any other action rested with the Navy Department? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true that the Marine Guards, when interviewed, disclosed information concerning illicit relationships with Polish females by American civilian personnel at the Warsaw Embassy? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it true that one of the persons thus implicated was a code clerk, and that this individual was thereafter interviewed in Washington and allowed to resign from the Department? Mr. CROCKETT. The resignation in this case was permitted in the light of the officer's misconduct and in no way reflected upon the officer's loyalty. Mr. SOURWINE. Under the third agency rule, and on the basis of the Department's understanding concerning the action responsibility of an agency within the intelligence community which is the originator of intelligence information, was it not proper to presume that the cases of the two prime suspects had been referred to the FBI by the agency which originated the information from Goleniewski? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir; but under current policy, when information is received by the Department from another agency which would be of interest to the FBI, necessary action is taken by the Department of State to insure that the FBI has also received this same information. Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any reason why any further action in these cases should have been generated by the State Department's Office of Security? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes. Some of the information and allegations furnished by the defector and disclosures made during the interviews of the Marine Guard detachment reflected upon the suitability factors of persons assigned to the American Embassy in Warsaw. Appropriate investigative action has been taken in order to resolve the suitability implications of the reported circumstances. Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that, in November 1960, Mr. Otepka was instructed by his superiors to undertake the performance of new duties which took him out of day-to-day operations of the Office of Security, and consequently detached him from the cases mentioned by the Polish defector? Mr. CROCKETT. It is my understanding that as of April 7, 1957, Mr. Otepka was assigned to the position as Deputy Director, Office of Security, and remained in this position until January 21, 1962 and that, during this period on various occasions, was, in an acting capacity, the Director of the Office of Security. In these capacities and, having the knowledge of the allegations made by the Polish defector, he was in a position to direct investigations on such allegations. In the event that there was any disagreement on the handling or on the action taken in these cases, Mr. Otepka had various channels to the higher echelons of authority in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs as well as other departmental officers to effect a resolution on the handling and investigation of the material supplied by the Polish defector. Even after Mr. Otepka was reassigned from the position of Deputy Director of the Office of Security to the position of Chief, Division of Evaluation, he continued to be in a position to direct further investigation of all personnel whose names appeared in the Polish allegations. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who was given specific responsibility for following these cases after Mr. Ötepka received his new assignment? Mr. CROCKETT. I am not aware of the delegation of this responsibility for these cases within the operational levels of the Office of Security. However, I have been advised that there is evidence that a number of these cases were reviewed and acted upon by subordinates of Mr. Otepka. Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that these cases had been made the specific responsibility of a person other than Otepka, in November of 1960? Mr. CROCKETT. No. sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that, soon after November of 1960, although these cases were no longer Otepka's responsibility, Otepka learned that the key suspect had returned to the United States, and that he immediately sought and received permission from the originating agency to report the information about this individual to the security officer of his employing agency, the individual not being at the time an employee of the Department of State? Mr. CROCKETT. I am advised that such is the case and cite this as an example of Mr. Otepka's knowledge of the Warsaw events and it further demonstrates that he was in a position to take supervisory action on these matters within the Office of Security. Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that because of Mr. Otepka's other assigned duties he could not maintain control over this or any other case disclosed by the then unknown defector without abrogating the wishes of his immediate superior? Mr. CROCKETT. I am not aware of such a specific limitation being placed upon Mr. Otepka's responsibility either in his capacity as Deputy Director, Office of Security, Acting Director, Office of Security, or as Chief, Division of Evaluations. As incumbent at various times in all of these positions he occupied a position of knowledge and authority as well as a point from which he could have given direct orders to subordinates or taken other action to resolve the Warsaw cases. In the event of possible disagreement he was in a position to seek consultation from appropriate higher echelons in the Department on the handling of this matter. Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware it is inaccurate to state that Otepka at any time had "control" over any of the cases involving disclosures by the Polish defector, either directly or through his subordinates? Mr. CROCKETT. It may be apropos to define the term "control." However, it is not incorrect to state that Mr. Otepka had knowledge of these cases and having this knowledge, as well as a position of high responsibility in the Office of Security, he obviously had a legitimate interest and duty to assure that these important allegations were expeditiously resolved. 13 The argument implied by Mr. Crockett's quoted testimony (that despite restrictions placed on Otepka as a result of orders from his superiors it was Otepka, and not his superiors, who was at fault in connection with what Mr. Crockett appears to regard as a failure to take adequate action on the basis of Goleniewski's reports) impressed the subcommittee as neither realistic nor convincing. The subcommittee took into account the fact that most of Mr. Crockett's answers, quoted above, were written after he had had months of opportunity to study the questions. 13 Ibid., pp. 701-704. SECURITY EVALUATIONS COERCED In testimony before this subcommittee during the past 4 years, State Department officials have indicated that great reliance is placed on the judgment of Department security evaluators. But other testimony has revealed that in actual practice, State Department officials have exercised coercion and sheer authority to alter or influence the decisions of evaluators. This is bad security practice. wherever it occurs. John F. Reilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, gave evidence about this practice during his testimony on April 30, 1963.1 While agreeing to the premise that evaluation reports should be accepted as true when submitted by the evaluator, Mr. Reilly admitted that on occasion he has returned security reports to the evaluator "asking" that the report be "re-examined" in view of his comments. He said he had done this "two or three times a month."2 Mr. Reilly further admitted that in certain instances "my suggestions become their judgment." Since he also admitted that in some cases his "suggestions" were directed orally to the evaluator, it appears that in some cases, at least, no record was made to indicate responsibility for changes in evaluation reports. 3 Mr. REILLY. But, now, with respect to FBI agents, the one particular group with which I am most familiar from years of experience, every one of their reports and their memorandums to the Department of Justice states that they are merely reporting facts, they are not drawing conclusions from them. That is for the Department of Justice to do, they are to submit a given set of facts, sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution under a given statute, so they are not sitting in judgment.' Mr. SOURWINE. That would, applying it to a security report, be a security evaluation you would apply it to that? Mr. REILLY. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. Such a report should be as objective as possible? Mr. REILLY. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. And the person making that report should weigh the facts and apply security standards? Mr. REILLY. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. And it is part of his expertise to know what weight to give? Mr. REILLY. That is correct. Mr. SOURWINE. And so as a matter of fact his security report when it has been evaluated; that is, the evaluation report, after it has been signed by the responsible official, should be accepted as true and Mr. REILLY. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. And you could not change an evaluation report after it has been signed and accepted? Mr. REILLY. Well, if upon my own-if upon my own personal review of a file I found that there are facts which, perhaps through oversight, are not stated in their proper posture, oh, yes, I could write a memorandum. Mr. SOURWINE. You could write a memorandum and disagree and add facts and say anything you want to and sign it and then it goes up with that memorandum covering it, but you could not change the evaluation report when signed by a responsible authority, could you? 1 State Department Security hearings, pt. 1, pp. 14-17. 2 State Department Security hearings, pt. 1, p. 15. State Department Security hearings, pt. 1, p. 16. 4 State Department Security hearings, pt. 1, pp. 14-16. Mr. REILLY. I can send it back to the Evaluations Division, this is what I would normally do, and do do, send it back to them with my comments, asking them to reexamine it in the light of my comments. Mr. SOURWINE. And do you ask them to change the conclusions or take any facts out, take any statements out? Mr. REILLY. I can ask them to consider, reconsider and if in reconsidering it they then hold to their original opinion, then my report-I write my own memorandum with my own conclusions and send it forward. Mr. SOURWINE. But you have done this, you have asked reports be changed, that matters be taken out or added on evaluation reports? Mr. REILLY. Yes. I simply-when I look at a case, a particular one, I read it and as I read it, and if, I say, feel it should be, I ask, "Would you have this reexamined to see if perhaps the evaluator has not given proper weight to this?" Mr. SOURWINE. You have actually done that? Mr. REILLY. Oh, yes. Mr. SOURWINE. In how many cases? Mr. REILLY. I don't keep statistics on that sort of thing, Mr. Sourwine, butMr. SOURWINE. Half a dozen? Mr. REILLY. Oh, maybe two or three times a month. Mr. SOURWINE. Two or three times a month you take a case back and ask something be changed? Mr. REILLY. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it always changed? Mr. REILLY. Not always. These are things where honest men may disagree— matters of weight. And they may disagree in good faith. Mr. SOURWINE. And you do that orally? You don't do it in writing? You don't give them a memorandum to sign or initial? Mr. REILLY. I would write it on a buck slip. What I quite frequently do, to save time, is to write it on the document, write it in black pen across the face of the document submitted to me for my comments. Mr. SOURWINE. Well, that gets lost, doesn't it, if the document is changed, that memorandum is not a part of the permanent record, if the evaluation report is, in fact, changed? Mr. REILLY. No, anything that any of my comments remain in the file, whether they are on a buck slip or not. Mr. SOURWINE. They would remain in the file but they wouldn't remain in the evaluation report that went upstairs? Mr. REILLY. Oh, ves, they would, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Would they? Mr. REILLY. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. Even when you send that in on a buck slip, as you say? Mr. REILLY. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. You always do it in writing, never orally? Mr. REILLY. I have done it orally; yes. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think, Mr. Reilly, that it is good security procedure to ask for changes or alterations, or to make criticisms of an evaluation report orally or in any such way that your responsibility for the change or criticism is not shown in the file record, in which it could be found? Mr. REILLY. But these are noncontroversial changes, where, for example, an evaluator has simply overlooked the fact-and this can happen-or if, in my feeling, the evaluator did not logically set forth his facts-I am not trying to be personally critical of that man. And if I write a man, criticizing his style, and so forth, this can reflect on that person as an individual, which I prefer not to do. That is the way I justify it. Mr. SOURWINE. I am not thinking of the evaluator. I am thinking of the person whose security status is involved. I thought that such a person was entitled to every consideration and that everything in his case is made a matter of record, from the evaluation report on up and that every official had to sign and state reasons for his action, whatever action he took, whether he concurred or disapproved. Isn't that right? Mr. REILLY. When a case has passed my office; yes, sir, that is a fact. Mr. SOURWINE. But you say that you can send it back for changes and you need not make a record of the fact that you requested the changes? Mr. REILLY. If there is no controversy between the Division of Evaluations and me with respect to suggested changes, then my suggestions become their judgment. Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I can understand this, since you are the chief. You are the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and you are certainly functioning as chief of the Office of Security; and your suggestions would carry, shall we say, great weight with any of your subordinates within that Office; would they not? Mr. REILLY. I would hope they do. Mr. SOURWINE. And a man would have to be most recalcitrant to resist a suggestion you made? Mr. REILLY. Oh, no, no, no. It is clearly understood that we operate in an atmosphere of intellectual honesty, and if my subordinates feel that they disagree with me-I am an attorney and I understand-they should disagree with me. Mr. SOURWINE. And when you send a report back and you tell them that they have overlooked some facts or you want it rewritten or changed somehow, you feel that he should be perfectly free to argue about it? Mr. REILLY. To point out to me where he believes he is correct; yes, sir. matters. QUESTION OF EXPERIENCE EXAMINED Mr. Reilly has made it clear to this subcommittee that when he first returned security reports to be "re-examined" he had no previous experience in security evaluations. Yet, he sought to persuade professional evaluators to "re-examine" their decisions in view of his own comment.5 Mr. SOURWINE. You would consider the law applicable, and the laws of evidence, and the rules of the court, and the policies of the Department. Now, an evaluator has to have in mind all of the facts, all of the factors which affect security. Do you think you have the background? Mr. REILLY. I think I am acquiring Mr. SOURWINE. As an evaluator, a security evaluator? Mr. REILLY. I think I am rapidly acquiring it. After all Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have it when you came to the State Department? Mr. REILLY. No, sir; admittedly I did not. Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have it the first time you sent a security report back to be changed? Mr. REILLY. I was just acquiring it at that time. Mr. SOURWINE. So it was in-job training, in-service training. * * * * * There is no doubt that any official, no matter what agency or business, has a great deal of influence, coercive or otherwise, over his subordinates. The distinction between a "suggestion" and a demand is hard to determine where administrative bureaucracy exists. Where the exercise of sheer authority is used to change the report of an evaluator without his consent, a serious violation of sound security practice occurs. Testimony adduced by the subcommittee uncovered such an occurrence. Harry M. Hite, an evaluator in the Division of Evaluations, testified on March 5, 1964, that, on one occasion, changes were made in his evaluation by a superior officer, Mr. David Belisle.o Mr. HITE. This occurred in October of last year. I had evaluated a Presidential case which went forward through my supervisor, Mr. Loughton, and from Mr. Loughton it went to Mr. Belisle. Apparently Mr. Belisle disagreed with my evaluation of that particular case and changed it. I say "apparently" because I was not aware of the changes that were made on that case until a month later when my supervisor called it to my attention. Mr. SOURWINE. You say he changed it? Mr. HITE. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Your findings? Mr. HITE. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. You don't mean he entered in the file a notation of his disagreement with you; you mean he physically changed what you had written? State Department Security hearings, pt. 1, p. 17. |