4. His loyal associates were transferred away from their work to a make-work project where they had no contact with other State Department employees.

As the situation evolved, the State Department began, finally, to move against this subcommittee.

1. Unusual delays were experienced in summoning witnesses and in official correspondence.

2. Witnesses arrived with instructions to limit their testimony and to refuse to discuss certain vital areas.

3. The "third-agency rule" was given an extreme interpretation which blocked information on many matters.

4. In news releases and public correspondence, the State Department indulged widely in half-truths and quoting out of context.

5. Three State Department officers lied to this committee, and were later forced to recant when the question of perjury became a matter of discussion on the Senate floor.

Perhaps the most illustrative example of the State Department attitude came when John F. Reilly, head of the Office of Security, testified that the reason why he had told half-truths was because the subcommittee had not asked him the right questions. Ironically, one of the original State Department charges against Mr. Otepka was that he had furnished the subcommittee with a list of the right questions.

State Department personnel security policy is manifestly contrary to the intentions of Congress. State Department officers have attempted deliberately to hide this fact from an agency of Congress charged with overseeing security practices. The State Department has indulged in illegal acts, the destruction of the careers of honest men, misrepresentation, and perhaps perjury, in order to prevent Congresss from carrying out its constitutional functions. This is an arrogant challenge, which must not be allowed to stand.

STROM THURMOND.

RULES ON TAPPING OF PHONES

State Department regulations in regard to the recording or monitor-
ing of telephone conversations and the practical functioning of these
rules were discussed at the hearings. The views and interpretations
of individuals involved in the Otepka phone bugging were varied.
To a notable degree, taking testimony at face value, it would appear
that officials of the Department were surprisingly unknowledgeable
respecting these regulations. This lack of knowledge by responsible
officials is hard to understand.1

MR. ROSETTI'S VIEW

Mr. Rosetti mistakenly said that wiretaps were unlawful and were
not condoned by the Department.2

MR. BELISLE'S VIEW

3

Mr. Belisle said he was not a lawyer and that he didn't know
what were the respective rights of a Department employee, on one
hand, and the Department's Office of Security, on the other, with
respect to the tapping of an employee's telephone. He testified also
that he never had an occasion to look into the matter of tapping or
bugging while at the State Department. He claimed that the right
of the Office of Security to tap a phone never had been discussed.*

MR. OTEPKA'S VIEW

Mr. Otepka's contrasting view: 5

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Otepka, what are the respective rights of the State De-
partment employees, on the one hand, and the Office of Security, on the other
hand, with respect to the tapping of employees' telephones?

Mr. OTEPKA. I think that an employee in the Office of Security of the Depart-
ment of State, or, as a matter of fact, any employee of the Federal Government,
has the same rights under the U.S. Constitution which are given to other persons-
that is, to be secure in his person and his property. I do not think an employee
should be subjected to wiretapping techniques, and I do not think that the Office
of Security has a right legally to engage in such techniques on its own; that is,
without proper authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "proper authority"?

Mr. OTEPKA. If I understand the laws correctly, the interpretations concerning
wiretapping, it is that a high authority ought to issue authorization for the tapping
of a telephone.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you a lawyer, Mr. Otepka?

Mr. OTEPKA. I am not a practicing attorney, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then do not try to interpret the law.

Mr. OTEPKA. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you know how it has been interpreted officially by the State

1 State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, p. 80.

2 See related testimony on p. 21 of this report.

Mr. Belisle, while not a lawyer, was administrative head of the Office of Security.

4 State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, pp. 84-85.

State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, p. 93.

Mr. CROCKETT. That's right. But in discussing this with the Secretary-and I have passed this on to my subordinates in Security-this must be at his express direction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. CROCKETT. Monitoring for security purposes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Oh, any monitoring for security purposes is not proper in the Department without the express direction and authorization of the Secretary? Mr. CROCKETT. That's right.

STATE DEPARTMENT ORDER

A State Department order of December 15, 1961, prohibits the recording of telephone conversation.10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
December 15, 1961.

Memorandum to all executive and administrative officers.
Subject: Monitoring of telephone calls.

Effective immediately, monitoring of telephone calls will be held to a minimum. When it is necessary to monitor telephone calls, the following practices will be observed:

(a) Telephone conversations shall not be recorded by recording devices unless advance notice is given to the other party and the device is connected in accordance with the Federal Communications Commission regulations.

(b) Advance notice must be given whenever a secretary or any other person is placed on the line for any purpose whatsoever.

(DBM) 11

Mr. Crockett admitted a bit later that the Division of Buildings and Management was under his supervision (December 15, 1961) when the memorandum was issued and that he had approved it.12

12

Although Mr. Crockett denied any knowledge of the violation of the State Department order, he said that he suspected it is not obeyed "as a matter of practice." 13 The questioning proceeded:

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether this December 15 order has been rigorously obeyed since it was issued?

Mr. CROCKETT. I couldn't say, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if it is obeyed as a matter of practice in the State Department today?

Mr. CROCKETT. I don't know. I suspect it is not, honestly, but I can't say to what extent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether there are telephones in the State Department which are used for recording or monitoring telephone conversations by devices which are not connected in accordance with the FCC regulations?

Mr. CROCKETT. I don't know, personally, know of any monitoring that is done by device. I think most of the monitoring, if there is any, would be done by secretarial monitoring.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it is true that there are no telephones in the Department with these recorders on them which have buzzers to sound a recurrent note to indicate a recording is being made?

Mr. CROCKETT. As I said before, I don't know of any situation in the whole Department where there is a recording device.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of any kind, with or without the buzzer, the beeper?

Mr. CROCKETT. That's right; yes.

So that it would be in a better position to understand the issues in the compromising of conversations over the Otepka telephone, the subcommittee took time to get discussions of the techniques involved

10 State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, p. 135.

11 DBM means Division of Buildings and Management. 1 State Department Security hearings, pt. 3, p. 136.

13 Ibid., pt. 3, p. 137.