Policy will enable the services to update and refine the existing policy based on lessons learned from the Operation Desert Storm call-up. The results thus far have been heartening; we have mustered the Total Force for Operation Desert Storm, and it has responded magnificently. The Army will continue to examine the Total Force Policy in order to benefit from Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm and to refine it for the rapidly evolving and uncertain international environment.

As the Army shapes the Total Force for the future, the size and composition of both the active Army and the Reserve Components will evolve to allow the Army to accomplish our strategic roles and to remain relevant to the international environment. Our current assessments indicate several trends that dictate adjustments to the Total Force. First, the reduced requirement to maintain large numbers of ready forces for rapid deployment to Europe to counter a massive, short-notice Soviet armored assault enables the Army to reduce the number of our armored divisions and the combat support and combat service support units that are dedicated to support these divisions. Second, the immediate deployment capabilities required by the unpredictability and uncertainty of the future international environment will require units that are prepared for deployment without delays for additional training. Hence, initial deployment capabilities must be provided by primarily Active Component units. Third, because of the Army's significantly smaller size, we will continue to rely extensively on the RC to reinforce extended contingency operations, to deal concurrently with a sec

ond major contingency, and to hedge against a resurgent and hostile Soviet Union or other large-scale threat to U.S. security. Fourth, the increasing time available to detect and counter a major Soviet reversal permits reliance on the capability to regenerate additional force over a longer period of time. This has permitted the Army to reduce the size of our Total Force and to begin to design provisions for expanding the force.

As discussed in Chapter II, the Army plans to build down to a smaller, capable Total Force over the next several years. These plans to reshape the force are based upon the need to provide the Nation with the sustained land combat capabilities that it will require to meet the challenges of the 21st century. We have planned to reduce the size of the force to the irreducible minimum the Nation will require in the international environment we envision for the future. To accomplish this in the current fiscal environment, both the AC and RC must be reduced. Maintaining larger forces than required will result in "hollow" structure units that are poorly trained, undermanned, and ill-equipped. We cannot afford this in the smaller force that we have planned for the future.

Active Component reductions began in FY90. No RC end strength reductions were planned for FY91 pending the completion of the Total Force Policy Study. The study has been completed and submitted to Congress. The Army intends to continue with RC end strength reductions in FY92 as a part of our plan to shape a smaller, capable, and quality Total Force.

It is also the Army's intent to seek innovative means to enhance the warfighting capabilities and readiness of the RC so that they can more effectively fulfill their wartime missions. The Army has recently been evaluating the cadre division concept as mandated by the FY91 Authorization Bill. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command is currently refining this concept so that it can be tested and fully evaluated in the near future.

The Army also seeks to establish command relationships that optimize the readiness of the Total Army and enhance the ability of the RC to contribute to the accomplishment of the Army's strategic roles. For example, on October 1, 1990, the Army implemented a plan to transfer control of the USAR budget process from the Commanding General of the U.S. Forces Command to the Chief of the Army Reserve. This action takes existing layering out of the budget process and places control of USAR funds under the Chief of the Army Reserve. Also on October 1, 1990, the Army established a provisional USAR Command that will be a fully operational Major Subordinate Command of Forces Command by the end of FY92. The Chief of the Army Reserve is serving as commander of this new organization. In this capacity, he will ultimately command all USAR units assigned to Forces Command, while continuing to serve as the principal Department of the Army staff adviser on the Army Reserves.

Shaping the Support
Structure

The Army recognizes that our general support forces (e.g., installation support activities) must be reshaped along with the general purpose forces (e.g., combat divisions) in order to make the best use of resources and to provide effective support to the Total Army. Activities, functions, and force structure of the general support forces must be modified or cut where appropriate to provide the most efficient overall Army force structure while maintaining readiness.

The Army is applying the same care and thoroughness in planning to restructure the general support forces that we have used in developing the designs for the general purpose forces. Project Vanguard was a special study group composed of functional experts drawn from the Army staff and major field commands to review the missions, functions, and organizational structure of the Army's general support forces and to reshape these forces to meet Army needs and resources in the future.

The primary purpose of Project Vanguard was to redesign the general support forces based on the planned reduction of the general purpose forces and projected future needs, and to introduce more efficient and effective

ways of doing business in the process. Its functional review of general support forces resulted in recommendations concerning alternative concepts, policies, and organizations to complement and sustain the smaller, more CONUS-based fighting force of the future.

All general support forces were subject to review: Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), staff; MACOMS; field operating agencies; and installations. Project Vanguard considered Active, Reserve Component, overseas, and CONUS units, as well as joint and defense agencies. Special attention was given to missions for which the Army has DOD oversight responsibility. Faced with rapid changes in the international security environment and increasing fiscal pressure, a number of MACOMS and staff agencies also initiated separate reorganization initiatives and efficiency reviews. Project Vanguard provided a common framework for rationalization of these initiatives within the Army's overall plans.

for reshaping our general support forces. The initiatives generated through the efforts of the Project Vanguard study group are being actively pursued by the Army.

Force Structure Adjustments, FY92/93

Although the FY92/93 budget continues to reduce the active force with reductions of 42,000 personnel per year to an end strength of 660,000 in FY92 and 618,000 in FY93, the actual end strength "ramp" will be adjusted

after the accomplishment of our national objectives in Operation Desert Storm. The majority of the force structure associated with that reduction will come from Europe, as the Army draws down to a 4-corps, 22-division force by the end of FY93. Reductions in Korea also will continue in concert with the President's report to Congress "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim -Looking Toward the 21st Century." Reserve Component end strength is programmed to decline to 694,000 in FY92, and 621,000 in FY93, and civilian end strength to 329,000 and 315,000 personnel in FY92 and FY93 respectively.

Training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units to fight and win in combat -- the Army's basic mission. The Army must be trained and ready in peacetime to deter war and, if required, to rapidly commit Army forces to combat to protect U.S. interests. As Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm have illustrated, our Nation's ability to deter attack and act decisively to contain or de-escalate a crisis depends on the ability to adapt quickly from peacetime levels of preparedness to war footing. This requires that all leaders in the Army attain and sustain high standards of combat readiness through tough, realistic, multiecheloned combined arms training. This section discusses Army programs designed to accomplish this as we restructure the Army.

Unit Training

Training of soldiers and leaders in schools or units serves one underlying purpose -- to enhance the ability of units to perform their mission. Unit readiness is the objective of all Army training. The complexities of modern warfare require frequent unit training under conditions that approach wartime realism. Ideally, such training includes the innovative use of available training simulations with deployment exercises and field maneuvers to fully integrate all unit functions.

Combat Training Centers (CTC)

The CTC program is central to the Army's strategy of maintaining a lethal and ready force capable of rapidly deploying and winning any ground conflict. The CTC program has made a greater contribution to improving and sustaining the professionalism and warfighting capability of the Total Army than any other single program. The CTCs encompass the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The centers provide advanced unit training and training in joint operations for the full range of AC and RC armored, light, and special operations units under realistic combat-like conditions. CTC training provides immediate feedback to commanders and provides lessons learned and data that contribute to improving the Army's warfighting capability. CTC lessons are applied continuously to the ongoing process of organizational and force structure design and materiel, training, and doctrinal development.

The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, provides realistic combat training under mid- to high-intensity conflict conditions. Scenarios concentrate on armored and integrated armored and light unit operations. The NTC will conduct 12 rotations in FY91 (two fewer than in FY90); however, 33 battalions will be trained (one more than in FY90) because of improved integration of armored and light unit training. Other improvements in NTC capabilities include better instrumentation, more brigade-level operations, and an expanded focus on contingency operations. The NTC also has recently proven invaluable as a training ground for ARNG armored forces preparing for possible deployment for Operation Desert Storm.

The Army's National Training Center provides intense unit training.

The Joint Readiness Training Center, currently operating at Little Rock Air Force Base and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, provides training focused on low- to midintensity contingency operations. Forces trained include airborne, air assault, light infantry, and other rapid-deployment units. SOF and armored operations are extensively integrated into training at the JRTC. There also is a strong Air Force commitment to the JRTC by both the Military Airlift Command and the Tactical Air Command. This commitment results in substantial joint training. In FY91, the JRTC will again conduct nine rotations.

The Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, provides CTC training to the forward-deployed forces of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Focused on mid- to high-intensity armored force scenarios, USAREUR maneuver battalion have been training at the CMTC once every 14 months. As USAREUR force structure is reduced, the training opportunities for the remaining units will be greater, and training time for each battalion may be increased.

The Battle Command Training Program operates from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It extends CTC training to division and corps commanders and their staffs. The two-part BCTP experience consists of an AirLand Battle Seminar followed several months later by a computer battle simulation command post exercise. Both phases can be conducted at the unit's home station, permitting more realistic training, with wider involvement of staffs in a tactical field environment, at lower cost.

Army and Joint Exercise Program

Army forces conduct military exercises to simulate wartime operations. Exercises conducted in a realistic battle-focused setting help train commanders, staffs, and units for combat and enhance force readiness. Senior commanders use military exercises to integrate units and

staff performing separate battlefield functions into combined arms forces. Exercises allow leaders, staffs, and units to practice operational procedures and to refine war plans. After-action reviews identify lessons to improve performance of units throughout the Army. The Army conducts unilateral exercises at all levels from Headquarters, Department of the Army, to corps level and below, while joint exercises are normally conducted as part of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Exercise Program. Ninety percent of all CJCS exercises are conducted overseas.

The primary objective of the CJCS Exercise Program is training to improve the CINC's warfighting capabilities. Exercises in the program are designed specifically to ensure U.S. forces are trained to accomplish those tasks that are essential to the execution of the CINC's war plans. The CJCS Exercise Program is the Army's primary joint training vehicle and provides Army forces the opportunity to train under the operational control of the warfighting CINC. Exercises in the program range in size from small no-notice interoperability exercises to worldwide command post exercises and large-scale overseas deployment exercises. Significant exercises in the program include:

-REFORGER is a CONUS-based deployment exercise to demonstrate rapid reinforcement of NATO and U.S. warfighting capabilities, improve NATO interoperability, and exercise general defense plans. Future REFORGER exercises will be scaled down and make more use of computer simulation. This will enable us to train more staffs those that benefit most from large exercises and to decrease the number of troops and tactical vehicles in the field. This is another example of more realistic training at reduced cost.

-Team Spirit is a large-scale field training exercise in Korea involving forces from both the United States and the Republic of Korea. The exercise is designed to increase combat readiness of Republic of Korea and U.S. forces through training in combined and joint operations, to include strategic and tactical movement, reception, employment, and redeployment of CONUS-based forces. Principal participation includes I Corps from Fort Lewis, Washington; the 25th Infantry Division (Light) in Hawaii; and a large number of Reserve Component combat service support units from throughout the United States.

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- Bright Star is a large-scale overseas deployment exercise conducted every other year in Egypt and several Middle Eastern countries. More than 6,000 Army soldiers participated in Bright Star 90. The exercise emphasizes strategic mobility and rapid deployment of combat-ready forces. Lessons learned from past Bright Star exercises were instrumental in the success of the Desert Storm deployment.