Page images
PDF
EPUB

erations in Low Intensity Conflict (developed with the Air Force), and Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, complement one another and describe possible military roles. Army operations under LIC include support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations, such as shows of force, noncombatant evacuation operations, security assistance, and support to counternarcotics efforts. LIC is the security challenge most likely to confront the Army in the 1990s.

Special Operations

The Army provides the preponderance of special operation forces (SOF) to the CINCs for execution of different contingencies around the world. Special operations forces may be required to execute sensitive missions authorized by the National Command Authorities, but SOF are also integral to the operations of Army and joint forces in all situations. These include a role in nation assistance and support for U.S. country teams worldwide.

Special operations doctrine provides guidance for the five elements that comprise Army SOF: Special Forces, Rangers, special operations aviation, psychological operations, and civil affairs. These forces are specifically organized, trained, equipped, and regionally oriented to provide a versatile military capability to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas worldwide.

SOF doctrine covers the planning, conduct, and support of special operations in all operational environments -- peacetime competition, conflict, and war. The doctrine acknowledges that Army SOF missions normally include joint or interagency activities and that many missions are conducted as combined activities with allied or friendly forces. Doctrinally, Army SOF missions include unconventional warfare, direct action, strategic reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and other activities as specified by the National Command Authorities.

Future Doctrine

Systematic and evolutionary update of current doctrine is necessary to prepare the Army for the battlefield of tomorrow. AirLand Battle will undergo revision in the near future. Envisioned changes will include a more detailed discussion of maneuver; a closer analysis of military operations in peacetime competition, conflict,

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][graphic]
[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][graphic]

We will continue to refine the doctrine for the employment of Army forces as we reshape the Army for the future.

[merged small][graphic]

The Army's forces are being reshaped for the changing security environment: Armored forces are essential in modern maneuver warfare.

Overview

The Army's force structure consists of armored, light, and special operations units; their supporting elements; and sustaining base activities. These units are organized, equipped, and trained to fulfill the Army's strategic roles in support of national security strategy. Choices about the size and composition of the Total Army are based upon assessments of current and potential threats to the Nation and of the capabilities required to meet them. These assessments are tempered by considerations of affordability and risk. The Army's challenge is to maintain the appropriate mix of these forces as we reshape the Total Force for the future.

In projecting future force reductions, the Army has focused on maintaining sufficient forces in the Active Component to satisfy crisis response and most forward presence requirements, and on a structure for CONUSbased reinforcing forces that relies primarily on the Reserve Components (Chapter I). Although these plans undoubtedly will be adjusted based on the duration and impact of Operation Desert Storm, current plans call for the Army to draw down to a 4-corps, 22-division force by 1993 and ultimately to a 4-corps, 20-division force by the mid-1990s. We strongly believe that this is the minimum force required for the Army to meet the Nation's future needs for a sustained land combat capability.

The future Army will be largely CONUS-based. Forward presence will be maintained by forward deployments at levels sufficient to maintain credible deterrence and to demonstrate unambiguous commitment and

resolve to allies and friends worldwide, and supplemented by the periodic deployment of forces from the United States or from forward locations. The Army in CONUS will likely consist of a contingency force of five active divisions rapidly tailorable for crisis response and other immediate requirements worldwide; an early reinforcing force of three active divisions rounded out by National Guard brigades; a follow-on reinforcing force of six National Guard divisions; two cadre divisions; and the requisite general support forces. When reductions to this level are completed, the Nation will be at the limits of acceptable risk with regard to its ground forces, even with the continued nonconfrontational posture of the Soviet Union.

Armored Forces

Armored forces are essential in modern maneuver warfare against a variety of well-armed potential foes. Consisting of armored and mechanized infantry divisions equipped with Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Apache attack helicopters, and advanced field artillery systems, such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System, the Army's armored forces possess the firepower and lethality necessary to dominate combat on mid- and high-intensity battlefields, and are important to complement light forces on lower-intensity battlefields. Five of the Army's armored and mechanized infantry divisions and two armored cavalry regiments are currently providing the bulk of the coalition's ground combat power for Operation Desert Storm.

Current assessments indicate both the opportunity to reduce the number of armored forces available for immediate employment and reinforcement of NATO and

the need to increase the armored capabilities of Army contingency forces. Our plans for reshaping the Army involve reducing our forward-deployed armored forces in Europe as quickly as prudently possible and reconfiguring the Army based in CONUS to have two complete armored divisions immediately available for deployment in contingencies worldwide.

The Army currently has six armored and nine mechanized infantry divisions. Eleven of these divisions are in the Active Component, five of which are currently rounded out with Reserve Component combat brigades. Four of these divisions are in the Army National Guard.

Light Forces

Army light forces consist of light infantry divisions, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), which is in the process of converting to a separate motorized brigade. These forces are designed to provide the Nation an extremely versatile strategic forceprojection and forcible-entry capability to deploy quickly to trouble spots worldwide. This capability was clearly demonstrated in Operation Just Cause and again during Operation Desert Storm, when tailored packages of airborne and special operations forces rapidly deployed to the Arabian Peninsula.

When appropriate, light forces are integrated with armored forces to provide the mix of combat power to meet the requirements of a given contingency. The Army continues to implement the Heavy-Light Forces Integration Improvement Plan that will maximize the ability of our light and armored forces to operate together. Integrated training at our training centers and the education of leaders in our school system ensure that these forces can work in concert.

Currently, there are four light infantry divisions in the AC, two of which have roundout brigades, and one

Light forces have unique capabilities in peace and war.

division in the Army National Guard. The ARNG also has five standard infantry divisions.

Special Operations Forces (SOF)

Army SOF provide the theater commanders a broad range of military options. They consist of Special Forces, Ranger, special operations aircraft, psychological operations, and civil affairs units and make up some 70 percent of the Nation's SOF personnel.

Army Special Forces units are designed to train and assist foreign military and paramilitary forces worldwide in internal defense, unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance. As these forces will play an increased role in promoting regional stability, the Army recently has activated another Special Forces group headquarters and one battalion, which will be oriented towards African countries. The remaining two battalions in this group will be activated in FY92 and FY93, bringing the number of Special Forces groups to nine -- five in the Active Component, two in the USAR, and two in the ARNG.

Army Rangers are unique light infantry units organized and trained to deploy rapidly to any region of the world to conduct special operations against critical military objectives. In conjunction with the Navy and the Air Force, Rangers can provide a powerful military capability and augment the forcible-entry capability of the 82nd Airborne Division. The 75th Ranger Regiment consists of a regimental headquarters and three Ranger battalions.

With its growth in personnel and aircraft, Army special operations aviation (SOA) has significantly increased its capability for all types of conflict. Specially trained crews and modified aircraft provide the unique capability to support SOF missions at night and during adverse weather. These SOA assets are organized into one SOA regiment consisting of four SOA battalions (three AC and one RC), two SOA separate companies, and one forward-deployed SOA detachment. SOA's specifically configured aircraft have proven their effectiveness in recent operations ranging from missions off U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf to combat in Panama and in Operation Desert Storm.

[graphic]

U.S. Army psychological operations (PSYOP) forces provide the theater commander with a means to shorten conflict, reduce casualties on both sides, and achieve military objectives with minimum force. Through PSYOP, the commander has the ability to communicate U.S. policy to denied areas and to create appropriate perceptions to facilitate U.S. and allied operational success. PSYOP units are trained and equipped to provide influence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Well-designed and executed PSYOP campaigns

Special operations forces perform a broad range of missions.

can also provide significant support to counternarcotics operations, low-intensity conflict, and contingencies short of war. The Army maintains three PSYOP groups composed of six battalions and 27 companies in the U.S. Army Reserve and one group composed of four battalions and six companies in the active Army.

Civil affairs (CA) units provide the important interface between deployed military forces and the civilian government and population. All CA units, with the exception of two Marine Corps Reserve units, are maintained in the Army's force structure. There are currently 36 USAR CA units stationed in 22 states and one active CA unit stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The Army recently activated the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) as the sixteenth Army major command (MACOM) and the Army Component headquarters of U.S. Special Operations Command. All reserve SOF came under the control of USASOC in October 1990. The training, operations, and budget activities of RC SOF forces will now be aligned with those of the Active Component. Additionally, all special forces units will come under the control of the 1st Special Operations Command, an Active Component command, and all civil affairs and psychological operations units will come under the control of the 1st Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, a reserve command. This will functionally align like units for training and mission guidance.

FY90 Force Structure Actions

FY90 was the first year of the Army's planned force structure reductions. In addition to the previously inactivated brigades from the 9th and 4th Infantry Divisions, the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division, and the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), were inactivated last year. Additionally, the 194th Separate Armored Brigade was reorganized into an armored battalion task force, two

[merged small][graphic][merged small]

Our recent experience has shown that the impact of inactivating units goes well beyond the particular unit being inactivated. The inactivation process places Armywide demands on our logistical support structure and personnel management activities. Inactivations must be carefully phased to ensure that we properly manage equipment refurbishment and transfer, reassignment and relocation of personnel, revitalization and transfer of facilities and grounds, and transfer of missions and responsibilities.

The effectiveness with which the Army can carry out programmed force reductions is directly related to the steepness of our force reduction "ramp" -- how far and how fast the Army must reduce the force. Our original plan called for reducing the Army by 35,000 soldiers per year over a 4-year period. Reducing at this "ramp" would enable the Army to maintain a qualitative process for equitably selecting and processing officers and soldiers from the service without resorting to a reduction-in-force for enlisted soldiers; to manage accessions to meet future manning requirements; to manage efficiently personnel assignments to ensure proper job and skill match; and to permit the concurrent reduction of force structure and personnel so essential to the proper manning of the force. While we have currently suspended our plans for reducing the force until the completion of Operation Desert Storm, the steeper ramp envisioned in the current program will force the Army above the 35,000 soldiers per year threshold to around 42,000 soldiers per year. The accompanying increase in turbulence, compounded by the requirements to reverse "stop loss" provisions for the active force and to release over 150,000 reservists from active duty, will have a significant negative impact on Army-wide readiness.

Shaping the Total Force

Operation Desert Storm has clearly demonstrated that the Army Reserve Components are an integral part of the Total Force. Over 150,000 Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve soldiers are currently contributing to the accomplishment of our national objectives in the Persian Gulf. This opportunity to exercise the Total Force

« PreviousContinue »