1. The first of these concerns the question of who should be responsible for establishing and promulgating operational radiation protection standards, and what would likely happen should an agency head, in accordance with his statutory responsibility for health or safety, find it necessary to promulgate an operational standard which could result in a radiation exposure significantly at variance with the radiation protection guides approved by the President.

Operating standards are now developed and promulgated by the individual agencies, and while they do have a common basis, the standards are individually tailored to meet the specific requirements of each agency. In my opinion, this arrangement should be continued.

However, we do believe that it is both feasible and desirable that the common basis for the operational standards be centrally provided. In my previous testimony, I explained why we recommended that this should be a function of the President and also the purpose of the Federal Radiation Council. The arrangement whereby the President provides guidance of executive agencies with respect to criteria for radiation protection, following advice of the Federal Radiation Council, was formalized by Executive Order 10831 and was given a statutory basis by Public Law 86-373.

With regard to the nature and status of the guidance provided by the President, I would describe it as a manifestation of presidential leadership and direction over the affairs of the executive branch. Like most direction of this nature and at this level, it provides for the exercise of judgment on the part of the recipients. Those agencies with direct statutory obligations for safety standards will continue to fulfill them. The presidential guidance embodies sufficient flexibility to accommodate such obligations.

I would assume that any agency head intending to promulgate operating standards distinctly at variance with the radiation protection guides approved by the President would discuss the matter in advance with the Council. There is always the possibility that the Council might wish to reconsider its recommendation if new evidence of sufficient import were involved. I would also assume that if the intended variation was of significant importance, the agency head would discuss his proposed action with the President.

In the final analysis the responsibility for the operating standards lies with the particular agency involved. Under present circumstances we can foresee no legal or administrative problems in this regard.

2. Next, I would like to discuss the question of whether a public member should be added to the Federal Radiation Council. Public Law 86-373 wisely provided that the President could add members to the Council to furnish the President with flexibility in this respect. However, it was our belief initially that by providing membership on the Council to those agency heads with the greatest statutory responsibilities for programs most affected by radiation protection standards, the public interest would be properly safeguarded. The present membership of the Council is designed to assure that the two primary considerations-protection from radiation hazards, and realization of the benefits of the use of radiation and atomic energy-are properly provided for. It would be difficult to select individuals from private life who would better represent the enormously varied inter

ests of the public than officials immediately responsible for important related Federal programs who report directly to the President. Experience indicates that individuals from private life can perform a useful service as advisers, but generally speaking their contribution stems from their knowledge in specialized fields, rather than from their ability to represent the public. The President and the responsible agency heads are, of course, free to consult with anyone they choose regarding proposed standards. In the case of the recently issued standards, the entire Cabinet membership was consulted.

3. A related issue is whether additional agency heads should be added to the Council. There are a number of agencies with an interest in the work of the Council, particularly the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, the transportation agencies, and the State Department. To add them all would produce a body which would appear to be an augmented Cabinet. Our present thinking is that the Council should provide such representation in a manner similar to that employed by the National Security Council of inviting such agencies to participate as appropriate; that is, when their agency's interests are affected. And we feel, by the way, that they should be kept thoroughly advised of the work of the Council, so that they can invite themselves in as well as being invited in.

4. A fourth question is whether the Federal Radiation Council should provide its own staff.

The development of radiation protection guidance involves a large number of scientific disciplines. Thus, the Council would be limiting its resources if it attempted to duplicate such expertise on its own staff. Under present arrangements the entire resources of the excutive branch are available to the Council. Executive branch agencies have not hesitated to make competent people available, and it is expected that they will continue to do so.

5. A further important question raised in the hearings concerned the proper relationship of the Federal Radiation Council to such groups as the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements, the International Commission on Radiological Protection, and the National Academy of Sciences.

The existence of such scientific groups functioning as independent organizations is an important asset. As we see it, no problem exists with regard to relationships of these groups and the Council. It has been intended that the Council be in a position to draw upon the scientific work and findings of all such groups. It may well be, however, that individual members of those organizations who are also Government employees may experience some problems as a result of their dual capacities. This, of course, is not a unique situation, as you know; it is a Government-wide problem. It is believed that in this instance satisfactory arrangements can be developed which will permit Government scientists to assist these organizations. And this is, I believe, on the agenda of the Council at the moment to explore.

6. One issue raised several times during the hearings is whether the Council should be advisory, or whether it should be authorized to issue binding directives on the executive agencies; that is, whether it would have an authoritative nature and in a sense be a regulatory body itself. It is not appropriate that the Council serve in other than an advisory role. It is the President who is responsible for the general di

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rection of the executive branch. Basic radiation protection guidance constitutes such general direction. On the basis of presidential decision and actions, each agency is responsible for the specific application of that guidance, using such discretion as the circumstances might warrant. The Council plays an extremely important and beneficial role in providing advice for the President in this regard, but it should not be assigned the task of providing direction for the executive branch, a function properly vested in the President.

7. I would like to make some comments at this point about the balance of risk and benefit which serves as the fundamental basis for the establishment of basic radiation protection guidance. Much has been said during the course of these and other hearings about what is involved in the measurement of biological risk. Some impression may have been left that the measurement of benefits represents only shortsighted economic considerations. The measurement of benefits is by no means confined to dollars-and-cents benefits. At issue may be involved the question of either forgoing or using a particular process or device. For example, the availability of a small, cheap source of electric power generated by atomic energy could have political, economic, and social implications which far transcend the particular monetary cost problems of the manufacturer or public utility. Similarly, the existing and potential value of devices and techniques which are, or could be, used in industry, research, and medicine, even though such use may result in some exposure or release of radioactive material to the environment, cannot be measured in monetary terms alone. Even though the assessment of risk and benefit is difficult, basic guidance implicitly or explicitly represents a balance between those two factors.

In conclusion, I would like to state and to emphasize our very definite belief that hearings of the type you have held here can only be beneficial. This is an area about which we feel that the public needs a lot more information, and one which, as we indicated in our earlier testimony, we are going to have to constantly reassess from the standpoint of the Government itself.

It is our intention, as the Budget Bureau, to follow this area very closely. We did not want to be in a position here of attempting to be completely dogmatic about any of these points, because the Radiation Council, as we know, is a relatively new organization, and we need to learn a lot more about this problem. But we do plan to follow this area closely; and if we feel that further changes in organization are required, we will certainly recommend that to the President and to the Congress.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Staats.

Mr. HOSMER?

Representative HOSMER. I take it that you view the Council's func tion, as advisory to the President and the President's establishment of guidance in radiation, as essentially a policy matter. Is that correct?

Mr. STAATS. That is right.

Representative HOSMER. Let's see what the situation is in another = field, aviation, where we have military airplanes, civilian airplanes, and Government nonmilitary aircraft, and you have all the altitude ▾ at which these various planes fly when they are going in various di- E rections, and a lot of regulations about it. That is not done by way

1

of a policy of the particular administration, but by way of a continuing regulation within a particular agency of the Government, is it not?

Mr. STAATS. I think here you are referring to the authority of the Federal Aviation Agency to prescribe these standards. But even so, I think that you will find that that authority is not a complete one, in view of the military having a role. But if you had exactly the same problem I would not preclude the need for some issuance by the President of some overall standard.

I see the point you are making. You do not have the same number of agencies. I think in this case you have the Federal Aviation Agency and the military services as being the ones primarily involved. The Federal Aviation Agency can issue regulations; but to carry this a bit further if I may, you have regulatory authority now in the public health field in the Public Health Service, and also in the Atomic Energy Commission. These are both matters of statutory powers. What we have attempted to achieve is some common standards under which both of these agencies can proceed to develop their own regulations in this field.

I am not sure the two situations are exactly comparable.

Representative HOSMER. I brought up the point mainly for discussion and evaluation. However, we do find ourselves in the situation of a multiplicity of regulation-writing authorities, which in turn are controlled by the guidelines that the President establishes. Your argument is that the divergences of the situations each of these handles necessarily makes this the only reasonable way to go about it; is that right?

Mr. STAATS. Yes, that is right.

Representative HOSMER. We had a gentleman in here the other day, I do not know whether you read his testimony or not, but he was talking about some research they wanted to do with iron. The AEC regulations in that regard held down, or specified the degree of radiation effect that could be put into this iron.

Actually, the amount they needed was so low that the properties of iron itself would be harmful to a person before any concentration of radiation would. And yet he said that it was such a difficult procedure to get an exception to this general regulation, and so forth, that this industry just decided that they would have to forgo that fruitful avenue of research, not because it in itself caused trouble, but there was too much trouble with the regulations.

Is there any way that this system can avoid such results?

Mr. STAATS. I believe this involved the Atomic Energy Commission, if I am properly advised.

I believe that is the kind of a problem that only the agency itself can work out. I know that they are making very great efforts in this line to work out these regulations. I do not believe that this had to do with the problem of the lack of any overall, basic standards. This was a problem of administrative regulations within the agency.

Representative HOSMER. That is right, and that is a facet of this whole thing, I am sure. In the abstract of philosophy, you can have a perfect system; but when you come down to administration, you > still have trouble.

I do not think we have covered that too well, but I just wanted to bring it up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STAATS. Perhaps you would want to proceed on that with the Atomic Energy Commission.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Van Zandt?

Representative VAN ZANDT. I have no questions.

Representative HOLIFIELD. As I understand from your statement, Mr. Staats, you indicated that the Radiation Council is properly an advisory body, and the task of providing directions to the executive branch is vested in the President.

My question is, is the memorandum on radiation protection guid ance, approved by the President on May 13, 1960, binding on inde pendent agencies such as the ICC, CAB, and others not strictly in the executive branch?

Mr. STAATS. Yes, they are bound to the same degree that the other agencies are, as we understand it. The only caveat I would have, perhaps, would be whether or not the Interstate Commerce Commission's statutory powers are such that they would not feel that they were bound by any pronouncement of the executive branch.

I think you well know the tradition and the history of the Interstate Commerce Act, which might, in their view at least, put them in a different situation. This, however, I would have to explore a little further to be a hundred percent certain as to my statement.

Representative HOLIFIELD. There is a legal question as to whether an independent agency would be bound by an Executive order, is

there not?

Mr. STAATS. That is right, and it is an issue which has had a long history, and one which I do not believe has been a hundred percent resolved either way by the Congress or by the Executive.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Has the Budget Bureau considered the advisability of making the FRC an independent regulatory body that would actually have the function of regulation and the enforcement authority for those regulations?

Mr. STAATS. Yes; we did consider that as one of several alternatives at the time the Radiation Council was established.

I might say here that, along with Chairman McCone and Secretary Flemming and the various other agencies concerned, we explored a large number of alternatives before we came to the conclusion to recommend the establishment of the Federal Radiation Council. There was a great deal of staff work involved which I think explains a little bit the time that it took us from the time we announced this study until the time the Council was actually established. A great deal of intensive staff analysis was done in the Budget Bureau, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Public Health Service.

If there was felt to be any question in this area as to the status of these regulations, we would much prefer to see it resolved by vesting additional legislative authority with the President, rather than by giving it to a council made up of presidential advisers. We think that the fundamental point would be to keep this authority with the President.

However, we have checked with our legal people, and we do not believe that it is necessary to vest any additional legislative powers in the President. We think he has them inherently as the Chie Executive.