MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI In April 1964, the Department of State began mailing out an unsigned statement dealing with certain aspects of the case of Michal Goleniewski. Full text of this statement follows. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, APRIL 1964 In December 1958, the Department learned that Michal Goleniewski, a Polish intelligence agent, had accused an officer of the U.S. Embassy in Poland of cooperating with Polish and Russian intelligence services. Subsequently, Goleniewski also alleged that some other members of the Embassy staff had behaved in such a way as to make themselves potential victims of blackmail by Communist agents. At the time of the original allegation the Polish agent was of unknown reliability. His information and motives were evaluated as quickly as possible. While the evaluation was being made, the Ambassador in Warsaw inaugurated additional security measures in the Embassy designed to isolate the accused member of the staff from classified information. Only in the single case noted above was there reason to believe that an officer of the Embassy staff may have been implicated in espionage. The individual was discharged, and action has been taken which will preclude his future employment in any position where a security clearance is required. Despite intensive investigation by Federal agencies there was insufficient legal evidence to support criminal proceedings against the suspected individual. As a result of investigations, the Embassy Marine guards who were guilty of unacceptable conduct (but which in no case involved treason or espionage) were disciplined and returned to the United States. In the case of the other civilian members of the Embassy accused by Goleniewski, investigations indicated that no espionage activities had taken place. However, the behavior of some of these employees was sufficiently questionable to warrant letters of reprimand which will seriously impair their future in the U.S. Government. The executive branch of the Government has cooperated fully with the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee since that subcommittee served the first subpena on Michal Goleniewski in August 1963. A second subpena was served on Michal Goleniewski in early March 1964 through the assistance of the executive branch. Michal Goleniewski requested postponement of his appearance on both occasions for reasons of health, to which the subcommittee agreed. Currently he is under subpena to appear before the subcommittee at an early date. At no time have there been efforts by any executive department or agency to quash the subpena or to prevent Michal Goleniewski from testifying before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Congressman Leslie C. Arends made the following comment on the House floor: "I might add that the CIA Subcommittee, of which I am a member, went into every aspect of this case. I am personally satisfied that the publicized statements reported to come from Michal Goleniewski are not correct. The information as reported in the press is not in agreement with the information Goleniewski has made available to many departments of the Government." Mr. Arends' full statement, which may be of interest, appears in the Congressional Record for March 26, 1964, on pages 6167-6169.1 2 This document is so worded as to indicate to someone receiving it. from an official State Department source that the Department had serious doubts as to the authenticity and reliability of Michal Goleniewski and the information he supplied. Examples: Such Mr. Arends' full statement appears on pp. 6372 through 6373 of the permanently bound copy of the Congressional Record of Mar. 26, 1964. 2 State Department Security hearings, pt. 10, pp. 622–623. phrases as "Goleniewski also alleged;" the statement that "At the time of the original allegation the Polish agent was of unknown reliability;" the recital that Representative Arends was "personally satisfied that the publicized statements reported to come from Michal Goleniewski are not correct." John R. Norpel, Jr., a former FBI agent, and more recently employed in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on July 24, 1964, giving his impression of Goleniewski's reliability.3 Mr. Norpel first became aware of this defector in late 1958 or early in 1959, and learned of his identity as Goleniewski in 1961. Asked whether he knew "of any information ever furnished to the U.S. Government by Goleniewski which turned out to be untrue or inaccurate," this witness answered in the negative. He declared that information furnished by Goleniewski had checked out in substantial part. Mr. Norpel estimated that Goleniewski's reliability had been verified by U.S. security agencies by the early part of 1959.5 Of the Department's statement that "Only in the single case noted above was there reason to believe that an officer to the Embassy staff may have been implicated in espionage," this witness testified: “I would say it was not accurate. There were a number of others im plicated in espionage." "In your judgment," Mr. Norpel was asked, "and from what you know of these cases, were persons allowed to continue in employment in our diplomatic service or in the Embassy in Warsaw who, on the basis of good security, should have been removed from these positions?" He answered in the affirmative and explained that he felt there is "grave doubt as to the security reliability of an individual already compromised." He noted that there was at least one and very likely two such cases in the Warsaw Embassy which had already been "brought to the surface by Goleniewski." 7 In a memorandum accompanying his letter to Senator Eastland, dated March 10, 1964, and prepared for William J. Crockett by Ambassador Wilson Flake and Col. George W. French, the information supplied by Goleniewski is belittled and an attempt is made to pass the buck to Otto Otepka. We quote: WARSAW SEX SCANDAL AND THE GOLENIEWSKI SPY RELEASES There was a problem at the Warsaw Embassy which was brought to light in 1959. It was first revealed to the Department by the defector Goleniewski. A number of U.S. employees, including Marine guards, were implicated. This case was brought to the Department's attention during a time when Mr. Otto F. Otepka was serving as Acting Director of the Office of Security. The case was subsequently controlled in large part by Mr. Otepka and his subordinates when Mr. Otepka was Deputy Director of the Office of Security and later when he served as Chief of Evaluations in the same Office. Despite the fact that this case occurred some 4 years ago, the Department does attach importance to it and has asked Ambassador Wilson Flake (retired career Foreign Service officer) and Col. George W. French (recently retired Army intelligence officer), working closely with the Office of Security, to review carefully all aspects of the handling of this case, giving particular attention to the timeliness and sufficiency of interviews, additional investigations ordered, and the 3 State Department Security hearings, pt. 10, pp. 620-629. 4 Ibid., p. 621. Ibid., p. 624. general effectiveness of dealing with all the issues and personnel involved, to insure the maximum protection of U.S. interests.8 Mr. Otepka protested against the inaccuracy of Mr. Crockett's statement in an analysis presented to the subcommittee, from which we quote in part: In the summer of 1959 while I was Deputy Director and temporarily serving as Acting Director in the absence of my immediate chief, William O. Boswell, I was handed a highly classified document by representatives of another agency in the presence of the Acting Secretary of State. I was permitted to reveal the contents of this document only to Boswell, upon his return, and to the Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Boswell's immediate superior. I was instructed that the Office of Security should not take any action with respect to the principals (employees) named in the document without the express permission of the originating agency. The true identity of the source of the information was not revealed to me. I adhered to the agency's instructions scrupulously. On a subsequent occasion when I became concerned about one of the principals I personally contacted the originating agency and followed its advice. * * * * * There were additional byproduct employee cases developed as the result of interviews conducted with the Marine Guards and I took the necessary action as soon as the information about the conduct of those employees was made available to me. I must emphasize that the disposition of the cases of the Marine Guards who were implicated was not within my jurisdiction. They were under the exclusive control of the Navy Department with the coordination of the originating agency. If anyone in the Office of Security controlled a large part of the Goleniewski case, it was Mr. Boswell. By late 1960 he saw fit to divest me and other division chiefs of our personal involvement in matters normally within our operational jurisdiction, which he himself wished to control. For example, while I was still Deputy Director in September 1960, without consulting me and over the strong objections of the then Chief of the Division of Evaluations, he selected and assigned as Deputy Division Chief, Charles W. Lyons. I did not learn the true identity of the source of the information given to me in 1959 and I did not associate the name Goleniewski with the source until August 1963, after my eviction from the Division of Evaluations. I obtained a copy of a private bill (a public document) sponsored by a Member of Congress to grant citizenship to Michal Goleniewski. The contents of the bill were sufficient in scope to reveal to me that he was the other agency's source of information.10 Certain newspapers have featured the story of Michal Goleniewski, or a version of it, in a series of sensational articles. Perhaps this may have induced Mr. Crockett to fasten responsibility for the case upon Otto Otepka. We present an excerpt from the testimony to illustrate: Mr. CROCKETT. * * * First, as to whether Mr. Otepka knew of the identity of Michal Goleniewski in 1959, it should be noted that in August 1959, Mr. Otepka was advised in detail on intelligence information furnished by a Polish intelligence officer who had defected from the Polish Intelligence Service. During this period the Polish defector was referred to either as "the Polish defector" or "source." This defector was not identified to the Office of Security as Michal Goleniewski until sometime after 1963. Referring to Mr. Otepka's statements in 1961 at which time he testified that he knew of no Communists or subversives in the State Department, it must be assumed that he meant what he said, to wit, that he did not know of any Communists or subversives in the State Department as of that date. As to whether he discounted the information by the Polish defector, Mr. Otepka would be the best party to reply to this question. Ibid., p. 632. Ibid., p. 699. 10 Ibid., p. 700. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you realize that your memorandum does carry this implication? Mr. CROCKETT. I realize this implication, but certainly Mr. Otepka in his responsibility when he received this information must have made this determination when he made his statement before your committee about Communists in the State Department. Mr. SOURWINE. Your memorandum also asserts that Mr. Otepka controlled the cases of the employees identified by Goleniewski; is this true? Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Otepka, during this time, was employed as the Deputy Director of the Office of Security and in this capacity received knowledge of the information and allegations furnished by the defector. He was in a position to issue instructions that appropriate action be initiated on the information he had received. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not a fact that Otepka was not aware of the identity of the defector Goleniewski in 1955, and did not learn of it until the summer of 1963? Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Otepka could not have been aware of the identity of the Polish defector in 1955 since the information relative to this source first became available in 1958-59 period. As of August 1959 Mr. Otepka had detailed knowledge of the Polish intelligence defector and the information which was made available by this source. Whatever action could or should have been taken at that time would not be dependent on what the defector's name was. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not a fact that Otepka learned the full identity of this defector only as the result of a private bill for Goleniewski's citizenship which was presented to the Congress in August 1963, and the report on that bill made by another agency? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir; but whatever action might have been called for was in no way dependent on knowing the defector's name. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true that when information respecting some of Goleniewski's disclosures, respecting the conduct of State Department employees, was furnished to the Department in 1959, there was a specific request that none of the employees involved were to be transferred or investigated by the Department until more information had been obtained by another agency and provided to the Department? Mr. CROCKETT. There was not a complete prohibition on the investigative activities or precautionary security measures that could be undertaken by the Department of State based on the information furnished by the Polish defector. In 1959 the controlling agency explicitly requested the Department not to undertake any active investigation without the approval of that agency. Before 1961 the defector was "in place" which placed certain limitations on the dissemination and usefullness of the information furnished by the source. Later, after the source was no longer operating “in place," the controlling agency advised the State Department of his change in circumstances and requested that any investigative activity by State Department be coordinated with their agency. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true that the information respecting the existence of the defector, and respecting what he had furnished in the way of information concerning certain State Department employees, was to be very closely held within the Department, and was in fact very closely restricted? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true that it was decided at the very highest levelan Acting Secretary in the Department-that the Office of Security would not proceed with respect to any of the cases involved in Goleniewski's disclosures except as later instructed and in accordance UB 11 or the KGB 12 learning of the existence of the defector and the fact that he was furnishing information? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true that the decision to permit two prime suspects, concerning whom Golieniewski had furnished information, and who at that time were employed in the Warsaw Embassy, to complete their then current tour of duty, was based on the judgment by the Ambassador that neither of them handled any substantial amount of sensitive data? Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir; that is true. Mr. SOURWINE. Were there any subsequent instructions to lift the ban against taking any action against the individuals named by Goleniewski? The Mr. CROCKETT. There was never a firm prohibition against action. controlling agency requested at the outset that State would undertake no active investigation without the approval of that organization and later requested that any investigative activities be coordinated with that agency. 11 Polish secret police. 12 Soviet intelligence agency. |