demonstrate unambiguous commitment and resolve to allies and friends worldwide. As discussed in Chapter I, additional forward presence will be maintained through the periodic deployment of forces from the United States or from forward locations. The Army in CONUS will likely consist of five active divisions tailorable for crisis response and other immediate requirements worldwide; an early reinforcing force of three active divisions rounded out by Army National Guard brigades; a follow-on reinforcing force of six Army National Guard divisions; two cadre divisions; and the requisite general support forces. When these reductions are completed, the Nation will be at the limits of acceptable risk with regard to its ground forces, even with the continued nonconfrontational posture of the Soviet Union. The Army of 1997 will be a perilously small ground force for a nation with the United States' worldwide responsibilities. As we continue to shape the force for the future, we must keep this in mind. It will be essential to minimize the risks inherent in a smaller force by limiting the turbulence created by rapid force reductions and by maintaining the quality and the readiness of the force. The smaller Army of tomorrow must clearly be a better Army in every respect. The FY92/93 budget represents the continuation of the Army's efforts to reshape the force. As submitted, it is based on the Army's attaining designated FY91 end strength reductions by the end of the fiscal year. It seems clear, however, that these plans must be adjusted after U.S. and coalition objectives in Operation Desert Storm have been achieved. While the outcome of Operation Desert Storm is not in question, its duration and impact on the Army are. Hence, while the Army remains committed to the prudent continuation of our plans for reshaping the force, we will complete the refinement of our plans for the future after the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm. The Imperatives The requirement to maintain a full range of capabilities as we reshape the Army necessitates difficult decisions and trade-offs in projecting resource allocations to support the traditional fiscal categories of readiness, sustainment, modernization, and force structure. The Army has been guided in our decisions by adherence to six fundamental imperatives that have shaped the development of today's Army, that have been unambiguously validated during Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, and that will continue to guide Army resource decisions in the future. The first of these imperatives, and the overarching requirement for the Army of today and tomorrow, is the quality of the force. Quality is the characteristic that enables the Army to fulfill worldwide strategic roles in spite of a relatively small structure. A quality force demands an environment in which every soldier, civilian, and family can reach the highest levels of personal and professional growth. Quality requires excellence in facilities and services, in training and equipment, and in leadership at all levels. The quality of the force, of course, depends upon quality soldiers. It has been essential in many of our recent successes, ranging from protecting shipping in the Persian Gulf to assisting in the recovery from natural disasters, and from deploying rapidly for Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm to interdicting traffic in illicit drugs. These experiences have strengthened the conviction that recruiting and retaining talented men and women -- the best the Nation has to offer -- must continue to be the top priority in the Army of the future. The rise in the quality of the Army's soldiers has been accompanied by a renaissance in our thinking about war. The second imperative focuses on sustaining the momentum in this area by maintaining a forward-looking warfighting doctrine. AirLand Battle, the Army's contemporary doctrine, provides the basic rationale for developing leaders, designing forces, determining materiel needs, and conducting training. This doctrine recognizes the need to integrate the capabilities of U.S. Army units with those of the other services and of our allies to achieve maximum combat power and effectiveness. It establishes the foundation for the Army's disciplined evolution to the future. Projecting ahead, the Army is developing the AirLand Battle-Future concept to update our warfighting doctrine for the early 21st century. As the doctrine and the security environment have evolved, so too has the composition of Army forces. That evolution will continue. Thus, the third imperative is to maintain the appropriate mix of armored, light, and special operations forces in the Active and Reserve Components. While the present force structure does not meet the current needs of all U.S. commands worldwide, the Army can meet the highest-priority U.S. strategic requirements. As the Army shapes the forces needed for the future, we will take into account the increased U.S. need to rapidly project a tailored, sustained land combat capability worldwide. In the conduct of tough, realistic training -- the fourth imperative -- the U.S. Army has set a standard for armies everywhere. The investment the Army has made in training over the past decade has produced the readiness for war that is the basis for credible deterrence and victory on the battlefield. The exercises conducted at the Combat Training Centers in California, Germany, and Arkansas are the keystone of the Army's training program to ensure our soldiers, units, and leaders are trained and ready for immediate commitment worldwide in support of our national objectives. Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm stand as evidence of the Army's training achievements. Tough, meaningful, and fulfilling training is also a key element in encouraging the very best soldiers to stay in the ranks. Demanding training, accomplished to high standards, is one of the best investments today's Army can make in the Army of tomorrow. Another dramatic improvement over the past decade has been modernization, particularly in the combat equipment of Army forces. The fifth imperative is continuous modernization. The Army modernizes for one reason -- to enhance our warfighting capability. This can readily be seen in Operation Desert Storm, where the value of technological advantages in warfare is being demonstrated daily. The Abrams tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Apache helicopter, and the Patriot air defense missile are examples of weapon systems fielded in the 1980s that are currently proving their worth in the crucible of combat. They, and other systems like them, are the products of a continuous process that reflects the Army's doctrine, technological advantages, and overarching commitment to providing our soldiers the best equipment possible. Because resources have always been limited, Army modernization plans ensure that units likely to be the first to fight -- including selected Army Reserve and Army National Guard units are modernized first. To develop needed future capabilities on time, the Army will continue to emphasize aggressive research and development in the key areas of operational concepts, unit designs, materiel, and training innovations. - In the final analysis, the capabilities of the Army depend not only on the quality of our soldiers, but also on the competence of our leaders our officers, noncommissioned officers and civilians. Thus, the sixth imperative is to continue development of Army leaders. There have been many recent initiatives in this area, to include enhancements in formal education and training, successive operational experiences, continuous self-development opportunities, and enhancements to Reserve Component and civilian leader development programs. Leader development for soldiers and civilians is the most important and lasting contribution to shaping the Army of the future. Past adherence to these imperatives has positioned today's trained and ready Army to address the challenges of Operation Desert Storm and the challenges of tomorrow. The Army of the 1990s and beyond will continue to be an Army that is shaped by reliance on these proven imperatives. The Army of the Future Last year, in shaping an Army to support the requirements of the national military strategy, we concluded that the Army of the mid-1990s must be a smaller, capable force -- forward deployed in sufficient strength to provide a credible deterrent and to demonstrate unambiguous U.S. commitment and resolve to our allies, and clearly able to execute worldwide power projection operations. We also determined that success in the evolving international environment would require an Army with three fundamental qualities: tomorrow's Army must be versatile, deployable, and lethal. These characteristics continue to form the basis of our efforts to reshape the Army. A Versatile Army The Army must be able to counter a wide array of potential and unpredictable threats with a relatively small force. The Nation cannot afford to maintain forces uniquely specialized for every conceivable geographical area and type of combat. Therefore, a highly capable, versatile Army able to meet U.S. strategic requirements for rapid power projection and forward presence worldwide will be the most effective solution to worldwide requirements for ground forces. The ability to tailor force packages for specific missions and to project the necessary initial elements of these forces without delays for retraining or mobilization will be critical. Versatility will require the right proportions of Active and Reserve Components, the correct mix of forces (armored, light, and special operations), adequate sustainment stocks, and, above all, high quality in all aspects of the force. In view of the rapidly changing international environment, the precise time, location, and nature of the threat will always be uncertain. Versatility also demands intensive training and frequent exercises. For the Army of the future, training programs and worldwide deployment exercises will have to demonstrate the ability to tailor force elements, to deploy them within anticipated contingency warning times, and to employ and sustain them as necessary to assure success. Therefore, the Army plans to reconfigure the active forces available for crisis response and other immediate requirements worldwide. These plans envision a contingency force that can call on two fully structured The Army must be versatile... Active Component armored divisions and airborne, air assault, and light divisions, as well as increased Active Component combat support and combat service support. This configuration will enhance the Army's versatility by increasing our ability to rapidly tailor lethal force packages. Versatility also will be essential in enabling the Army to meet other challenges. The Army will continue to support national efforts to combat drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. Assisting civil authorities in disaster relief and during other unforeseen emergencies will similarly demand adaptive and responsive Army civilians, soldiers, units, and leaders. The same will be true of the Army elements that will carry out security assistance efforts in the future. The focus in this area will be on programs that yield a multiplier effect in host nation armies. Leader development initiatives, training enhancements, joint exercises, and exchange programs -more than equipment transfers -- frequently shape how friendly armies address their needs and help defend mutual interests. Such activities will be given additional emphasis. Forward-deployed ground forces will continue to be essential too, although their specific numbers will change to reflect contemporary circumstances. The locations of Army bases abroad are likely to be limited to those areas where deterrence and regional stability cannot otherwise be assured. The decrease in the number of forward-deployed forces and bases will require an increase in periodic deployments from the Unites States to maintain U.S. forward presence. In the future, the United States also will have to maintain an unquestionable ability to conduct an opposed ...deployable... COMMAN entry in defense of vital interests anywhere. In many contingencies, a forcible entry will only be possible, or will best be achieved, by simultaneous airborne assault on a number of objectives. Army airborne and ranger forces are uniquely capable of performing this function. They will remain a key element in the Army of the future. Even the most deployable and combat-ready land force cannot be employed without adequate airlift and sealift. The United States cannot afford to risk the effectiveness and credibility of its overall defense strategy by failing to develop and field adequate worldwide lift assets. Airlift and sealift currently available have proven adequate in deploying forces for Operation Desert Storm. They were, however, severely taxed in the early phases of the operation. U.S. worldwide lift capabilities must be reviewed in the immediate years ahead. A smaller, predominately CONUS-based Army will be even more reliant on worldwide lift capabilities for rapid movement to trouble spots in sufficient strength and with adequate sustainment to deter threats or to quickly terminate conflicts. Of particular importance will be the further development of sufficient fast sealift capacity to support rapid power projection requirements. Finally, the Army will continue to evaluate our requirements for pre-positioned equipment and supplies and to develop our structure, systems, and training programs to enhance our deployability. A Lethal Army Lethality is the assured capability to defeat an opponent, winning as quickly as possible to preserve the Army's most valued asset -- the lives of soldiers. Assuring the lethality of Army forces will demand a disciplined, continuous modernization effort. This will mean maintaining the capability to swiftly counter the heavy armored forces of potential adversaries after deploying to austere environments while at the same time fielding forces that can defeat less substantial threats around the world. In the 1990s and beyond, as in the present, concepts and doctrine must guide the Army's efforts to field combat-ready forces. For the near term, AirLand Battle doctrine, as discussed in Chapter IV, provides this foundation. The Army also will continue to participate in the development of joint and combined doctrine and warfighting concepts. Based on this doctrine, Army modernization will capitalize on U.S. advantages and strengths -- particularly the qualities of our soldiers, leaders, and technology -- and exploit vulnerabilities and weaknesses in potential adversaries. Future budgets will be constrained, so the Army must assign appropriate priorities and levels of effort to all aspects of modernization if we are to field a competitive force in the future. The Army believes we can make the best use of our resources by investing in our technology base in order to identify promising new technologies while avoiding mortgaging our future for useful but noncritical near-term capabilities. The Army will therefore forgo some near-term modernization while continuing with essential long-term modernization efforts. The greatest challenge in this area lies in selecting those key technologies that will provide the greatest increase in future warfighting capability for each dollar spent. In sum, high-technology research and development is, and will remain, a central feature of the Army's modernization strategy. The Army of the 1990s and beyond will reflect significant increases in battlefield effectiveness as a result of the application of advanced technologies. The lethality of the Army of the future will be determined, above all else, by the actual combat readiness of the force. Training will continue to be the cornerstone of Army readiness. Combat Training Centers will remain the key to developing the maximum lethality of Army units. These centers not only hone combat skills, they also enable us to apply lessons such as those to be derived from Operation Desert Storm, to assess the validity of the Army's combat doctrine, and to develop officer and noncommissioned officer leaders. The Army will continue to provide tough, realistic training to the highest standards so that soldiers, units, and leaders have the best possible chance of quickly accomplishing their missions and minimizing casualties should they be committed to combat. An Expansible Army A smaller Army must also be expansible to hedge against future uncertainties. The dynamics of the international situation are such that current plans to reduce the size of the Army are not without substantial risk. Some of this risk can be reduced by maintaining quality and readiness in the Total Force and some by retaining the capability to rapidly expand the force. The force generation model discussed in Chapter I is the cornerstone of an expansible Army. It is the means by which the Army structures the force to meet the requirements of the national military strategy. As we have seen in Operation Desert Storm, smaller U.S. ground forces may often be outnumbered by the ground forces of their opponents. Given the planned size of the future Army and the uncertainties of the international environment, the United States must maintain the capability to regenerate forces to reinforce extended contingency operations, to deal concurrently with a second major contingency, or to confront a resurgent Soviet Union or other unexpected large-scale threats to U.S. security. The Army will therefore continue to rely extensively on the Reserve Components for combat support and combat service support augmentation and to provide reinforcing combat forces. Their timely activation for crises beyond small-scale contingencies will be essential to the successful attainment of U.S. objectives. The ability to successfully expand Army forces rests on detailed mobilization planning, realistic call-up authority and planning assumptions, periodic testing of the mobilization apparatus, and the foresight and discipline to adequately resource programs and units required on mobilization. The Army must retain the capability to expand the force at any time throughout the transition to a smaller force and in the future. This vision of the future Army and the unambiguous adherence to the six imperatives have guided the Army through the preparation of the FY92/93 budget and mid-term programs. The FY92/93 budget reflects the continuation of our transition from a Cold War posture primarily oriented on the Soviet threat to a versatile posture for the 1990s and beyond with a more diverse threat orientation. Operation Desert Storm, while validating the Army's characteristics and imperatives, will undoubtedly have a significant impact on how and when the Army continues with the build-down of the force begun last year. |