any and all desired information, documents, or interviews and appearances of witnesses; (2) that the Department be notified of the scope and nature of any inquiry; (3) that the Secretary be furnished with transcripts of testimony by State Department personnel and be permitted to have an observer at the hearings; and (4) that before publication by the subcommittee of any testimony the Secretary be given opportunity to review it "for security purposes."

Secretary Rusk said he was confident there would be good cooperation-if his suggestions were followed. As he put it:7

If the guidelines I have suggested are followed, and if we concentrate on our joint concern to assure the highest security standards in the Department of State, I am confident that we can work together effectively in pursuit of our common objectives.

8

Secretary Rusk gave assurances to the subcommittee that he did not either resent or resist the interest of the subcommittee. He said: $ *** On this security work, this is work that never ends.* * *

It is a constant battle. Just at the point you think you have everything in tight shape, some human frailty occurs among the 15,000 people and you have something else on your hands. It is a constant battle and please be assured that I do not in any sense resent or resist the interests of this committee.

One of his top aides, William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, backed up his boss by testifying, August 19, 1964, that neither he nor the Secretary considered the inquiries by the subcommittee as "meddling." 9

Mr. SOURWINE. *** There have been some suggestions that you have been critical of the Congress or this committee in particular for meddling in the affairs of the State Department. You never took that position, did you?

Mr. CROCKETT. This is another of the unfounded rumors that get scattered around. I have never taken this position. I think my position is very clear. I would like to have a very close, friendly, and intimate association with this committee and other committees to assure that our community of interest is well taken care of. I think that we have a mutual interest, that you have a responsibility and we have one. This is my philosophy. I think it is the Secretary's philosophy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you regard this committee's activities in connection with this investigation as in any sense meddling?

Mr. CROCKETT. No, not in any sense. Čertainly not. I think that what I may consider relevant and important you may not, and vice versa. But what you consider in those categories is for you to determine. If you want to spend a lot of time on various things, that is your business. I don't think we have any responsibility or competence to decide what is relevant to you and what isn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "you," you mean the committee rather than counsel?
Mr. CROCKETT. Yes.

These promises and assurances, while not fulsome, left the subcommittee rather skeptical in view of previous difficulties in getting information. And doubts grew as contests, difficulties, and delays struck the ensuing portions of the lengthy inquiries, as outlined in other chapters of this report.

Ibid., pt. 5, p. 273.

Ibid., pt. 5, pp. 292–293.

Ibid., pt. 18, pp. 1495-1496.

CHALLENGE TO SISS MEMORANDUM

On October 2, 1963, the Internal Security Subcommittee placed before Secretary of State Dean Rusk a memorandum that sparked a protracted inquiry into faulty State Department security practices. Because of the urgency of the matter the document was taken to New York, where Secretary Rusk was at the time, and was handed to him by Senator Dodd.

The memorandum, unanimously approved by members of the subcommittee, and delivered at the direction of the full Judiciary Committee, alerted the Secretary to the fact, among other things, that one or more of his subordinates had lied under oath in testifying before the subcommittee. This was something, it was felt, that the Secretary should know, and the subcommittee hoped for a response that would help correct the situation. Neither the Department nor the subcommittee made the memorandum public.

In one respect, at least, the response was disappointing. Unfortunately, the defensive mechanisms at the State Department were set in motion and there were abortive efforts to discredit the subcommittee's assertions. True, the lying trio-John F. Reilly, David I. Belisle, and Elmer Dewey Hill-were persuaded to "supplement" their testimony, but the defensive urge still played a role. The "supplemental" letters were found inaccurate. Eventually the Department backed away from this contest, and Mr. Hill gave testimony which disclosed most of the truth.

Thomas Ehrlich, then on the staff of the State Department Office of Legal Adviser, revealed in testimony November 14, 1963, that shortly after the memorandum had been received by Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ehrlich drew a special assignment from George Ball, the Under Secretary. He was to look into matters that were covered in the memorandum. He was to work on this directly for Mr. Ball-not the legal adviser, Abram Chayes.

Ehrlich said he found errors in the subcommittee's statement, but both he and the Department declined to lay them on the record although the subcommittee formally requested an outline of his conclusions in his memorandum given to Mr. Ball and/or the Secretary of State. Senator Dirksen made the motion asking for the memorandum and it was supported by Senators Eastland, McClellan, Dodd, Hruska, Keating, and Scott.

The subcommittee did receive copies of the "recantation" letters of Reilly, Belisle, and Hill.

Testimony by Mr. Ehrlich on these points (Nov. 14, 1963) includes the following:

Mr. SOURWINE. What conclusion did you reach with respect to those matters? Mr. EHRLICH. Well, there were 10 pages of matters and all of them, frankly— the purpose of my doing this was to work with the Secretary in preparing his statement, his testimony before you, I believe it was 3 weeks ago.

any and all desired information, documents, or interviews and appearances of witnesses; (2) that the Department be notified of the scope and nature of any inquiry; (3) that the Secretary be furnished with transcripts of testimony by State Department personnel and be permitted to have an observer at the hearings; and (4) that before publication by the subcommittee of any testimony the Secretary be given opportunity to review it "for security purposes."

Secretary Rusk said he was confident there would be good cooperation-if his suggestions were followed. As he put it:7

If the guidelines I have suggested are followed, and if we concentrate on our joint concern to assure the highest security standards in the Department of State, I am confident that we can work together effectively in pursuit of our common objectives.

Secretary Rusk gave assurances to the subcommittee that he did not either resent or resist the interest of the subcommittee. He said:

*** On this security work, this is work that never ends.* * *

It is a constant battle. Just at the point you think you have everything in tight shape, some human frailty occurs among the 15,000 people and you have something else on your hands. It is a constant battle and please be assured that I do not in any sense resent or resist the interests of this committee.

One of his top aides, William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, backed up his boss by testifying, August 19, 1964, that neither he nor the Secretary considered the inquiries by the subcommittee as "meddling."9

Mr. SOURWINE. *** There have been some suggestions that you have been critical of the Congress or this committee in particular for meddling in the affairs of the State Department. You never took that position, did you?

Mr. CROCKETT. This is another of the unfounded rumors that get scattered around. I have never taken this position. I think my position is very clear. I would like to have a very close, friendly, and intimate association with this committee and other committees to assure that our community of interest is well taken care of. I think that we have a mutual interest, that you have a responsibility and we have one. This is my philosophy. I think it is the Secretary's philosophy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you regard this committee's activities in connection with this investigation as in any sense meddling?

Mr. CROCKETT. No, not in any sense. Čertainly not. I think that what I may consider relevant and important you may not, and vice versa. But what you consider in those categories is for you to determine. If you want to spend a lot of time on various things, that is your business. I don't think we have any responsibility or competence to decide what is relevant to you and what isn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "you," you mean the committee rather than counsel?
Mr. CROCKETT. Yes.

These promises and assurances, while not fulsome, left the subcommittee rather skeptical in view of previous difficulties in getting information. And doubts grew as contests, difficulties, and delays struck the ensuing portions of the lengthy inquiries, as outlined in other chapters of this report.

Ibid., pt. 5, p. 273.

Ibid., pt. 5, pp. 292-293.
Ibid., pt. 18, pp. 1495-1496.

CHALLENGE TO SISS MEMORANDUM

On October 2, 1963, the Internal Security Subcommittee placed before Secretary of State Dean Rusk a memorandum that sparked a protracted inquiry into faulty State Department security practices. Because of the urgency of the matter the document was taken to New York, where Secretary Rusk was at the time, and was handed to him by Senator Dodd.

The memorandum, unanimously approved by members of the subcommittee, and delivered at the direction of the full Judiciary Committee, alerted the Secretary to the fact, among other things, that one or more of his subordinates had lied under oath in testifying before the subcommittee. This was something, it was felt, that the Secretary should know, and the subcommittee hoped for a response that would help correct the situation. Neither the Department nor the subcommittee made the memorandum public.

In one respect, at least, the response was disappointing. Unfortunately, the defensive mechanisms at the State Department were set in motion and there were abortive efforts to discredit the subcommittee's assertions. True, the lying trio-John F. Reilly, David I. Belisle, and Elmer Dewey Hill-were persuaded to "supplement" their testimony, but the defensive urge still played a role. The "supplemental" letters were found inaccurate. Eventually the Department backed away from this contest, and Mr. Hill gave testimony which disclosed most of the truth.

Thomas Ehrlich, then on the staff of the State Department Office of Legal Adviser, revealed in testimony November 14, 1963, that shortly after the memorandum had been received by Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ehrlich drew a special assignment from George Ball, the Under Secretary. He was to look into matters that were covered in the memorandum. He was to work on this directly for Mr. Ball-not the legal adviser, Abram Chayes.

Ehrlich said he found errors in the subcommittee's statement, but both he and the Department declined to lay them on the record although the subcommittee formally requested an outline of his conclusions in his memorandum given to Mr. Ball and/or the Secretary of State. Senator Dirksen made the motion asking for the memorandum and it was supported by Senators Eastland, McClellan, Dodd, Hruska, Keating, and Scott.

The subcommittee did receive copies of the "recantation" letters of Reilly, Belisle, and Hill.

Testimony by Mr. Ehrlich on these points (Nov. 14, 1963) includes the following:

Mr. SOURWINE. What conclusion did you reach with respect to those matters? Mr. EHRLICH. Well, there were 10 pages of matters and all of them, franklythe purpose of my doing this was to work with the Secretary in preparing his statement, his testimony before you, I believe it was 3 weeks ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you reach any conclusion as to whether any of the statements in that 10-page memorandum were false or misleading or in any way untrue?

Mr. EHRLICH. Well, I reached a number of conclusions about them. I frankly would have to see the statements before I could comment about them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you find any of the statements in that 10-page statement which in your judgment were untrue or misleading?

Mr. EHRLICH. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you convey this impression to Mr. Ball?

Mr. EHRLICH. Yes; and I prepared-yes; I did, and to the Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. And to the Secretary?

Senator DODD. You are referring to the memorandum which you and I put to the Secretary in writing?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. Did you convey this in writing?

Mr. EHRLICH. I gave the Secretary part of my judgments in writing and part orally.

Mr. SOURWINE. You prepared a memorandum, or in a sense an analysis of at least some of the portions of that statement?

Mr. EHRLICH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You never did finish your first answer now?

Mr. EHRLICH. Excuse me?

The CHAIRMAN. I said, did you finish your first answer? You conveyed a memorandum and discussed your impressions. Is that with the Secretary?

Mr. EHRLICH. There were a number of issues raised in the memorandum, in the committee's memorandum, and I gathered together material for the Secretary and prepared some memorandums myself and discussed a few of the points with the Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember any one statement in the committee's memorandum which you concluded was false or misleading?

Mr. EHRLICH. Sir, without making that-before making that specific statement, I would want to see the memorandum because that would be a serious charge on my part.

A similar blackout of findings by State Department consultants occurred in the case of the investigations by former Ambassador Wilson Flake and retired Col. George W. French, Jr. They had been assigned to review State Department security practices and procedures and matters suggested in the subcommittee memorandum, but not "the Otepka case as such."

Mr. Crockett, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, said he hoped the investigation by Ambassador Flake and Colonel French would show whether "there was any substance" to the memorandum the subcommittee gave to Secretary Rusk October 2, 1963.

What were the findings and conclusions of these consultants? Oral and written memorandums covering numerous aspects of security matters were submitted to Secretary Rusk, but these were withheld from the subcommittee in this succinct manner: 1

Mr. SOURWINE. Can a copy be supplied for the committee record?
Mr. CROCKETT. No, sir.

It would seem that had Mr. Ehrlich, Ambassador Flake, or Colonel French found any demonstrable errors in the subcommittee memorandum those errors would have been fired back at the subcommittee. The absence of a contest over the facts highlights the emptiness of the challenge.

1 State Department Security hearings, pt. 5, p. 323.