RULES ON TAPPING OF PHONES

State Department regulations in regard to the recording or monitoring of telephone conversations and the practical functioning of these rules were discussed at the hearings. The views and interpretations of individuals involved in the Otepka phone bugging were varied. To a notable degree, taking testimony at face value, it would appear that officials of the Department were surprisingly unknowledgeable respecting these regulations. This lack of knowledge by responsible officials is hard to understand.1

MR. ROSETTI'S VIEW

Mr. Rosetti mistakenly said that wiretaps were unlawful and were not condoned by the Department.2

MR. BELISLE'S VIEW

Mr. Belisle said he was not a lawyer and that he didn't know what were the respective rights of a Department employee, on one hand, and the Department's Office of Security, on the other, with respect to the tapping of an employee's telephone. He testified also that he never had an occasion to look into the matter of tapping or bugging while at the State Department. He claimed that the right of the Office of Security to tap a phone never had been discussed.*

MR. OTEPKA'S VIEW

Mr. Otepka's contrasting view: 5

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Otepka, what are the respective rights of the State Department employees, on the one hand, and the Office of Security, on the other hand, with respect to the tapping of employees' telephones?

Mr. OTEPKA. I think that an employee in the Office of Security of the Department of State, or, as a matter of fact, any employee of the Federal Government, has the same rights under the U.S. Constitution which are given to other personsthat is, to be secure in his person and his property. I do not think an employee should be subjected to wiretapping techniques, and I do not think that the Office of Security has a right legally to engage in such techniques on its own; that is, without proper authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "proper authority"?

Mr. OTEPKA. If I understand the laws correctly, the interpretations concerning wiretapping, it is that a high authority ought to issue authorization for the tapping of a telephone.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you a lawyer, Mr. Otepka?

Mr. OTEPKA. I am not a practicing attorney, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then do not try to interpret the law.

Mr. OTEPKA. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you know how it has been interpreted officially by the State

1 State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, p. 80.

? See related testimony on p. 21 of this report.

Mr. Belisle, while not a lawyer, was administrative head of the Office of Security.

State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, pp. 84-85.

State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, p. 93.

Department you can tell us. Do you know if there is any interpretation in this regard?

Mr. OTEPKA. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not think that the Office of Security which, necessarily, must investigate any charges against an employee of the Department involving security breaches or risks should have a right to employ electronic eavesdropping techniques for the purposes of such an investigation?

Mr. OTEPKA. Well, I would say that if it is in the interest of the security of the United States, yes.

MR. HILL'S VIEW

The State Department was not concerned with eavesdropping, as such, Mr. Hill declared on July 9, 1963. This was several months before he wrote his letter of recantation of previous lies, but here is the way he put it: 8

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Hill, what are the respective rights, if you know, of State Department employees, on the one hand, and the Office of Security, on the other, with respect to the tapping of employees' telephones?

Mr. HILL. I understand that we observe the law in that regard, the law on wiretapping.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean by that that the State Department, itself, or the Office of Security, does not have the right to tap the telephone of one of its employees?

Mr. HILL. We do not have the right to break the law.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, that is a different thing. I am talking about tapping employees' telephones, not breaking the law.

Has it been officially decided, and is it your understanding, that for the Department of State or the Office of Security to tap the telephone of an employee would violate the law?

Mr. HILL. As I said earlier, we do not engage in that type of activity. The Department of State is not concerned with eavesdropping per se-only in protecting from it.

MR. CROCKETT'S VIEW

William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, in testimony before the subcommittee, revealed that he thought the Department opposed monitoring for security purposes except with the expressed direction and authorization of the Secretary of State.9

Mr. SOURWINE. Has there ever been any authority in the Department for recording or monitoring telephone conversations surreptitiously and without the knowledge of the other party on the line?

Mr. CROCKETT. I don't know what you mean by "authority." I don't think there has been any general regulation. I'm sure that in the past-I know, or I have been told of this in the past, there has been such monitoring. But it is done in the guise of security rather than in this context of just what you might call secretarial monitoring. That is what this memo really had reference to, secretarial monitoring, either by person or by machine.

Mr. SOURWINE. This memo, even though it covers recording devices, in your understanding was not intended to apply to monitoring for security purposes? Mr. CROCKETT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Monitoring for security purposes could be very broadly construed, could it not?

William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, said no one at the Department ever called Mr. Otepka a security risk. This assertion was made despite the Department's charges that Mr. Otepka had violated some of its rules (and with knowledge of Mr. Reilly's effort to get the Justice Department to prosecute Mr. Otepka for alleged violation of espionage laws).

7 Mr. Hill never specifically recanted this testimony, though his later testimony (and the facts) are in sharp conflict.

State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, p. 82.
State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, p. 136.

review of this testimony I have concluded that mention of an incident which occurred last March would serve to clarify my responses to Mr. Sourwine's questions concerning interception of conversations in Mr. Otepka's office. I believe

that my answers to these questions were correct. I would like, however, to have the attached statement inserted in the record of my testimony in order that there be no misunderstanding.

If you approve my request I suggest that the statement and this letter be inserted at page 1107 of my testimony.

I enclose the copy of my testimony which was made available to me.

Sincerely,

ELMER DEWEY HILL.

On Monday, March 18, 1963, Mr. John F. Reilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, asked me to explore the possibility of arranging some way to eavesdrop on conversations taking place in Mr. Otepka's office. Mr. Reilly explained to me that he would only consider such a technique if other investigative methods failed.

Later that day, I discussed the technical aspects of this matter with Mr. Clarence J. Schneider who, at that time, was serving as Chief of the Technical Operations Branch of the Division of Technical Services. We agreed on the approach to be used-modifying the wiring of Mr. Otepka's telephone instrument-and decided to return that evening to try the approach.

That evening Mr. Schneider and I altered the existing wiring in the telephone in Mr. Otepka's office. We then established a circuit from Mr. Otepka's office to the Division of Technical Services laboratory by making additional connections in the existing telephone system wiring.

Mr. Schneider and I tested the system and found we would be unable to overhear conversations in Mr. Otepka's office, except actual telephone conversations, because electrical interference produced a loud buzzing sound. (It was never contemplated that an attempt would be made just to monitor Mr. Otepka's telephone line in order to overhear conversations on it.)

I reported our unsuccessful effort to Mr. Reilly the following morning. Mr. Schneider has told me that during that day he asked an officer in the Division of Domestic Operations of the Office of Security whether he had, or knew where to acquire, equipment which would elimina te such a buzzing sound. Mr. Schneider assured me that he did not discuss with the officer the specific application for which the equipment was needed. I also attempted during that day to obtain such equipment, but was unsuccessful.

On the following day, March 20, Mr. Reilly informed me that I should not pursue the matter further because he had found the type of information he was looking for from an examination of Mr. Otepka's classified trash. Mr. Reilly directed me to disconnect the wiring connections which Mr. Schneider and I had made. That evening, Mr. Reilly, Mr. Schneider, and I met in the Office of Security. In the space of a few minutes, I removed the extra connections which Mr. Schneider and I had made in Mr. Otepka's telephone while Mr. Reilly and Mr. Schneider stayed in the hall outside Mr. Otepka's office.

To summarize, for a 2-day period it might have been possible to intercept conversations taking place in Mr. Otepka's office if certain technical problems could have been resolved. These problems never were resolved and the wiring connections which were made were removed without any conversations having been intercepted.

TWO WITNESSES LEAVE THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The story of how three State Department officials told falsehoods under oath to this subcommittee, and how they recanted-or "amplified" their testimony, as they so quaintly put it-is told in detail in the preceding section of this report.1

Lying under oath before a Congressional committee can hardly be classed as casual fibbing. If the Department of Justice had chosen to prosecute, the charge would have been perjury-a felony. So let us see how the State Department dealt with their three "amplifiers."

Messrs. John Reilly and Elmer Dewey Hill were suspended and then allowed to resign. But Mr. David I. Belisle was retained by the Department through a rather curious interpretation.

Some indication of the thought processes used by State Department officials in arriving at this determination may be found in the following testimony by Mr. William Crockett on May 4, 1965:2

Mr. SOURWINE. According to newspaper reports, when you went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee you indicated that Mr. Reilly and Mr. Hill had been subjected to severe action by the State Department but stated you found no fault with the decision to continue Mr. Belisle as a trusted employee of your office, explaining that you made the distinction that Mr. Belisle was out of the country when the wiretap was put through on the Otepka phone. Is this true?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. This would appear to indicate that you consider a major element of Reilly's and Hill's offense to have been the actual participation in the wiretap. Is this conclusion correct?

Mr. CROCKETT. No; not only the actual participation in the wiretap but the actual action to make the tap without consulting with me or higher authority. As a matter of fact, there is still a great deal of question as to whether Hill acted on instructions by Mr. Reilly or took action on his own to check out his own technical capacity to make such a tap.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't the giving of false testimony under oath before a Senate committee a much more grievous offense than participating in a wiretap for security reasons?

Mr. CROCKETT. To give false testimony under any circumstances is a grievous offense.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have told us that the existing order, issued in 1961, dealing with telephone monitoring and recording was not intended to apply to the security field. Is there any existing order or regulation in the State Department under which the tapping of Otepka's phone or the conversion of his telephone instrument to a receiver for the purpose of recording conversations, constituted a violation?

Mr. CROCKETT. No, sir; this kind of activity did not violate the order of 1961 since that order referred to an individual having his own calls monitored by his secretary without the knowledge of the caller.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any general instructions in the State Department which would have made it improper to have tapped Mr. Otepka's phone under the circumstances?

Mr CROCKETT. No; there were no instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. How does the fact that Reilly and Hill participated in the arrangements for compromising Mr. Otepka's phone constitute any aggravation of their offense?