Flexibility and European Unification: The Logic of Differentiated IntegrationRowman & Littlefield, 2006 - 323 pages After the stagnation that beset the European Communities in the 1970s, European unification has made decisive advances between the mid-1980s and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004. At the same time, legal differentiation ("flexibility") has allowed initially reluctant member states to opt out of new obligations in a variety of important areas, including monetary integration, defense policy, and justice and home affairs. This book disentangles the important, fascinating, and complex relationship between flexibility and European unification. Alkuin Kölliker builds upon public goods theory to uncover the logic of differentiated European integration. The result, differentiated integration theory, explains why flexible integration among the most willing EU members eventually attracts reluctant countries in some cases, but not in others-as well as why it is sometimes not even used in the first place. Empirical case studies are drawn from all the main pillars of EU activities, taking into account instances of differentiation within and outside EU law, as well as of differentiated arrangements within and beyond EU borders. Flexibility and European Unification provides the first theory-based, comprehensive, and empirically sound account of European integration from the perspective of legal differentiation. |
Contents
Differentiation in the EU and Its Unsolved Puzzles | 13 |
11 Differentiation in the Context of the EU | 14 |
12 What Are the Effects of Differentiation? | 21 |
13 The Existing Literature and the Effects of Differentiation | 29 |
Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Differentiation | 43 |
21 Framework of Analysis | 44 |
22 Flexibility of Institutions | 46 |
23 Initial Willingness of Member States | 52 |
The Snake | 155 |
The ERM | 162 |
EMU | 167 |
64 Summary | 174 |
Social Environmental and Tax Policies | 179 |
The Maastricht Protocol | 180 |
Climate Protection | 186 |
The Feira Tax Package | 195 |
24 Character of the Issue Area | 54 |
25 Level of Integration | 69 |
Differentiated Integration Theory | 71 |
31 An Introductory Overview on the Theory | 72 |
32 Clarifying Basic Assumptions | 80 |
33 The Impact of the Flexibility of Institutions | 84 |
34 The Influence of Excludability | 88 |
35 The Influence of Rivalry in Consumption | 91 |
36 Ranking Goods According to Centripetal Effects | 97 |
37 Hypotheses Drawn from the Model | 101 |
38 Alternative Explanations | 105 |
Empirical Evidence from EU Policies | 109 |
41 Methodology and Case Selection | 110 |
42 Summary of the Empirical Case Studies | 118 |
43 Evaluation of the Hypotheses | 128 |
Trade Integration | 139 |
EEC Enlargement | 140 |
SEA Participation | 144 |
EEA Participation | 146 |
54 Summary | 149 |
Monetary Integration | 153 |
74 Summary | 204 |
Justice and Home Affairs | 209 |
The Schengen Agreement | 211 |
The Schengen Information System | 215 |
From Schengen to Dublin | 217 |
84 Summary | 220 |
Foreign Security and Defense Policies | 223 |
From the Elysee Treaty to EPC | 226 |
From the WEU to CFSP | 230 |
From the Petersberg Declaration to ESDP | 233 |
94 Summary | 238 |
Policy Implications of Differentiated Integration Theory | 243 |
101 Insights Concerning Enhanced Cooperation | 244 |
102 Implications for EU Actors Institutions and Policies | 250 |
103 Potential Applications beyond European Integration | 260 |
The Role of Flexibility in European Unification | 267 |
Appendix | 287 |
293 | |
315 | |
About the Author | |
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Common terms and phrases
actors Amsterdam Treaty applied Article borders centrifugal effects closer cooperation club common pool resource context core defense policies Denmark differentiated arrangements differentiated integration theory Dublin Convention EC Treaty economic Elysée Treaty empirical evidence enlargement establishment EU Treaty Euro Europe European Community European integration European Union eventual participation excludable network explain fixed exchange rate flexible arrangements flexible integration framework governments Hypothesis initially reluctant countries initially unwilling countries initially unwilling member institutions international common pool involve issue areas issue linkage justice and home level of integration Maastricht Treaty monetary union negative external effects Nice Treaty non-excludable non-members non-participants number of participants participation of initially policy areas political pool resource problems positive internal effects potential public goods theory referred regulatory competition respect rivalry in consumption Schengen Agreement Schengen Information System security policy single market snake specific subsection tax harmonization theoretically expected tion unity veto
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